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I-

The scholarly tradition in urban policy analysis holds that a
variety of economic, social and political background factors influence
the nature and amount of output by the policymaking system.

Here a

number of these factors such as elections and parties, structure of
the national economy and age and sex composition of the population are
examined to determine their effect on public housing and local government revenue policy in two Central American urban centers.

2

San Jose, Costa Rica and San Salvador, El Salvador were chosen
for the study because they are in the same size range, both a.re capital
(and primate) cities and both have been growing rapidly in recent years.
Moreover, the cities exist in radically different sociopolitical milieux.

With such characteristics as size and primacy held constant, it

was felt that variations in policy output could be linked to and at
least partially explained by the political, social and economic differences.
For a variety of systemic and historical reasons, urban public
housing is provided in both countries by autonomous agencies of the
national governments.

Their operational policies and programs are com-

pared.
Two major activities in the field of municipal revenue are traced
through the policymaking process from their genesis:

a successful ef-

fort to install parking meters in San Jose, and an unsuccessful attempt
at overall tax reform in San Salvador.
In neither policy area, public housing nor municipal revenue, was
the original hypothesis sustained.

No important differences in policy

output between San Jose and San Salvador could be identified.

Conse-

quently, there were no variations to be explained by the diversity in
social, economic and political background factors.
Nonetheless, these factors are considered in detail, along with
the nature of the policymaking process in the two cities.

Finally,

some suggestions are offered as to why San Jose and San Salvador exhibit these similarities in policy product in spite of their many
social, political and economic dissimilarities.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In a recent article Charles O. Jones pointed out that a review
of the literature on state and local policy analysis indicates "that
lots of things are related to lots of things, other things being
I

equal."

The 'things' referred to are generally, on the one hand,

economic, political, and sociarJoackground factors, and on the other,
some policy outputs.

It is the intent of this study to examine and

compare the policy consequences of these factors in two Central American urban centers, San Jose, Costa Rica and San Salvador, EI Salvador.
The appropriate scholarly literature on these locations is reviewed in
Chapter II.
The policymaking process, with its attendant structure, both
serves as nexus in the transformation of these background factors into
policy outputs and is itself a variable.
this process abound.

Models for the analysis of

Our model of choice is presented in Chapter III,

along with its genesis in our particular needs and the policy analysis
tradition.

Here, too, will be found the rationale for our taking a

comparative approach to the analysis of urban public policy.
To try and examine the entire range of policy possibilities for
these two municipalities would be to enmesh ourselves inextricably in
a thicket of minutiae; the forest of significant relationships would
be hidden by the trees of trivia.

Consequently, we limit our study to

2

two substantive areas, revenue raising and the provision of public
housing.

Reasons for our choice of these fields and some of the gen-

eral principles thereof will be presented in Chapter IV.
Various political, economic, and social factors for the two polities will be compared in Chapter V.

Chapter VI will consider the pol~

icy process itself, both generally in San Jose and San Salvador and
with particular examples from the revenue and housing

fi~id5.

In Chap-

ter VII the results of this process will be examined, and Chapter VIII
wi 11 pres ent what we have concluded from all this.

Th~;'

remainder of

this first chapter is devoted to a brief introduction to San Jos~ and
San Salvador and their national milieux, and to a formal statement of
our basic hypotheses.
El Salvador is the smallest country on the American mainland.
Occupying 8,259 square miles, it is about the size of Massachusetts.
(Were the country square, it would be 91 miles on a side.)

It lies be-

tween 13°08' and 14°24' North latitude and 87°39' and 90°08' West longitude.

Bounded on the west by Guatemala, the south by the Pacific

Ocean, the north and northeast by Honduras and the southeast by the
Gulf of Fonseca, it is the only country north of Ecuador lacking an
Atlantic (or Caribbean) coast.

(See map, Figure 1, p. 3.)

El Salvador is not only the smallest country in Central kmerica,
it is also the most densely populated, with a population of 3,549,260
2

counted in the 1971 census,

estimated at 4,180,000 in 1976 and pro3

jected at 5,000,000 by 1981.

In 1971, some 560,500 of these people

4

lived in San Salvador.

Not only is the country densely populated,

its rate of natural increase, 3.9

per cent annually, is the highest
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in the world.
Gonzalo de Alvarado
coatitan Valley in 1525.

founde~

Cuzcateclos Indians, annoyed by this Spanish

effrontery, burned it in 1526.

Rebuilt, the city served as capital of

colony, federation and republic.
an earthquake in 1854.
remain.

the city of San Salvador in the Zol-

It was destroyed a.gain, totally, by

Consequently, few traces of the colonial era

During the late 19th and the 20th centuries San Salvador has

been reconstructed.
It is simplistic but not inaccurate to const!uct a stereotypical
model of El Salvador as it exists today.

It will contain a population

about one-third literate and overwhelmingly mestizo but with a wealthy
cap of whites.

It will include a system of concentrated land owner-

ship with agricultural emphases on two major export crops, cotton and
coffee.

Moreover it will incorporate a recent political history of

minimum government involvement in the society, a chronicle of government as provider of control and regulation, not of services.
The policymaking environment will be dominated by a patronageridden bureaucracy, national single-party rule, and the dominance of
the militaTY in this single party.

Political power will be central-

ized, the national government barely acknowledging the existence of
local government.

In fact, we find the government of the capital city

in complete, bitter, partisan, ideological and pragmatic conflict with
the national government.

This animus has existed openly for at least

ten years; it shows no signs of abating.
Costa Rica at 19,575 square miles is the second smallest nation
in Central America, about the same size as West Virginia.

(If square,

5

it would be about 140 miles on a side.)

Lying between 08°02' and 11°13'

North latitude and 82°34' and 85°58' West longitude, it is bounded on
the north by Nicaragua, the northeast by the Caribbean Sea, the east by
Panama and the west and southwest by the Pacific Ocean.

(See map, Fig-

ure 2, p. 6.)
Not only is Costa Rica larger than El Salvador, it is less densely
populated.

The 1973 census found 1,840,730 inhabitants of whom some

419,000 lived in urban San Jose.

National population is projected to

reach 3.,682,000 in the year 2000.

In the early 1960s Costa Rica had

an annual rate of population increase of 3.8 per cent; in recent years
6

the figure has dropped below 2.0 per cent.
Costa Rica, despite its name meaning rich coast, was a great disappointment to the Spanish conquistadores.

No mineral wealth was to

be found and the Indians proved truculent and unsuited to indentured
service in hacienda operations.
it was not founded until 1737.

San Jose is a relatively young city;
Consequently it is the least Spanish

in appearance of any Central American capital.
San Jose was not a colonial capital.

Unlike San Salvador,

Cartago was the original capital

of both colony and nation, losing its status to San Jose in 1823 following a factional dispute.
As we did for El Salvador, we can construct a simple but representative model of Costa Rica today.

In it we will include a history

of gradual expansion of public services such as education, insurance,
social security and government guaranteed mortgages.

To this we will

add a highly literate (c. 80%) and, alone in Central America, a predominantly white population.

(Little race mixing has occurred in Costa
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Rica.

Until recently the black population was restricted to the Car-

ibbean littoral; the Indians are for the most part on isolated reservations, effectively outside the national life.)

The ownership of

land we expect to be fairly evenly distributed by Latin American standards, with the economy based on foreign sales of coffee and bananas.
Developing the model further, we will combine a strong tradition
of administrative decentralization, a stable pattern of electoral competition, a disbanded military and the presence of many active and potent professional and economic associations.

To complete the model,

we incorporate a central government that, at least rhetorically, embraces local government as a partner in national development.

The re-

suIt, then, is a model of polity and a policymaking process that is
7

"very open, stable, competitive and often indecisive."
We have, therefore, two stereotypical models representing the
traditional extremes in Latin American policymaking systems.

The com-

parative importance lies in determining whether and to what extent
quality and quantity of policy responses are determined, or at least
influenced, by these apparently antipodal sociopolitical cultures.
The two cities chosen, San Jose and San Salvador, were selected
because they are in the same size range and because both are not only
capitals but also primate cities.
problems and prospects.

As a result they face many similar

At the same time, the two cities differ sig-

nificantly with respect to political milieux and population growth.
An

additional factor in their choice is proximity which enabled both

localities to be visited more than once in the course of a single
field investigation.

8

It was anticipated that the results of this comparative study
would enable us to indicate the differing effects of political, social
and economic factors on policymaking in the two cities.

Our assumption

was that the characteristics of each city would affect the range of
policy alternatives considered, the nature of the policy process, and
finally the policies selected.
The following two areas were chosen as the foci of the research;
revenue, i.e., policies designed to raise revenue, from whatever source,
to support other public policies, and the public provision of housing.
These problem areas were chosen because historically they have been
prominent political issues in Latin American urban centers.

With rapid

urban growth, increased demands have been placed on all levels of government to supply urban services of all kinds, including housing.
These demands have resulted in::he necessity of increasing revenue in
order to finance this expansion.

Within each of these issue areas,

municipal governments have a constrained set of alternatives open to
them.
One question that has been raised and deserves an answer is, "Why,
in nations as small as Costa Rica and EI Salvador, do you not ignore
the cities and concentrate on the countries?"

Although the Central

American municipality is weak, constitutionally and politically, when
compared to its counterpart in Anglo America or Western Europe, it is
far from unimportant.

Ma.ny of the services of immediate concern to

the inhabitants aTe provided by or under the control of the municipality, alone or in concert with other agencies.
Much of the scant attention paid Central America by North Amer-

9

icans, including scholars, has been directed to the series of unstable
national governments that have characterized some Central American nations.

It is usual to attribute at least part of this instability to

the 'revolution of rising

expect~tions.

1

Within these nations: these

rising expectations have generally involved not national policies of
global concern but matters of local service delivery, i.e., rising bus
fares, deteriorating streets, inadequate fire protection.
Urban politics thus lie at the heart of national politics.

Latin

American political systems, to whatever extent control and administration are centralized, are composed of local and regional systems.

At

the head of this is the political network of the capital city, a political entity in its own right.

A capital city, particularly when it

is, as San Salvador and San Jose are, also a primate city, is expected
to be growing faster than the country as a whole and to possess a disproportionate share of the nation's wealth, education, technical skill
and culture.

Much of the nation's public revenue is also generated

here although, as will be demonstrated later, not as high a percentage
as would be the case if taxation systems were reformed and modernized.
The city will also contain most of the country's drunks, prostitutes,
and political and administrative talent.

While the majority of the

political elite of the metropolis will be dealing with issues of national concern and actually working in national government institutions,
it will be doing so within the political milieux of the capital city.
In short, a great deal of what is characterized as national politics is
based in and concerned with interests and problems of the capital city.
Some of the research considerations that led to the choice of

10

Central American cities, and these two cities in particular, have been
indicated above.

Three others might be mentioned here.

One is that

neither San Jos~ nor San Salvador is a federal district as are, for
example, Managua and Tegucigalpa.

Thus both are involved in local pol-

itics and are not simply wards of the central government.

Another is

the fact that in Costa Rica the same broad range of political parties
is found in both the council of the capital city and the national legislature whereas in El Salvador the party in opposition nationally controIs the government of the capital city.

Moreover, there is the

writer's personal idiosyncratic choice, based in part on earlier research in Central America.
8

As a final research consideration, Gary Wynia

has suggested that

there exists a 'competitive' political culture in Costa Rica and a
'bargaining' culture in El Salvador.

If these are reflected in munici-

pal government, and we have shown below the extent to which they are,
9

we might expect to find, in the terminology of Robert Agger

and asso-

ciates a 'consensual elite' situation in San Salvador and a 'competi/

tive mass' in San Jose.

Again, we see below whether this hypothesis

(guess) holds.
There exists a general assumption, almost a consensus, in the
policy analysis literature that a wide range of economic, social and
political considerations constitute independent variables with policy
decisions as dependent variables.

The policymaking process itself is

assigned roles of varying importance according to the view of the individual analyst.
In this study we examine a number of these background factors,

11
both for San Jose and San Salvador and for their respective national
settings.

Under the general label of political we include such factors

as the constitutional provisions relating to the municipalities, their
legislative and administrative structures, the relationships between
municipalities and national governments, the role of parties and elections in determining control of positions in the city government, the
policy preferences of local government leaders and the importance of
non-governmental groups in the policy process.

Economic factors in-

economic structure of both cities and countries, labor force composition and employment rates, the public-private mix, income and its distribution, growtn rates and the patterns of revenues and expenditures
for national governments.

Among social factors to be studied are pop-

ulation, its age and sex structure and rate of increase, internal migration, educational levels and group structure.

The appropriate data

on these background factors are assembled and analyzed below in Chapters V and VII.
This inventory of background factors constitutes the traditonal
list that analysts of state and local public policymaking in the AngloAmerican setting have suggested are important.

For this study we have

added one more, the existence of a comprehensive plan for metropolitan
development in San Salvador and the absence of any such plan for San
Jos~.

With all of this in mind, it becomes possible to briefly define
the current study in terms of two sets of formal hypotheses:
1 Ho:

There exist no significant differences in policymaking and policy outcomes between San Salvador
and San Jose.

12
Ha:
2 Ho:

Ha:

There do exist significant differences.
Differences in (1) are not related to the ·social,
political and economic differences between San
Jose and San Salvador.
Differences in (1) are related to such social,
political and economic differences.

The main thrust of this study, then, is testing these hypotheses in the
policy areas of urban revenue raising and the public provision of housing.
However, the results of the study were not as anticipated.
alternative hypothesis in (1) was expected to hold.

The

It did not hold.

But even with the null hypothesis in (1) supported, our analysis in (2)
need not be unnecessary or redundant.

We found there to be no signifi-

cant policy differences between San Jose and San Salvador, and must
ask, Why is this so?

Are the background factors too similar, was our

selection of them incorrect, did we in fact hold the ceteris too paribus?

Or are there factors tending to cancel one another?

Is the basic

assumption about the relationship between background factors and policy
incorrectly stated or simply inapplicable in the Central American situation?

Or need we consider other matters heretofore ignored?

Regard-

less of the failure of our alternate hypothesis in (1) to hold, our
analysis is carried through to determine what, in fact, are the relationships among the social, economic and political milieux, the nature
and scope of the policy process, and the policy outcomes in the polities of San Jose, Costa Rica and San Salvador, El Salvador in the
fields of public housing provision and urban public finance.
The explanations for our findings are qualitative.

They are

based upon the historical, procedural and political analysis of the
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policyrnaking process as we see it carried out.

We seek the causes of

a particular occurrence at a particular point in the process. An analysis of the interaction among the various policyrnakers, their policy
preferences and resources, their. roles and constituencies, will, we
hold, provide up with an explanation, insofar as an explanation is
possible.
The nature of the analysis carried out is influenced to some extent by the form of the data gathered.

It is at times tempting to let

the nature of the analysis be determined by the data, to simply gather
whatever is available and later see what has been amassed and decide
what to do with it.

Tempting, yes, but such abstract empiricism is

really not very satisfactory.
Amassing great reams of often unrelated but seemingly important
data can easily become an end in itself, burying the true intent of the
study.

Or, in systems theory terms:

The information system, displaying the ingestive properties
of a snake, swallows up the whole enterprise . . . The larger
objectives of the system are obscured if not obliterated; the
re~ources devoured; the total effort begins and ends with the
dr-~a-gathering.lO

The relationship between data and analysis is a two-way street.

One

lane has been mentioned above but in the other lane a conception as to
how the data is to be used governs the amount and type to be gathered.
Finally, there are two operational considerations involved in
this study.

One is determining the extent to which policy analysis ru1d

the comparative approach are truly compatible and appropriate for an
essay of this kind.
Chapter III.

We feel they are and explain why at some length in

Nonetheless we realized there existed a possibility, how-

14

iever slight, that this might not be the case.
this study involves a refining of technique.

And to that

ext~nt,

It is also an attempt to

devise, through constant backing and filling, a nonculture-bound framework for policy analysis, applicable in the developing as well as in
the developed countries.

Our particular choice of a model of the pol-

icy process was a first step in this direction; our concluding section
suggests some modifications thereto.

In any event, however, these con-

siderations are decidedly secondary.

The prime purpose of the study is

to examine and compare the effects of the political, social and economic background factors on the policyrnaking process and its products
in San Salvador and San Jose.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
North American and European scholars with interests in Latin
America have traditionally confined their work to Mexico and South
America.

Central America, if considered at all, has been regarded

simply as a narrow strip of land joining these and characterized by
bananas, a dormant population and petty dictators.
about

In fact it is

the size of California and contains over 12 million inhabitants.

Moreover, there are six separate republics, each with its own history
and sociopolitical structure, each worthy of investigation.

Despite

this overall pattern of neglect by scholars, there have been some exceptionsj some literature on ti1e area does exist.

In this chapter we

selectively sample the extant literature, both in English and in Spanish.
It is perhaps symptomatic of this traditional neglect that there
exists no up-to-date general scholarly work on Costa Rica.

The classic
I

in this field, the Biesanz' Costa Rican Life, was written in 1944.
it thus antedates postwar economic developments and more importantly
the 1948 Revolution--the event from which all modern Costa Rican pol2

itical history is reckoned--this book's current utility is somewhat
limited.

Nonetheless, it is of sufficient importance that the Costa

Rican Ministry of Culture translated the book into Spanish in 1975.
(An

earlier attempt at translation by Daniel Oduber, former President

As
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of Costa Rica, and Rodrigo Facio, Rector of the University of Costa
Rica, was aborted shortly after its initial publication due to wartime
paper shortages.)

The Biesanz' concern with Costa Rica was more than

academic; some years ago they moved to that country.

It is possible

that Costa Rican Life will be replaced as the classic work by Tne
Costa Ricans, the result of a six-year study by Richard and Karen Biesanz that is scheduled for publication late in 1978.
There exists no agreed-upon classic covering El Salvador the way
Costa Rican Life has covered Costa Rica for the last thirty years.
However, Alastair White's recent work El Salvador may well attain this
s ta tus .

The author is a British sociologis t but his writing is not

characterized by the extreme narrowness of viewpoint and overreliance
3

on jargon that pervades the bulk of American sociological scholarship.
No particular bias is noticeable in his comprehensive treatment of Salvadorean history.

He offers an interesting classification scheme for

Salvadorean presidents of the last hundred years, characterizing them
as pragmatic reformist, idealist liberal, pragmatic liberal, or conservative, and suggests that the prime difference between the two types
of liberal is the economic emphasis of the pragmatist and the political
concerns of the idealist.

It might be enlightening to apply this

scheme to other Central American presidencies within the same time
frame.
White's description of how the official party wins elections,
presidential and legislative, is a valuable piece of political analysis
at least as sophisticated as any published by political scientists.

On

the economic side, he suggests that current economic policies and prac-
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tices, including industrialization, are lopsided and benefit only a
minority.

He points out a number of ways in which the money received

by the lower economic sector of the population escapes from that sector, and how the rate of escape increases with increasing industrialization.

In short, this is the most current, comprehensive and objec-

tive treatment of El Salvador available in English, albeit a certain
4

Fabian cast is detectable in some of White's observations.
A recent short and very readable book on Costa Rican society and
5

politics is Charles Denton's Patterns of Costa Rican Politics.

It has

the merit of lacking the minutiae and turgidity of most books based on
6

Ph.D. dissertations.

The book suffers, however, from being purely

descriptive and in no sense analytic.

The author concludes that:

The "democracy" that the PLN [Partido Liberacion Nacional]
has done so much to create has gradually given way to deadlock
between administrative and political organizations, between
agencies within the administration, between parties in the
legislature, between the prestige and the working class, and
between the president and his government. Costa Rica's much
admired democracy has contributed major stumbling blocks on
the country's road to economic and social development.
He suggests that Costa Rica "could do much better if the political
system was capable of exerting more control over its internal structure, its environment, and its resources and could tackle some of the
7

nation's more basic developmental problems."

Despite its shortcomings,

especially some unsupported quantum leaps from data to often subjective
judgments and conclusions, Denton's work does provide the best current
brief picture of the Costa Rican political scene.
Another useful recent work on Costa Rican politics, although more
limited in scope, -is historian John Bell's Crisis in Costa Rica, The
8

Revolution of 1948.

Perhaps Bell's greatest contribution lies in
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pointing out that Jose'" Figueres was actively engaged in organizing a
revolutionary cadre prior to 1948.

This is a particularly enlightening

contrast to the generally held view that the 1948 Revolution was a
spontaneous reaction to the refusal of President Teodoro Picado and the
9

calderonista

-dominated National Assembly to permit President-elect

Otilio Ulate Blanco to take office.

In further contrast to the general

view of the 1948 Revolution as a purely Costa Rican internal matter 3
Bell places the event in the context of the Cold War and especially the
United States-inspired wave of hemispheric anti-communism.

Bell is ob-

viously a supporter of Figueres and his National Liberation Movement
and sometimes allows this enthusiasm to overcome dispassionate analysis
of the Revolution and its immediate aftermath.
Unfortunately, no parallel works on the political development of
El Salvador are to be found.

From a public finance viewpoint, however 3

it is worthwhile to mention Henry Wallich's Public Finance in a Devel10

oping Country:

El

Salvador~

A Case Study.

In this work Wallich de-

tails the increasing rationalization of the Salvadorean tax

system~

the

movement from dependence on excise taxes to greater use of income
taxes.

For the purposes of this essaY3

from two major shortcomings,
done 25 years ago.

however~

Wallich's work suffers

The first of these is age; the work was

The second is the virtual ignoring of pub-

lic finance in the municipal realm.

"In view of the very limited im-

portance of municipal finances 3 a few observations will suffice.
No comprehensive statistical information is available for the financial
activities of the muniCipalities . . . It is believed, however 3 that
11
this omissjon is not of great significance."
It is instructive to
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note the extent to which the national taxation system had been modified
by the time the current study was carried out.
A particularly useful book in that it is one of the very few to
make cross-national comparisons within Central America is Wynia's Politics and Planners:

----rr

Economic Development Policy in Central America.

His purpose was the discovery of patterns of innovation and their consequences for the policymaking

process.

He points out the general

failure of planners in the five republics to achieve their public investment objectives and links this failure to the nature of their relationship to politicians and administrators, espcially the presidents.
In addition, he has compiled seven characteristics which he suggests "appear to form what might be termed the policy-making structure
of the Latin American countries."

These are:

1. Personalistic, and often charismatic, leadership juxtaposed with a lack of institutional, especially constitutional,
legitimacy;
2. Expanding political participation, yet political underrepresentation of the urban and rural masses;
3. Administrative structures dominated by extensive patronage,
intricate formal rules, and widespread informal disregard for
formal rules;
4. Obscured and obstructed communications within the public
sector and between the public and private sectors produced by
weak information as well as by distrust and personal rivalries.
5. A heavy reliance on the private sector for managing but not
not financing economic growth;
6. Slow economic growth and modernization because of numerous
structural and institutional rigidities;
7. Economic dependence on foreign markets and, as a consequence, vulnerability to external economic and financial conditions.
He suggests further that these combine to give as paradigms
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personalistic leaders who direct patronage-ridden bureaucracies, enjoy weak communications with other power contenders,
and receive inadequate information from government agencies
and the private sector, yet must struggle to raise large reve~ues to su~porf3programs to expand their vulnerable and sluggIsh economIes.
Policyrnakers are likely to be found at the extremes of the policymaking continuum.

At one end are the overly cautious and underin-

formed proceeding in a hesitant manner to expand only marginally and
incrementally their policy initiatives, guided by the maxim 'small
risk, small loss.'

At the other end are found the policyrnakers whose

understanding of complex policy problems falls far short of their will
to solve them, and who consequently grasp at thoroughly utopian and unrealistic policy schemes.
In the course of this essay we will determine whether or not the
seven traits listed as national policyrnaking characteristics are mirrored in urban policymaking, and further, to see which of the ends of
the policymaking continuum, if either, is occupied by the urban policymakers.
Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies is of
14
more than average importance for two reasons.
First, it provides criteria which at least some segments of some 'developing' political institutions use to rate themselves, and second, it provides a broad
cross-national view of various political phenomena such as praetorianism.

An example of the former may be found in Costa Rica where the In~
15
stituto de Fomento y Asesoria Municipal (IFAM)
specifically measured
its own level of institutionalization in terms of Huntington's quar16

tet--adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.
Praetorianism, the deliberate and open intervention of the mili-
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tary in the political process, is often regarded, especially by observers in whose homeland this pheno'menon is rare, as being purely a manifestation of malevolence or perversity on the part of the military.
Huntington suggests this is not necessarily so:
Countries which have political armies also have political
clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labor unions and political corporations. Society as a
whole is out-of-joint, not just the military. 17
Praetorianism has been a continuing and dominant part of politics
in E1 Salvador.

Much of this military participation, it is suggested,

has had a salutory effect, such as the radical programs of social reform pushed by officers in the period following World War II.

Although

military intervention is the defining characteristic of praetorianism,
it is not the only one.

As Huntington points out:

"A high correlation

exists between student participation in politics and military intervention in politics.

Both are distinctive characteristics of the radical
18
praetorian society."
He observes further that a major difference, perhaps the major
difference, between the military and other interest groups is capability.

Monks, priests, students, workers and campesinos can demonstrate

and protest but usually cannot govern.

The military can do both.

The

understanding of praetorianism in general, and Salvadorean praetorianism in particular, provided by Huntington is of considerable utility to
this essay.
The most promising title discovered in the preliminary search of
the literature, Municipal Government in Costa Rica:

Its Characteris-

tics and Functions, turned out to be one of the more disappointing ref19
erences.
Data on characteristics of local government personnel,
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types of demands made on local government and decisionmaking of councils in terms of these demands were gathered, mainly by Costa Rican and
United States university students.
data were not well correlated.

Unfortunately the various sorts of

This probably reflects the emphasis of

the project which was designed primarily to give the students field experience in data gathering.
A greater shortcoming from the viewpoint of this paper is the total ignoring of San Jose.

(Interviews, perusal of council minutes and

other data collection were carried out in and for 25 of the 76 cantons
in Costa Rica.)

This omission of San Jose, regrettably, characterizes
20

much of the work on Costa Rican municipalities.
A genus of books generally valuable in the initial stages of research for a paper such as this is the anthology of readings on individual countries assembled in one volume.

These readings may be by

several authors, each dealing with one country, as in the collections
21
or all
edited by Martin Needler, and Ben Burnett and Kenneth Johnson,
22

by one author as in the book by Harry Kantor.

The selections may

deal generally with politics and government in the separate countries,
as in the works mentioned above, or the organization may be topical.
The latter approach is adopted by Ronald McDonald who categorizes and
23
relates nations according to party systems.
Of the three general works, the readings in Burnett and Johnson
provide the most useful background, in part, at least, because they are
the most recent.

Paul Hoopes, writing on El Salvador, emphasizes the

dynamism and inclination toward Central American regional integration
that characterize the Salvadoreans, especially the economic and politi-

24
24

cally potent.

He maintains that the middle class is genuinely re-

formist, unlike other Latin American middle classes who wish only to
displace and replace the current elites.

He suggests further that this

reformism manifests itself through the administration of the ruling
military regime, leading to the erroneous conclusion on the part of
some analysts that the military is itself reformist.

Robert Tomasek,

writing in this voll.iJue, presents the standard view of Costa Rica as
the one nation whose longstanding commitment to participatory democracy
25
distinguishes her from most of the rest of Latin America.
He points
out, as one facet of this, Costa Rica is virtually unique in that its
Legislative Assembly has de facto as well as de jure control over the
majority of the important political decisions.

Presidents of Costa

Rica do not rule by decree.
The readings on Costa Rica in the other two books, by Kantor and
James Busey, offer the same information but are given somewhat more to
26
praise and less to analysis than Tomasek is.
The sections on El
Salvador, by Kantor and Charles Anderson, point out the industriousness
of the Salvadorean people and, unlike Hoopes, suggest that the military
27

itself is behind programs of social and economic reform.

An indica-

tion of parallel approaches of these latter two sets of articles deserves mention,

Busey subtitles his article on Costa Rica "A Meaning-

ful Democracy"; Kantor calls his chapter "A Progressing Democracy."
Anderson's subheading for his article on El Salvador is "The Army as
Reformer," while Kantor labels his "The Military as Reformists."

Kan-

tor does include a 'Note on the Study of Comparative Government'; unfortunately his chapters are disjunct units with no attempt made at in-
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tegration or cross-national comparisons.

He observes that his work is

a snapshot at one point in time and concedes that it is impossible for
himself or anyone else to "write a book describing Latin American governrnent and politics and expect the description to be accurate for very
28

long."
McDonald does not see either Costa Rica or El Salvador as loose
multi-party systems of the anyone-has-a-chance-to-win variety.
Rica he characterizes as a multi-party dominant system.

Costa

He points out

that the Costa Rican Partido de Liberacion Naciona1 (PLN) has maintained its majority in the National Assembly since 1953 as opposition
to it has united and fragmented and reunited in different patterns.
The PLN has not, however, been able to succeed itself in the presidency
29

and hence is not characterized as single-party dominant.
Although a variety of parties contest elections in E1 Salvador,
the Partido de Conci1iacion Nacional (PCN) and its predecessor, the
Partido Revolucionario de Unificaci6n Democratica (PRUD) have maintained control of the Assembly and the Presidency since 1950.

Some op-

position parties have won seats in the Assembly since 1964 but they
have not seriously challenged the hegemony of the official party.

Mc-

Donald therefore classifies El Salvador as a single-party dominant systern.

The party structures and electoral patterns of both nations will

be more closely examined in a subsequent chapter.
Costa Rica's PLN has itself been the topic of a number of works.
Mbst often it is considered, as by Edward Williams for example, in the
30
larger context of Latin American Christian Democratic parties.
The
forerunner and model for these parties is of course the A1ianza Popular

26
Revolucionaria Americana CAPRA), founded by Victor Raul Haya de la
Torre in Mexico in 1924 but which was imported into Peru in "1930 and
has since been identified with the latter country.

Costa Rica has not,

however, been plagued with many of the problems usually attacked by reforrnist parties of this type.

Williams suggests that this has been a

drawback for the PLN, and there has been a tendency towards increased
conservatism on the part of its leadership.
Suzanne Bodenheimer puts the case even more strongly.

She sug-

gests that the PLN's ideology is fixated in the 1940s and must surely
prove inadequate in the 1960s and 1970s.

She maintains that the PLN

currently appeals to the "security and complacency of the middle
32
class"
rather than being directed, as it was initially, towards the
emerging middle and rising lower classes.

It is her conclusion that

poor performances of recent PLN governments have been rooted in ideo33
logy rather than in administration.
One of the earliest articles to compare and contrast Costa Rica
wi th another Central American republic was Busey's "Foundations of Pol34

itical Contrast:

Costa Rica and Nicaragua."

He supports the classic

explanation for Costa Rican egalitarianism vis-a-vis Nicaraguan class
distinction--the absence of mineral wealth in Costa Rica and its presence in Nicaragua.

Further, he suggests that differences in the two

political systems might be based in physical, ethnic, cultural and socia 1 integration or lack thereof, land tenure patterns, and even
weather:

"It can hardly be doubted that in some vague way the politics

of Costa Rica may have benefited and that of Nicaragua may have suf35
fered from climatic factors."

27
It is often the case that articles of a broad philosophical nature or articles covering a wide range of countries contain bits and
pieces of insight or information that can be usefully extracted.

An

36

example of the former is Ebel's "Governing the City-State."

He sus-

tains the argument here that one of the difficulties in the study; by
Anglo-Americans (and some Europeans), of the governing of small Latin
American nations, is the attempt by these outsiders to apply the political experience of their own nations to the Central American microstates.

A more fruitful approach might be to consider these nations

cities with hinterlands, with resources flowing from the periphery to
the center for redistribution and control flowing from the core outwards to the peripheries.

Our standard 'republican-pluralist' model is

therefore an inappropriate framework for analysis.

Ebel argues that

this is particularly true for countries in his Group V, the smallest
countries and those most dominated by a primate city.

In this group,

along with the island-sharing nations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, he includes Costa Rica and El Salvador.
Ebel also authored the single most useful article found on the
policymaking process in a Central American city.

In addition to anal-

yzing decisions made in San Salvador, he provided one set of answers to
the questions "Why study the urban centers in Central America?" and
"Why not just get on with examining the national political systems?"
For Juan Gomez it is in the community and not in the nation
where things happen. The plaza, bordered by church, market,
and town hall, competes only with the cantina, the soccer
field, and the cemetery as the focus of his life. And while
the better-educated urbanite enjoys a wider vista, for many
city people the barrio or the barranco [shantytown] pretty
largely fills their horizon. Ultimately, whether for a cosmopolite or a parochial, the services which lighten the day and
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enliven the night are largely local in character. Sewage and
water, light and power, transportation, recreation and justice
emanate from City Hall. 37
Torres' "Measurement of Political Power" fits in the second cate38
gory of articles mentioned above.
He obtained, by polling political
scientists specializing in Latin America, estimates of the power, on a
scale of 0-9, held by each of seven groups in each of the 20 Latin
American republics.

The seven groups were landed oligarchy, industri-

alists, campesinos, urban blue-collar workers, urban white-collar
39

workers, the military and the church.

He then constructed Lorenz

curves and calculated the Gini coefficients for each country.
coefficients are discussed in Appendix S.)

(Gini

The higher the Gini ratio,

the more concentrated was the political power in the country.

Of the

20 countries, El Salvador was ranked ninth with a Gini ratio of .846
while Costa Rica ranked 18th with a value of .673.

The extreme cases

were Haiti with a Gini ratio of .929 and Cuba with a figure of .563.
One final article to be mentioned here is Needler's "The Latin
40

American Military."

He examined various military governments in

Latin America to determine whether they were, as their detractors would
have it, feudal and ruthless defenders of an oligarchical status quo
or, as their advocates suggest, the one uncorrupted, technically competent apolitical force for change and development.
most relevant to this paper is:

The conclusion

"The only plausible example of a mod-

ernizing military in the recent history of Latin America that has actu41
ally accomplished anything permanent is that of El Salvador."
This survey of literature in English is, to repeat, not exhaustive.

Rather it indicates only some of the main pieces of scholarly

29

writing that have proved useful to date in the construction of this es42

say.

Many works consulted have not been included.

A great many re-

ports, technical works and data sources have not been indicated here;
they are cited in other sections of the paper where their utility is
more immediate.

The same is true of the literature in Spanish.

One of the advantages in researching a highly literate and welleducated Latin American country such as Costa Rica is that scholarly
literature is available to the researcher in Spanish as well as in English.

This is particularly useful when, as in the present case, the

area has not received a great deal of attention from North American or
British scholars.

Unfortunately El Salvador possesses neither the tra-

dition of critical self-examination nor the potential readership of
Costa Rica, hence there is much less literature in Spanish dealing with
the Salvadorean situation.
Two books that when read together provide a fairly complete background to the current political-legal situation in Costa Rica are Mario
43

Alberto

Jimenez~

Desarollo Constitucional de Costa Rica

and Joaquin
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Garro's Veinte Allos de Historica Chica.

Jimenez, one of his coun-

try's most noted jurists, traces the constitutional development of
Costa Rica from independence through 14 fundamental documents to the
45

current constitution of 1949.

He suggests that the differences be-

tween this document and previous constitutions are more profound than
generally realized.

Among these are a deliberate weakening of the

power of the president, a redefinition of the role of the legislature
with some weakening as a result, and a strengthening of the powers of
the judiciary.

In short, it takes a much more sanguine view of the na-
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ture of man and his capacity to prosper and 1ive in peace without excessive government.
Garro examines essentially the 18 years between the revolution of 1948 and the elections of 1966.

Chronologically, then, he

picks up roughly where Jimenez left off.

Garro is a former deputy to

the Natio:'19.1 Assembly and considers this time span from a political
viewpoint, regarding campaigns, elections and interparty deals as the
major happenings of the period.

His loyalty to the PLN is unques-

tioned; however he does raise, at least obliquely, some of the doubts
Williams mentioned.

Garro concludes:

We believe that the [electoral] fortune of the Party of National Liberation depends in large part on the message it can
give to or the impact that it can have on its old clientele:
campesinos, inhabitants of rural areas and the lower-middle
class, integrated with the professionals, small merchants,
skilled or semi-skilled workers and white-collar workers.
Neverthele,ss, if for these [groups] Calder6n Guardia should
disappear, the political situation will be for National Liberation more fluid and plastic: the Calderonistas will feel
free to choose their party and many of these gould be inclined
toward that party [PLN] as occurred in 1966. 4
He turns out to be a reasonably accurate predictor of the 1970 election.
A realistic look at important influences on policy formulation is
47
Oscar Arias Sanchez' Grupos de Presion en Costa Rica.
In this work
Arias uses a standard framework for defining and delimiting pressure
groups.

He lists the most active ones in Costa Rica and identifies

their sources of strength.

The actual role of some of these groups in

influencing specific policies is traced.

Arias regards pressure groups

as intrinsically undesirable and worries that individual and isolated
legislators may not be able to stand effectively against them.

The
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cure for this malady, he concludes, is an ongoing system of strong,
disciplined, permanent, ideologically-based political parties in whose
bosoms the legislators can find strength, reinforcement and guidance.
Conventional wisdom about Costa Rica has it that because the
land had no mineral riches or tractable Indian population no class of
landed gentry developed.

As a result the nation has a more equitable

land tenure system, hence a fairer distribution of weaith, hence a very
open political system with broad participation and wider distribution
of power than is the case in most Latin American nations.

Without dis-

puting the economic and historical preconditions, Samuel Stone Zemurray
suggests major political offices are held by a much smaller and more
interrelated group than is generally realized.

In a provocative arti-
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cle, he argues for the importance of blood.

He points out that 33 of

the 44 presidents have come from only three families, those of Juan
Vasquez de Coronado, Nicolas de Gonzalez y Oviedo and Antonio de Acosta
49
Arevalo.
Together with the family of Jorge de Alvarado, these families have provided 550 out of the 1,300 members who have been elected
to the Legislative Assembly since 1821.

Foremost among these families

is that of Vasquez which has supplied no less than 19 presidents and
50
some 230 deputies of all ideological persuasions.
Works in Spanish on Costa Rica and its municipal system are not
limited to those printed in Costa Rica; a few articles are to be found
in foreign journals.

Examples of these are the articles by Jorge-

Enrique Romero Perez appearing in the Madrid-based Revista de Estudios
51
de- la Vida Local.
In these pieces Romero outlines the principal purposes, structure and financing of IFA.t\1 and indicates the background to
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and some of the major provisions of Costa Rica1s first (1970) Municipal
Code.

Both of these articles are basically descriptive and generally

laudatory rather than critical and analytical.
A genre of literature that proved singularly useful was the graduate thesis.

These theses were primarily from the Faculties of Law and

Economic and Social Sciences at the University of Costa Rica.

Three of

these deserve specific mention: Lilia Montero, Evoluci6n del Sistema
52
Tributaria de Costa Rica;
Luis Ramirez, Investigacion de los Servicios Publicos Brindados por las Municipalidades y Sus Lineas de Ac53
cion;
and Jose Vargas, Administraci6n del Sistema Municipal in Costa
--54
Rica.
Montero examines the taxes in force in 1969 and 1970, considering
the various bases and tax rates, whether or not earmarked and their destination--central government, autonomous agencies, municipalities or
the private sector.

She also indicates the statute or administrative

directive establishing each particular tax, and the date enacted.

By

providing figures for 1950 through 1970 she makes it possible to determine shifts in emphasis on the various tax sources.

At the end of this

20-year period, for example, taxes on external commerce were only onehalf as important as they had been at the beginning, while taxes on internal economic activities became more important.

She points out, more-

over, that the efficiency of collection has increased markedly; adrninistrative costs dropped from a high of 5.47% of total collection in 1963
to a low of 1.67% in 1970, the last year for which figures are avail55
able.
The detailed tax data in her appendices are the most complete
available from any single source.
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Ramirez' work is an essentially empirical impressionistic examination of the actual administration of a number of small municipalities.
He is highly critical of what he found.

In one anecdote he relates how

he asked to look at the books in one small town--a legal right--but
found it impossible because an employee who was absent had the only set
of keys to the desk in which the books were kept.

Ramirez listed a

number of problems, some administrative and some political, which beset
the municipalities.

Among the former were employees who routinely

failed to show up at work and who did nothing while in the office, a
constant changing of treasurers and accountants, too many different offices to be visited by citizens with relatively simple business to conduct and an almost complete lack of coordination among various municipal offices and between the municipalities and the central government
and the various autonomous agencies.

He listed 13 of these agencies

with which the municipalities regularly dealt.
Political problems included unwarranted interference in day-today activities by the councillors and municipal executives, the lack of
requirements for the office of municipal executive and a lack of both
56

long- and short-term planning.

Ramirez maintained moreover that the

councillors traditionally set charges that were too low to cover service
costs.

He offered two reasons for this:

timidity, and the fact that

many councillors would be looking for votes among the taxpayers when
they were running for deputy or other higher elected office.

As imme-

diate and pragmatic solutions for some of the more obvious problems, he
suggested the hiring of more qualified people, paying them commensurately and insisting they work full-time, the keeping of a complete set
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of keys in the municipal office, and the use of bookkeeping machines.
Vargas began his work with an appreciation of the steadily diminishing role of the municipality in the framework of government.

He

first thought, in fact, that he would be chronicling the liquidation of
local government and indicated three major reasons for this:
The loss of autonomy suffered by the Local Governments is
directly related to three phenomena: I)Archaic legislation,
2) lack of financing, and ~) the necessity of upgrading the
quality of the personnel. S
His findings as to the insufficiency of user charges and their nonpayment through administrative ineptness closely parallel those of Ramirez.

Vargas states:

"We have never known [of a case] where a munici-

pality has charged excessive amounts for services rendered, or where
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properties have been forfeited for failure to pay [taxes].
His own preference is for local government vastly strengthened at
the expense of national government.

He goes so far as to argue for the

municipality as primary tax collector, with monies not needed locally
made available for national government expenses.

The actual situation

in Costa Rica remains the reverse of this, however.

Vargas sees a def-

inite strengthening of the municipality which he attributes to three
acts of the National Government:

Law 4340, which provides for the

participation of municipalities in the sharing, to a known and expanded
extent, of certain nationally collected taxes; the new Municipal Code
(Costa Rica's first); and the creation of IFAM.
terizes the municipalities thus:

He succinctly charac-
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Economic situation
Legal base
Budget system
Accounting system
Control

Insufficient
Magnificent
Good
Bad
59, 60
Acceptable

The final Spanish language source to be considered here, dealing
/

with Costa Rica, is Volume 20 (1972) of Revista de Ciencias Juridicas,
a journal published by the University of Costa Rica School of Law.

This

entire volume is devoted to various legal aspects of the Costa Rican
municipal system with emphasis on changes contained in the new (1970)
Municipal Code.
Municipal autonomy, the Municipal Code and subventions from the
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national government are discussed in the first article, by Otto Rojas.
The author, a lawyer like most of the other authors in the volume, is
currently a member of the Supreme Administrative Tribunal for Costa
Rica.

He gives a very brief history of the Costa Rican municipality and

considers whether municipal autonomy is mere administrative decentralization or something more.

After a lengthy legalistic discussion, he

suggests the autonomy possessed by the municipality in its sphere of action is more than that granted to the autonomous agencies but less than
that reserved to the central government.

Autonomy is, in short, quite

imprecisely defined.
Rojas argues that the appropriate division of activity is for the
national legislature to determine what, in fact, is local in nature and
once this is done, each municipality is to deal with local matters as it
deems fit.

In this way diversity can be accommodated within the general

policy aims of the central government.

He concedes, however, that the

municipality as currently constituted is ill-prepared to carry out such

36

responsibilities and recommends certain structural reforms, including
fewer and larger municipalities, that will enable local government to
play its rightful role.

He suggests further that a complete examination

of local financing is necessary to determine not only the proper level
of national to local government transfer payments but also the correct
sharing and distribution of revenue sources.
In a brief essay, Manuel Castro deals with the taxing powers of
the municipal and national governments and the relationships between
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these.

He indicates the limited types of levies the Municipal Code

allows municipalities to collect--charges for paving sidewalks, lighting
and cleaning of streets and the like.

He emphasizes the severe restric-

tions on the power of the municipality to raise revenue, particularly
the provision that any new municipal tax or change in tax rate requires
the approval of the Comptroller General and/or the legislature.

Castro

concludes by pointing out that any cases not covered by the Municipal
Code are covered by the Taxation Practices and Procedures Code.
A very broad article by Eduardo Sancho, Chief of the Legal Department of the Municipality of San Jos~, examines the relationships between
municipal functions as laid out in the Municipal Code and what he terms
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the Costa Rican municipal reality.

He begins by viewing the munici-

pa1ity in three different ways--as a socio-historical entity, as a legal
entity and as a political entity.

This is followed by a chronological

discussion of the Costa Rican municipality and its antecedents; from the
Roman municipiurn through Visigoth settlements, the Spanish ayuntamIento
of the 17th and 18th centuries, the municipality in colonial American
and early independence to the present.

Abruptly shifting gears, Sancho
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considers short,

medi~,

and long term objectives of the municipality,

and its duties and attributes, whether exclusive or concurrent.
In an interesting aside he discusses the sticky issue of antinomy-the conflicts, apparent and real, between two laws.

In this particular

case it refers to conflicts between provisions of the Municipal Code and
those of other laws, especially regarding matters of concurrent responsibility such as public health, tourism, education and socioeconomic development.

Sancho states:

Repeatedly we observe that functions for which responsibility is shared remain moribund and do not produce the benefits
the communities expect from them. Each institution transfers
the problems to the co-responsible institution, without offering solutions and this~ of course, generates a mood of insecuity in the citizenry.64
As a solution he suggests the redefining of municipal and national jurisdictions to eliminate concurrence, along with adequate financing for
the municipalities.

With the new Municipal Code, Sancho concludes,

things are getting better, the municipalities are being strengthened.
This article did not delve deeply into any of the vast array of
matters it addressed.

Moreover, it did not engage in precise niceties

of legal reasoning on technical points.

It did provide probably the

best introduction available to the multifaceted Costa Rican municipal
system, whether it be considered from a historical, political, legal or
administrative viewpoint.
Mauro Murillo, Professor of Public Law at the University of Costa
Rica and Parliamentary Counsel to the Legislative Assembly, addressed
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his essay to neighborhood participation in local government.

He

points out that unlike national government, local government is susceptible to direct as well as indirect participation.

Any person at least
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18 years of age, in possession of political rights, and a resident
of the canton, has a variety of ways of affecting local government directly.

Among these are the cabildo or open meeting which is oral and

advisory; plebiscites, a yes or no vote written and binding upon the
municipal council; and referenda, ratifying acts already passed by the
council.
To facilitate citizen participation in municipal policymaking,
the Municipal Code, which Murillo helped draft, requires that all projected municipal acts be published in the Official Journal, and further,
that no less than ten working days after such publication, a public
hearing must be held.

Any citizen-resident has the right to appear and

speak at these hearings.

Internal rules and procedures of the council

are exempt from these requirements.

Murillo points out, however, that

all of these provisions are no guarantee that legislation unacceptable
to the majority of the inhabitants will not be passed.

One reason for

this is that cabildos, plebiscites and referenda are called only by the
council itself; the council may do this, it does not have to.

Another

is that the Official Journal, like journals of record in many countries
including the United States, are often not readily accessible.

Yet a

third factor is the tendency of the residents, both in Costa Rica and
internationally, towards apathy in matters of local government.
The final article in this set deals with current and recommended
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municipal revenue practices in Costa Rica.

The author, Joao de Mo-

raes, is a Brazilian specialist in municipal administration who was on
loan to IFAM.

This will not be discussed further here; it is examined

at some length in the section below dealing with public finance.
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As mentioned above, the scholarly literature in Spanish dealing
with municipal finance, government and policymaking in El Salvador is
much less extensive than that dealing with similar concerns in Costa
Rica.

In fact, only two works will be considered here.

The first of

these, by Alberto Harth Deneke, is a fairly technical look at the de67

velopment of city plans for San Salvador in the period 1954-1973.
He notes the changes in them, the progressively greater comprehensiveness and the degree of their implementation or lack thereof.
rent plan itself will be examined below in Chapter

The cur-

v.

Fidel Chavez Mena's Organizacion Municipal is much broader in
68

scope than the average doctoral thesis in law.

It combines politi-

cal philosophy and partisan political ideology (Partido Dernocrata Cristiano--PDC) with a legal and administrative analysis of the Salvadorean
municipal system, concentrating on San Salvador.

It accurately re-

flects Dr. Chavez' own career as practicing attorney, PDC stalwart and
long-time San Salvador city councillor.
Chavez maintains:

As a philosophic viewpoint,

"The State is no more than the result of the organic

structure of the local communities" and immediately projects this viewpoint into the Salvadorean situation:
It is inconceivable to pretend to obtain efficacy in municipal administration if the municipality finds itself limited in
a centralist political order in which its activities are limited to the merely mechanical [ones] of providing services
regulated by and dependent economically upon subsidies provided by the will of the central government. 69
He maintains further that no state that deliberately weakens or attempts to abolish the municipality can be called democratic.
Not content with analyzing or philosophizing about the municipality and its relations with the nation, Chavez takes the central govern-
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ment to task for certain specific practices.

He criticizes its limits

on municipal spending as unrealistic, citing the fact that a municipality must solicit permission to buy a simple desk.

He censures the na-

tional government for having allowed private enterprise to compete with
the municipalities in the provision of user-chargeable municipal services.

Two further indictments charge that the central power plays

partisan politics, favoring municipalities with a PCN government and
that, despite enabling legislation, there exists no agency to provide
either financial or technical assistance to the municipalities.
Costa Rica IFAM carries out these activities.)

In short,

Ch~vez

(In
com-

bines a scholarly legal and administrative analysis with a partisan attack on a central government and official party he feels

ar~

deliber-

ately enervating his city.
This review does not include all the literature in existence on
Costa Rica and EI Salvador.

It does not even encompass all the litera-

ture used in the preparation of this paper.

It does, however, provide

a broad and representative sample of what scholars have written concerning these two countries.
In summary, it presents a general description of the two polities.

Costa Rica is indisputably more open politically, more advanced

economically, and more thoroughly examined by scholars than is El Salvador.

It is with this general background in mind that Chapter V ex-

amines more specifically the political, economic and social conditions;
Chapter VI considers the policy process; and Chapter VII describes the
current programs in the fields of public housing and municipal finance
in the two countries and their capital cities.
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CHAPTER III
POLICY ANALYSIS
As indicated in Chapter I, the two key research techniques
adopted in this study are policy analysis and comparative examination.
In this chapter the various elements thereof are more thoroughly explicated.
First, the nature of the policymaking process and frameworks for
its analysis are considered.
presented.

Second, our particular model of choice is

Third, following from the previous two sections, is an ex-

planation as to why the policy approach is used here.

Fourth, the tra-

dition of scholarly examination of the policy process is traced.

Fi-

nally, the nature and applicability of the comparative approach are
discussed.

.

~

In Chapter VI, specific policy developments ln San Jose and

San Salvador will be analyzed and compared.
NATURE OF THE POLICY PROCESS
It is well at the outset to present our working definition of
policy, for probably no word in current social science literature is
more used or less defined.

One prominent author in the field, however,

holds this to be no bad thing.

Ira Sharkansky has written, "It would

be futile and misleading to work toward a clear definition of policy,
I

policy process, or policy-making."

When it is defined, policy, like

kachina, is as often defined in terms of what it is not as in terms of
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what it is.

Stuart Rakoff and Guenther Schaefer have pointed out that

unless further specified, policy may describe
the general or specific norms, goals, objectives or actions
pursued by the political systems, or it may refer to the instruments or strategies devised to realize these goals, or to
the actual actions and concrete steps of implementation. 2
For the purposes of this study policy will be defined, following Rakoff
and Schaefer, as "the action or nonaction of a political system in re3

sponse to demands made upon it."

Such action or nonaction can take a

variety of forms, from simple statements of intent to actual implementation or termination of particular projects.
Underlying all policy analysis is the concept that decisionmaking
is a process, a process that can be traced.

Thomas Dye suggests six

perspectives from which public policy may be examined:

systems theory,

eli te theory, group theory) rational decisionmaking theory, inrremer;4

talism, and institutionalism.

The perspective adopted here is prima-

rily systems theory, although elements from some of the others do appear from time to time.

In David Easton's terminology there is a pol-

itical system that receives inputs, demands and supports, and eventu5

ally translates them into outputs.

Policy analysis attempts to open

the "black box" that is the political system and examine this transformation of inputs, particularly demands, into outputs.

We are dealing

here with public policymaking, studying demands on a governmental entity or entities, and the way in which these demands are, or are not,
translated into some sort of governmental response.
Frameworks for the analysis of public policymaking abound.

They

vary in terminology, complexity and occasionally boundary definition
but are essentially parallel.

Almost all take as their input demands,
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some include supports.

Each of these frameworks is designed to enable

the analyst to follow a demand from its genesis through a series of
stages to either its emergence as a policy or its falling by the policymaking wayside.
In a typical analytic framework, the first stages are the individual perception of some environmental condition and the defining of
this condition as an imperfection, a state wanting change.
idual is faced at this point with three choices:

The indiv-

he can, if possible,

change it himself, privately; he can forget it; or he can seek public
activity to change it.

At this juncture the perceived problem is still

outside the political system, only a small proportion of these potential demands ever enter thereunto.
As John Dewey points out, the usual alternative to pTivate action
is not public action but either inaction or "routine, impulsive and
6

other unreflected acts also performed by individuals."

Daniel Elazar

reinforces this position and says of public officials that they
are normally not willing to initiate new programs or open up
new areas of government activity on their own recognizance.
They will do so when they perceive an overwhelming public demand for them to act, but only then. 7
This perceived condition, defined as a problem, is then often aggregated with similar ones, at least this is held to be the case in 'developed' nations for which most policy analysis frameworks have been
designed.
Already some major difficulties with these frameworks appear.

At

what point does the the problem become a demand, before or after aggregat ion?

Does this aggregation take place inside or outside of the

boundaries of the political system?

What, in fact, are the boundaries
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of the political system, and how are they chosen?

Easton suggests that

the system boundaries are determined heuristically by the analyst:
Accordingly, what we choose to put inside our system to consider within its boundaries, will depend upon what we wish to
examine in detail; for scientific purposes we also expect that
these variables will show considerably interrelationship and
coherence. What we leave outside, as part of its environment,
will be those factors that we can accept as givens. They represent the independent variables or parameters of the system. 8
At this point the agreement among the various schema for policy analysis begins to break down.

Jones, for example, holds that the problem

does not become a demand nor enter the political system until not only
aggregation but organization and representation as well have taken
9
place.
Rakoff and Schaefer, on the other hand, maintain that individual needs enter the political system which may then process them into
demands and, in order to avoid overloading itself, aggregate these de10
mands.
Demands, however, are not necessarily aggregated; some may be
summarily dropped by the political system, a few others may be strong
enough by themselves to warrant further consideration.

William Riker

posits that the usual course is for demands to aggregate until there
are only two, conflicting demands, or more precisely, coalitions of deII

mands between which the policymaking system will eventually choose.
This stage of the policy process is far from neat but we attempt
to summarize.

Differing perceptions of the environment lead to differ-

ing definitions as to what sorts of activity, if any, the political
system might undertake.

Only a few of these perceived needs or prob-

lems ever formally enter the political system as demands, but even this
small proportion are so different and in such conflict as to require
the system, in self defense, to aggregate them.

For the specific in-
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terest areas of this study a purely empirical approach is taken.

That

is, the formal government structure is examined to see at what point it
first takes cognizance of the particular issues involved.
Standard policy analysis frameworks encourage, and research in
'developed' nations emphasizes, these inputs into the political system.
And this is appropriate in those nations where well-developed political
parties and interest groups engage in the articulation and aggregation
of interests, whether seeking policy changes or in support of the status quo.

But as Thomas Smith points out, "in many African and Asian

political systems interest groups and political parties may be weak,
12
inarticulate, or even abolished by action of the government. 1f
This
may not be the case in Costa Rica or El Salvador but it does raise by
implication another major question, What happens when all important
perceptions of problems and presentation of demands corne from within
the political system?

This, we maintain, is likely to be the case in

the two polities under study here.

Such an occurrence does not inval-

idate the policy approach but extra care must be taken to recognize it
when it happens.
If the political systems of developing nations may lack these
specific inputs, they may possess, willingly or otherwise, extra inputs
from without the system.
influences.

We refer here, of course, to international

Consider for a moment the vast number of economic and so-

cial development programs undertaken by the United State alone, and the
direct influence these can have on the policy processes of cooperating
or client nations.

Not only money but also technical personnel can in-

fluence policy choice.

And it is not unknown for two foreign agencies,

52

from the same nation, to be working at cross purposes within a single
polity.

For example, in a small country, the presence of financial

and technical aid and influence from the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps and the World Bank may indicate the magnitude of this intervention and the possible policy effects.

With the

simultaneous presence of multinational corporations the external constraints on internal policyrnaking in developing countries such as El
Salvador and Costa Rica become even more important.
Returning to the standard framework for policy analysis, we find
the perceived problem has become a formal demand and entered the political system, there to be acted upon.

The next stage in the process is

policy formulation, the actual development of a plan for solving the
problem, for responding to the demand.

This stage is often regarded,

particularly in the 'developed' nations, as the single most critical
part of the policy process.

At this point decisionmakers have essen-

tially three tasks--they must enumerate the alternatives available,
they must evaluate these alternatives, and finally they must select, or
adopt, one of these alternatives.
Ideally, the policymakers will engage here in optimal decisionmaking.

That is, they will study and debate thoroughly every policy

alternative until eventually one will emerge as the absolute best that
can be achieved.

It will not only be the optimal policy in and of it-

self but will also reflect the allocation of precisely the right share
of resources in relation to all other policy alternatives of whatever
kind being considered during the same time frame by the political system.

More likely, however, the policymaking will be of the type termed
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13

by Yehezkel Dror satisfying

and by Herbert Simon satisficing.

That

is, the policymakers will determine beforehand what will be a satisfactory level of response to the demand with which they have been presented and will adopt the first alternative which satisfies that criterion, regardless of whether or not it is the best response.

This

practice is much more amenable to the omnipresent scarcity of resources,
including the time available to the decisionmakers and their lack of
perfect knowledge.
A policy has been adopted.
goes legitimation.

In the usual framework it now under-

Legitimation is a dual process.

On the one hand

the policy must be examined to determine that it is in accord with accepted standards; in United States' parlance, Is it constitutional?
And in the case where the policymaking unit is a subnational government, e.g., the Municipality of San Jos~ or San Salvador, the policy
must be in agreement with the wishes, expressed or implied, of the national government.

In addition, if implementation of the policy is

going to require funds from a foreign source, e.g., funding to build
public housing, the policy must also meet the guidelines of the funding
agency.

On the other hand, the policy must be legitimated to the pub-

lic at large.

The people, or at least a large and influential enough

segment of them to ensure the political feasibility of the program,
must be prepared to accept it.
Not every member of a polity plays an equal part in public policyrnaking.

In authoritarian systems most of the public is involun-

tarily excluded from the process.

In the more open systems, the public
15
is generally content, for a number of good reasons,
to choose the
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proximate policymakers, give them some sort of vague mandate, and let
them go about their business.

The most formal of the policy analysis

models assume that specific roles in the process will be played by
specific actors.

The separation of powers model to which decisionrnak-

ing in the United States is supposed to adhere gives to the 1egis1ative branch the formulation and adoption stages, to the judiciary the
legitimation stage (in the legal sense) and to the executive the imp1ementation stage.
Inputs at these stages from other than the proximate po1icymakers
appropriate to each stage are often frowned upon.

Aldermen are not to

interfere with municipal civil servants in the implementation of policy
nor are the courts to engage in policy formulation.

But this strict

legalistic approach to the policy process does not mirror political rea1ity; informal operations do take place and are important.

These in-

formal operations are of two types; they may involve a proximate policyrnaker acting outside of his assigned role to influence policy or
they may involve a party who is not formally a proximate policymaker
taking an active and direct part in decisionrnaking.

These informal

operations may in some cases be even more important than many of the
formal operations.

Unfortunately for the policy analyst, they are

also more difficult to locate and evaluate.

But this must be done to

achieve a thorough analysis of any policy, perhaps through the hunches
and intuitive judgments that form part of what Dror terms the 'extra16

rational subphases' of policy analysis.
"When a Western political system makes a policy, it is assumed
that the policy will be implemented and the results will be somewhere
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near those expected."

This statement is perhaps less accepted today

than it would have been a few years ago; nonetheless it points up one
of the differences between developed (Western) and developing policymaking systems.

In the latter, the implementation phase is most often

the weak link in the policy chain.

The reasons are many.

One could be

cynical and ascribe all shortcomings in implementation to corruption,
and it is not to be denied that the mordida can be an important factor.
There may also exist a simple shortage of trained, goal-oriented personnel in the bureaucracy, especially in one staffed through patronage.
Futhermore, many groups and interests find it more effective and efficient to have policies modified to suit their purposes in the implementation phase than in any other.

This is particularly true of groups

that may have been denied access to the earlier stages of the policymaking process.

In terms used above, informal operations are likely to

reach their maximum effectiveness in this stage.
Politically, public response to perceived shortcomings in policy
application is somewhat different in developing than in developed nations.

Where a public has not been conditioned to expect prompt and

efficient policy implementation, the political consequences to a government in the absence of such implementation may be quite minimal.
This is especially the case where electoral politics are oriented more
toward personality or ideology than toward issues and performance.

For

all of these reasons this study pays particular attention to the policy
implementation stage.
Policy analysis can be pushed beth forward and backward from the
stages included here.

Pushing backward we enter the realm of metapol-
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icyrnaking,

policymaking about policyrnaking.

Included here are such

aspects as the processing of values, reality, problems and resources,
the designing of the policyrnaking system so as to allocate these, and
the determining of a policyrnaking strategy.

This realm will not be ex-

plored further; we will take the policyrnaking system as we find it and
work from there.

Pushing forward we enter the phases of reaction, eval-

uation and finally termination.

Reaction, the response

to the imple-

mentation of policy, is examined only to the extent that reaction to a
previous, similar policy has become an input into subsequent policyrnaking or has influenced the political environment.
comes from two major sources:

Evaluation of policy

in-house evaluation by the system that

has created the policy, and evaluation unsought but freely offered
from the outside, primarily from journalistic and academic sources.
The first type of evaluation is not

~specially

prevalent in the parti-

cular polities and policy areas under examination here; the second
type is one product of this research.

The needs of the populace for

housing, and governmental response thereto, did not come to an end during the course of this study, nor did the municipalities cease to require additional revenues.

The termination phase, then, drops from

further consideration.
As Rakoff and Schaefer point out, there is no definitive, broadly
19
accepted term for the end product of the policyrnaking process.
Public policy, policy choices, policy decisions, policy outputs, and policy outcomes are among the terms used.

Sharkansky, for examples, chides

Dye for failure to differentiate 'policy' from 'outcomes'.

Sharkansky

himself abjures the term 'outcomes' and speaks of public policy, policy
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outputs and policy impacts as three
important dimensions of the policy process . . • public policy represents actions taken by the government; policy output
represents the service levels which are affected by these actions; and policy impacts represent the effect which the service has on a population. 20
A good deal of policy analysis literature is devoted to the difference
between policy outputs and policy outcomes.
to-one correlation between these.
different from those intended.

There is not always a one-

Policies may have final effects very

For example, urban freeways were con-

structed in United States' metropolitan areas, a policy output, to end
urban traffic congestion.

But the policy outcome has not, in fact,

been the end of such congestion.

It is not intended in this study to

probe deeply into outcomes vis-a-vis outputs but it is worthwhile taking cognizance of the discrepancy, noting with Mr. Dooley that "Results
is what you expects, consequences is what you gets."
A MODEL OF THE POLICY PROCESS
A simple but useful model of the policy process is presented below (Figure 3, page 58).

It contains a number of conditions constitut-

ing the social, political and economic environments.

Individuals may

regard these conditions, or some of them, as imperfect and define problems or perceive needs as arising out of these imperfections.

If pri-

vate actions avail nothing and the needs are regarded as too important
to ignore, the affected individuals may make demands on the political
system for change.

(These demands or other anticipated changes may

also lead to demands for maintenance of the status quo.)
These demands may be made separately, or several like demands may
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be clustered together.

Once inside the political system they may be

considered on their own merits, or aggregated.

Next, some of these

demands are formulated as policy statements and adopted.

Of those

adopted, some successfully go through the implementation/application
phase and ultimately impact upon one or all of the political system,
the individual perceived needs or the environment itself.

It should

be noted that to have effect, policy outputs do not have to reach back
as far as the environment.
This model indicates clearly the filtering nature of the political system in the policy process.

Each phase may be conceptualized as

a screen of successively finer mesh.
the system.

The mixed bag of demands enters

Some are screened out in the aggregation phase.

The re-

mainder, either strong enough to stand alone or strategically aggregated with others of their kind pass through to the adoption phase.
More are screened out here.

Of this select group still others fail to

pass through the application phase.

The proportion of needs that actu-

ally result in some public policy impact is very small.
The genesis of this model in the policy analysis tradition in
general and in the work of Rakoff and Schaefer in particular, is documented in the next section.

In Chapter I it was pointed out that im-

proving and refining our model is one of the subsidiary concerns of
this study.

Suggested modifications resulting from empirical testing

on our specific policy areas appear in Chapter VIII.
USE OF THE POLICY APPROACH
Implicit in the above description of the policy process and of
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our model thereof are some of the reasons why the policy approach was
chosen for this study.
here.

These reasons will be more fully explicated

Policy analysis is more generally applicable than many other re-

search techniques.

Of particular importance to this study, it is not

disciplinary bound.

Nor is it limited in its application to a particu-

1ar political milieu.

Admittedly, as we have shown above, many of the

traditional frameworks do have a bias toward developed, Western po1itican systems but these can be modified to reduce, if not eliminate, this
bias.
The policy approach provides a logical framework for longitudinal
analysis, enhanced by the consideration of feedback loops.

Policy for-

mu1ation and implementation require time, and during this time actors,
roles, demands, and responses

CQTI

changes to be taken into account.

change.

This approach allows such

It also allows for the disaggrega-

tion of the decisionmaking process into its component parts for closer
examination.

It can thus be determined whether some sections are more

or less important than others in a particular case, and what relationships exist among them.

Moreover, this disaggregation indicates what

stages of the process are likely to provide the most effective access
to those seeking to influence the policy.
Policy analysis avoids some of the assumptions of the organicfunctional or consensual-homeostatic model and of the deve1opmental21
continuum model often used in comparative research.
For example it
does not posit that any formal interest articulation structures will be
found in the polities under comparison.

As a result many of the diffi-

cu1ties encountered using those models can also be avoided.

This prop-
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erty is likely to prove particularly useful in a study such as this
where a number of important informal operations are to be considered.
In addition, policy can be measured in many terms, financial and symbolic to mention but two.

Or, given the specific foci of this study,

it may be expressed in actual construction of housing and raising of
revenue.
Finally, policy analysis is singularly appropriate to the scope
of this particular dissertation.
by a single researcher.
survey research.

It is capable of being carried out

It does not require extensive and expensive

Nor does it require a vast array of complex elec-

tronic equipment or highly exotic mathematical techniques.

When all is

said and done the choice of an approach depends to a large extent on
the individual researcher's intuition as to what is likely to work.
En fin, the selection of a methodology is a matter of epistemology, as
are the criticisms levelled against the selection.

And there are fora

eminently more suited to epistemological debate than this paper.
THE POLICY ANALYSIS

TRft~ITION

It would be difficult to put an accurate starting date on public
policy analysis as an intellectual exercise.

In the last decade, how-

ever, much literature has appeared attempting to examine the connections between environmental factors such as socioeconomic conditions,
the nature of the political system, and public policy.

This literature

has dealt predominantly with subnationa1 governmental units in the
United States; however, its concern with environment-political structure and process-policy linkages makes it relevant to the study at
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hand.

A total review of this literature would be both prohibitively

time-consuming and inappropriate for our current purposes.

Jones, for

example, in a recent paper examined only five journals for the period
1963-1972 and found 67 articles classifiable as state and local public
22
Nonetheless this section will look briefly at some
policy analysis.
of the more important ones in this tradition.
Most of this literature derives from a 1963 article by Richard
23
Dawson and James Robinson.
They attempted to combine economic and
political science

approaches by considering both political and socio-

economic variables as they related to public policy and by using a comparative rather than a case-study approach.

The model of their choice,

pictured below, was an adaptation of David Easton's flow model of the
political system and the policy process.

v
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Dawson-Robinson model of the policy process.

Policy, in their view consisted of
the goals (objectives of or commitments made by the political system), the means by which they may be implemented and
the consequences of those means . . . the chief output of the
political system and the allocation of values for the society
. . . the outcome of activity or interaction among external
conditions, political system and political process. 24
They considered the relationship of a political variable, extent of
party competition, and a number of economic factors in determining nine
public welfare policies in the American states.
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25
Much the same approach was taken by Dye.

He modified the above

model somewhat by collapsing process and system variables into a single
category which he called the political system.
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Dye model of the policy process.

In this work he also considered several political factors and dealt
with a wide range of state expenditure patterns as the policy outcomes.
He concluded that the political system characteristics--division of the
two-party vote, level of interparty competition, level of voter participation, and degree of malapportionment--had little independent effect
on policy outcomes.

He also provided for the possibility that socio-

economic development variables may bypass the political system altogether (c) and be transformed directly into policy outcomes:
Economic development shapes both political systems and policy outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between
system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed
to the influence of economic development. Differences in the
policy choices of states with different types of political
systems turn out to be largely a product of differing socioeconomic levels, rather than a direct product of political
variables. 26
Economic development was measured by levels of urbanization, industrialization, income and education.
Dye's simple model was adopted by most of the policy analysts who
followed.

No doubt associated with this, their findings continued to
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show an almost preordained policy response to the socioeconomic environment.

Lewis Froman in a study at the city level found that certain

political structures were associated with 'areal' policies while others
were associated with 'segmental' policies, but these structural differences he traced back to the socioeconomic characteristics of 'homoge27

neous' as opposed to 'heterogeneous' communities.

Sharkansky did

find, examining groupings of states, that "the regional location of
states has a relationship with political characteristics that is inde28

pendent of state economic characteristics"

but again this may be re-

garded as a geographical rather than a political factor.

For the most

part, however, the social and economic considerations continued to be
assigned preeminence over political structure and process in the shap29

ing of public policy outputs.
These findings led Robert Salisbury to be overwhelmed by the
possible irrelevance of politics in the American states:
Wealth, urbanization, perhaps settlement patterns, and other
such factors account for both political-system characteristics
and decisional outputs . . . . This, I submit is a devastating
set of findings and cannot be dismissed as not meaning what it
plainly says--that analysis of political systems will not explain policy decisions made by those systems. 30
The political system, then, seemed to play no major role in determining
the quantity of policy output.
mental changes.

At best, it was responsible for incre-

If incrementalism was its only function, it would soon

be rendered obsolete and immaterial.
to be found for the political system.

To avoid this fate, a new job had
Salisbury developed the model

below and posited that the true role of the political system was not to
determine amount of policy output but types of policy.

In other words,

politically-oriented policy analysis could be used to determine the
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situations in which policy would be distributive, redistributive, regulative or self-regulative, depending upon the interactions between
31
patterns of demand and the structure of the decisional system.

Figure 6.

Salisbury model of the policy process.

Interestingly enough he did not address extractive policies, policies
designed to obtain the wherewithal for distribution or redistribution.
Not all political scientists and policy analysts agreed with
these conclusions as to the reduced importance of political factors in
the determination of public policy.

Some, perhaps out of self-preser-

vation, argued that these findings were the results of problems in
32

measurement and analysis.

This line of reasoning held that more pre-

cision and discrimination in selection of political, economic and social variables and greater sophistication in analysis and in evaluation
would surely restore politics to its rightful place at the center of
the policymaking stage.

The basic assumptions as to the appropriate-

ness of the Dye process model, however, seem not to have been seriously
questioned.
In a quantum leap, Rakoff and Schaefer did attack this basic as33
sumption.
They maintained that the models of the policy process used
were insufficient, the underlying theory was inadequate and the variables, both dependent and independent, were chosen more for their availability than for their policy relevance.

Census data were used uncriti-
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cally 'because they were there.'

It was these shortcomings, they sug-

gested, that led to the common finding that politics was not very important in determining policy outcomes.

It was not that politics was,

in fact, unimportant.
They established the following criteria in an attempt to construct
a more valid and realistic approach to such studies whose elements included political, social and economic variables:
The theory must specify the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable, policy, as
well as deal with the relationships among the independent variables. It must possess closure--that is, include among its
elements all the variables which might explain the variation
in the dependent variable. It must be precise, that is, the
elements themselves must be clearly and unambiguously defined.
Finally, the model chosen must be appropriate: it must lead us
to useful statements of the relationships involved, statements
which are empirically verifiable by clear-cut standards. 34
,Using these criteria, they concluded that the various adaptations
of the Eastonian flow model of the political system and the policy process used by most researchers were not sufficient.

They found, agree-

ing with Sharkansky, that
the conversion of environmental conditions into demands requires the intervention of the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of the participants in the system, and also depends upon
the operations of both formal and informal means of decisionmaking. 35
In other words, the level of urbanization itself makes no demands on
the decisionmaking system.

Rakoff and Schaefer also felt that some re-

definition of the boundaries of the political system was necessary.

The

end result of their work was the model shown below (Figure 7, p. 67).
The Rakoff and Schaefer model of the policymaking process, then,
represents an improvement over many of the earlier models, although
its kinship to them can be recognized.

Nonetheless it is not entirely
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suited in an unmodified form to this study.

A number of changes were

made to convert this model to our model of choice (Figure 3).

Some of

these were designed to strengthen the model generally, others are particular adaptations for examining policymaking in developing nations.
According to Rakoff and Schaefer, the 'ecological condition' of
the environment refers to the "location of rivers and ports and mountains, the occurence of natural disasters such as hurricanes or blizzards, or such contemporary events and conditions as the pollution of
36

atmosphere and water."

Ecological conditions, so defined, are not of

the same class as economic and social conditions.

True, rivers and

mountains and ports are not to be ignored but neither do they play any
direct role in the policy process.

They can affect social or economic

factors in the environment and thus be subsumed thereunder.

Hurricanes

and blizzards are unique events and not ongoing characteristics of the
environment.

And while policy may be made to replace housing in or

provide money to refugees from devastated areas, the policies so made
are housing or relief policies, not hurricane or blizzard policies.
Pollution, again, we see as acting on and through the social and economic aspects of the environment.

For all these reasons our adapted

model does not contain the environmental category 'ecological conditions. '
In its place is the category 'political conditions.'

It appears

that these are insufficiently considered in the Rakoff and Schaefer
model.

In their model the existing political milieu is vaguely re-

garded as something through which perceived needs become demands and
enter the political system.

We contend, however, it is more than this.
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Perceived needs arise from the political conditions of the environment
as well as from the social and economic conditions.

Moreover, the pol-

itical environment is also the result of a seri.es of policy outcomes
from the decisionmaking system.

And certain important considerations

such as the condition of political dependence found in developing nations are most appropriately included here.

In summary, the boxes la-

beled 'social,' 'economic,' and 'political' conditions will be filled
with the appropriate elements, listed above on page 11.
In earlier discussion of the policy process it was indicated that
one of the truly difficult conceptual problems was dealing with boundary conditions and this problem arises again here.
perceived needs become demands?

At what point do

The Rakoff and Schaefer model assumes

that the political system is faced with needs and that these needs are
are translated into demands either at the system boundary or within the
system.

It is our contention, however, that needs are most often con-

verted into demands outside the political system and it is demands that
the political system encounters.

In any event, policymaking is a pro-

cess, not merely a series of discrete actions, so the emphasis of policy analysis must be on the linkages, and boundaries are to be treated
as interfaces, not as blockades.
The usual frameworks for policy analysis assume that needs are
perceived and problems identified outside of the political system.

If

this is the case in developed policymaking systems, a debatable proposition, it is certainly not the universal situation in developing nations.

It was suggested earlier that the governments, national and

subnational, in Costa Rica and El Salvador may well play the role of
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patron.

In this case, the needs would be perceived and the problems

identified almost completely within the political system.

This is not

to suggest that adoption and application of policy would thus become
automatic and analysis of decisionrnaking trivial, but it would affect
the shape of the policy process.
For one thing, the aggregation phase could assume less importance
than it is customarily assigned.

This would be the case particularly

where political parties were primarily ideological and/or personalistic
in nature and were not brokerage agencies as the United States' political parties are often regarded.

As a result, nonaggregation of demands

would not necessarily disqualify these from further consideration in
the formulation-adoption stage.
One final modification of the Rakoff-Schaefer model seemed desirable to adapt it for this particular study.

In their model, incipient

policies that are aborted in the aggregation, adoption or application
phases, re-enter the political system as demands.

This mayor may not

be the case; we must be prepared to accept the possibility that such
potential policies, not acted upon, might simply fall into policyrnaking
limbo.
Our debts to Rakoff and Schaefer in particular and to the earlier
policy analysts in general are nonetheless considerable.

Hopefully, our

model, as tested in the field and suitably modified, will be another
incremental step in the development of a nonculturebound framework for
policy analysis, applicable in the developing as well as in the developed countries.
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THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH
One integrative stream can be found running through all of the
studies cited above.

This is the comparative approach.

The diverse

authors have made broad and all-compassing statements on the desirability of comparison in public policy analysis.

Dye, for example, main-

tains that
the development of an explanatory model of public policy,
whether in international politics or American state politics,
requires comparative analysis. Comparative anal~sis occupies
a distinguished place in all political inquiry.3
Froman states flatly, "If we are to develop theory in the public policy
38

field, comparative research is needed."

Nonetheless, we feel it is

useful here to iterate the case for comparative analysis both in general and for this essay in particular.
Perhaps the primary reason for comparing is that at the moment
there exists no absolute standard of performance by which to measure or
evaluate a policymaking system; a result, perhaps, of insufficient metapolicymaking.

We must, then, satisfice, go to second best and measure

systems by comparing them one against the other.

It might be possible,

knowing the inputs into two political systems to calculate net policy
outputs and examine the relative efficiencies of the two systems.

Dror

includes comparative surveys as important means of examining know alternatives, one of his rational subphases of the preparation of major
39

alternatives phase.
A second important reason for comparing is to distinguish a common class of urban phenomena.

One end of all research is the discovery

of empirical generalizations that can be verified and eventually become
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part of an overall explanatory structure.

It is possible in a compara-

tive study to approach the ceteris paribus by choosing subjects of
study in such a manner that the appropriate number of variables are
held constant.

Of course care must be taken to ensure that the ceteris

does not become so paribus as to render the results trivial.
Comparative research may show that certain variables tend to occur
in association, knowledge that could have some explanatory or predictive value.

In fact, we seek covariation among variables with as much

scope of verification as possible.
served:

The usual three caveats must be ob-

assure that the relationship discovered is not spurious, re-

member that statistical association is only an identity and not an explanation, and avoid tautologies.
Harold Lasswell has pointed out that the development of political
science has been hindered by a tendency to view the political process
40

in each territorial unit as unique.

We maintain here, following Wil-

liam Hanna, that the comparative method can lead to the dissolution of
these separate frames of reference, providing opportunities to "extend
generalizations, specify conditions, develop new hypotheses and en41

lighten specific cases."

In short, then, comparative research is un-

dertaken to find explanations for urban phenomena and to separate common from particular explicans.
The comparative method is applicable to policy analysis in general
and to urban research in general.

Again, it is not disciplinary bound.

Further, it is singularly appropriate to the study of the policy process
in developing nations.

Smith lists four reasons why this is so.

First,

[the] comparative perspective is essential if social scientists expect to evaluate public policies or to offer advice to
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policymakers. Second, the examination of non-Western policy
processes can provide insights regarding neglected aspects of
the policy process in Western nations. Third, while it is
useful to study policy in terms of "outputs" in Western countries (often operationalized in public expenditure figures)
such an endeavor in'llany developing countries may result in
misleading explanations. Last, the literature of comparative
politics and comparative administration is a fruitful source
of insights, concepts, and models of policy processes. 42
In Chapter VI our model and the comparative approach are used in
an examination of the actual policymaking process in San Salvador and
San Jose.

Chapter VIII presents the conclusions reached as a result

of this examination, and the modifications suggested as useful by our
empirical testing.
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CHAPTER IV
POLICY AREAS
Chapter I indicated the particular policy areas examined in this
paper are municipal revenue and public provision of low-cost housing.
It is important to choose areas of substantive value for the analysis.
As Cliff Kaufman has pointed out, policy relevance is a necessary if
not sufficient consideration in the determination of research priori1

ties.
One set of reasons, then, for the choice of these areas, lies in
their intrinsic importance.
The other set of reasons is procedural; a great deal of information is available on public finance and public housing.

The policy

outputs may be determined, making it possible to go back and trace the
process through which these outputs were generated.

Moreover, there

exists a set of generally accepted principles against which the actual
/

policies of San Jose and San Salvador are analyzed.
This chapter treats these two policy fields, urban finance and
public housing.

Each will be examined from the viewpoints of their im-

portance to the community and their basic principles.

The specific

processes that lead to their formation will be considered in Chapter VI
and the results of these processes in Chapter VII.
urban finance and later at public housing.

We look first at
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MUNICIPAL REVENUE RAISING
Public finance may in some ways be regarded as the single most
important policy area, for without funds most other policy decisions
made by a municipal or other government agency may well be rendered
moot.
Rudolf Goldschied regarded the field of public finance as so important that he suggested the development of an entirely new science of
'Fiscal Sociology' to "examine the impact of revenue raising as well as
spending policies to the total society in its internal and external relationships."

He went so far as to argue that "public finances repre-

sent the driving motor of the total societal development."

And the two

faces of the Janus of public finance were not to be considered as separate entities:
Tell me how and whence you acquire your revenue and I shall
tell you what your expenditure budget must look like. The
same applies in reverse: Tell me what you want to spend your
money on, and I shall tell you by what means you will get the
required revenue, what class of society you must draw upon and
the size and kind of administrative apparatus you will need
therefore. 2
Budgets, then, are not only accounting ledgers of income and expenses
but are also overall indicators of policy responses and provide insights as to the general mindsets of the agencies preparing them.
This holds just as true for urban areas of Latin America as for
the general case.

Further, in the case of comparative urban studies in

Latin America, "Research on the causes and consequences of urban growth
has focused on demographic, sociological, and physical aspects of the
3

topic far more than on economic and political dimensions."

Public

finance, manifestly, contains both economic and political dimensions,
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and a study such as this should serve as one small particle in filling
the research hiatus suggested above.
Pragmatically, public finance as a policy field lends itself to
the researcher's needs.

Even in jurisdictions with rather primitive

data gathering and handling procedures, government revenues and expenditures, by class, are among the first data to be quantified and tabulated and made more or less readily accessible to the public.

More-

over, there exists a corpus of public finance, or at least revenue
raising, theory as to what are the 'right' ways to go about raising
money in certain places at certain times for certain purposes.

Such

theory suggests, for example, where taxes are to be preferred to user
charges.

Comparisons of the public finance policies of the two poli-

ties can be more meaningfully made against such a background.
It is appropriate at this point to describe briefly the principIes of public finance and more specifically, of tax policy.

Follow-

ing this some particularly urban applications will be examined along
with some considerations of taxes vis-a-vis user charges.

Finally,

we will look at the developmental paradigm of Luiz de Moraes, a model
4
It is
designed especially for municipal finances in Latin America.
this model that will serve as our norm in the light of which the revenue systems of San Jos~ and San Salvador will be compared.
There exists, at least at some level of generalization, agreement as the the bases of taxation of practical postulates of tax policy.

The outline below was suggested by Wagner some 90 years ago,

but remains a useful general statement as to what 'good' taxation
should involve.

Each of the nine criteria will be commented upon
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briefly.

In considering these it must be remembered that the choice

of tax or other revenue policy is ultimately a political choice.
A. Financial Principles:
1. Adequacy of yield.
2. Flexibility of taxation.
B. Economic principles:
3. Choice of correct sources of taxation, i.e., especially
examination of the question whether taxes should be
levied on individual and national income only or also
on individual and national wealth (capital), and whether
and how far a distinction must be made between the interests of the individual and the national economy.
4. Choice of the kind of tax, in the light of the effect
of taxation and of different kinds of taxes on the taxpayers, and general examination of the problem of tax
shifting.
C. Principles of justice, or of the equitable distribution of
taxation:
5. Universality, and
6. Equality of taxation.
D. Principles of tax administration (or principles of the administrative efficiency of the tax system:
7. Determinacy of taxation.
8. Convenience.
9. Effort to ensure the lowest possible collection costs. S
The first principle, adequacy of yield, requires little explanation.

There is no point in levying a tax if it is not going to bring

in sufficient revenue to justify itself.

This principle is, unfortun-

ately, widely violated in certain jurisdictions that attempt to regulate morality by taxing such commodities as tobacco, liquor and commer6
cial sex.
Insofar as these taxes are designed to raise revenue, they
are legitimate.
are illegitimate.

Insofar as they are designed to uplift morals, they
This latter activity may be an appropriate role for

churches and ministeries of culture, but not for tax policy.
A good tax must also be flexible.

It should be designed so as
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to increase quickly when necessary, and to be lowered or discontinued
when the needs for revenue decrease or are better met from some other
source.

Income taxes are relatively flexible taxes; as income rises

so do taxes therefrom, and rates are relatively easily changed by the
appropriate legislative bodies.

Examples of inflexible taxes are fixed

amount head or poll taxes.
The choice of correct sources of taxation is very important, and
regrettably, seems to receive insufficient consideration in many jurisdictions.

The question of whether income only should be taxed, or also

capital, is only one of these issues.

It can be argued that if income

as return to capital is taxed, capital should not be taxed.

Capital

diminished by taxation cannot generate as much income, hence, not as
much income tax.

It must also be remembered that whatever the ostensi-

ble tax base, income and capital are the only sources of taxes.

Prop-

erty taxes are not paid in land nor mining taxes with ore; all taxes
are paid with money and money comes from capital or income.
The kinds of taxes selected should also take into account effects
other than just revenue raising.

Will a capital gains tax, for example,

discourage investment in the economy, with a consequent loss of current
or potential jobs, hurting not only the individuals involved but perhaps jeopardizing future income tax revenue?

Tax policy need also be

formulated in such a way as to ensure, as far as possible, that those
upon whom the tax is levied actually pay it.

If a payroll tax is im-

posed on an employer for example, how much of the cost does the employer actually absorb, how much is shifted forward to his customers,
and how much is shifted backward onto his employees?

An

additional con-
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sideration, in the case of export taxes, is whether or not the ultimate
tax burden can be shifted totally out of the country.
Justice in taxation involves considerations of universality and
equality.

Today the terms horizontal and vertical equity are commonly

used, and it is worthwhile to consider these concepts in somewhat more
7

detail.
uous.

Of these, horizontal equity is the clearer and more unambigOnce the criteria for equality are chosen, all individuals

equal in these criteria should pay equal taxes.
the choice of criteria.

The problem lies in

In the realm of personal income for example,

should income itself be chosen, or is consumption expenditure more
equitable?
fined?

And how is income, including nonmonetary income, to be de-

Although the principle is precise, the difficulties in opera-

tionalizing it are legion.
Horizontal equity, then, demands that equals be taxed equally.
Its corollary, vertical equity, calls for unequals to be treated unequally.

But how unequally are they to be treated?

Should the wealth-

ier, however defined, pay the same proportion of their income in taxes
as the poor, with their greater dollar sacrifice regarded as sufficient
inequality?

Or should those with higher incomes also pay a higher pro-

portion of their income in taxes?

Some of the arguments for this lat-

ter viewpoint have been presented above in the discussion of the diminishing marginal utility of money.
Some economists cite the principle of vertical equity as the
ability-to-pay approach. Musgrave has identified three schools of
8
thought in this genre.
In the first of these, the expenditure side
of the budget is ignored and only the tax burden is considered.

The
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state is to impose tax shares in an equitable manner.

The nature of

this equity is to be determined by non-economic, non-political factors.
A wide variety of viewpoints is thus encompassed in this school; the
specific concept of equity depending on the ethical, philosophical,
and/or religious proclivities of the individual advocate.

The second

school, of which John Stuart Mill is the leading spokesman, also ignores the expenditure side.

Here the distribution of the tax burden is

a matter of welfare economics.

The burden is to be distributed so as

to minimize total societal sacrifice and this can be achieved only by
taxing each taxpayer up to the point where the marginal sacrifices of
all taxpayers are equal.

The third view kept the welfare approach in

determining tax shares but expanded the argument to include the expenditure side of the budget:

"Thus the budget came to be seen as a more
9

or less general plan to maximize welfare."

Under this third view, it

was possible to increase the tax share of the poor and still maintain
vertical equity on the grounds that if the poor benefited disproportionately from public sector expenditures, it was equitable to ask them
to pay more.
It may be argued, of policies in general as well as tax policies
in particular, that no policy can be better than its administration.
One of the factors to be considered is determinacy of yield.

An inher-

itance tax in a jurisdiction composed of a few large, wealthy landholdings, where the oldest child by law inherited the family estate, might
well, in a 50-year averaging period, yield adequate revenues but
there would be no guarantee that in anyone-year period the government
would have sufficient funds to operate.

An income tax, however, with
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monthly or weekly withholding provisions, would yield a determined
amount of revenue.
Convenience is a two-sided coin.
matter of convenience to the taxpayer.

On the one face there is the
A tax payable a little each

payday is for most taxpayers more convenient than one to be paid in a
lump sum once each year.

Convenience to the tax collector means the

minimum effort exerted for each dollar in revenue obtained.

The prop-

erty tax, which requires the taxing unit to assess and reassess and
maintain extensive and elaborate records, and which the taxpayer must
pay in a lump sum once each year an amount generally unknown until the
bill arrives, is about as inconvenient a tax as one could devise.
Finally, the taxing unit wishes to obtain its revenue at the lowest possible cost.

A tax in which cost of collection is a large per-

centage of the yield is to be avoided.

The most common way of minimi-

zing tax collection costs is to pass them on to someone else.

This is

part of the reason why income and payroll taxes, in which the employer
has to do the bookkeeping, and sales taxes, where the merchant absorbs
the collection costs, are so attractive to tax administrators.
In examining the above principles of taxation as a whole, two apparently dichotomous strains can be determined.
tuality can be found.
one implies the other.

In one, a certain mu-

Some of these principles fit naturally together;
But in different cases, two or more of the

principles seem to be almost mutually exclusive.

It is unlikely that

a single tax or tax system scoring high on each of these principles can
be devised.

At least, however, it should be possible to design tax

policy that violates as few of them as possible.

Again, tradeoffs need

85

be made and for all the guidance of economic principles, the determination of tax policy is in the final analysis a matter of politics.
The tax and revenue principles discussed above apply to all
levels of government.
of its own.

Each level, however, has specific considerations

Discussed below are some of the considerations that are

particular to local government.

Urban jurisdictions have three special

pecularities that need be taken into account:

first, the presence of

spillover effects; second, the need for an appropriate mix of taxes and
user charges for local services; and third, the existence of legal and
political restraints on local revenue raising.
In most urban areas there are a number of services providing benefits to non-residents of the local government jurisdiction.

These bene-

ficiaries consume these services at no cost to themselves but at the expense of the taxpaying resident.

Consequently the residents are often,

reasonably, unwilling to tax themselves heavily to provide
vices.

these ser-

As a result, adequate levels of these services are often not
10

provided.
One strategy commonly adopted in the attempt to internalize these
externalities is the areal expansion of the urban government jurisdiction to make it, as far as possible, coincident with the area in which
the services it provides are enjoyed.

It can readily be seen, however,

that there are finite limits on the extent to which this can be done.
Another possible solution is to shift the cost of financing these particular services to a higher level of government whose jurisdiction
contains all the beneficiaries.

This solution is seldom attractive to

the level of government expected to absorb these costs.

Moreover, the
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lower level of government is more often than not reluctant to transfer
any of its functions, as opposed to the costs, to the higher level.

A

third possibility is the financing of the specific services involved
through user charges rather than taxes.

If this is done, there is far

less likelihood of a serious undersupply.
The benefit principle, then, is the basic philosophical underpinning for user charges, just as the ability-to-pay principle, discussed
above, forms the basis of much of the decisionmaking process in the
realm of taxation.

The questions are often raised as to why a govern-

ment should engage in supplying anything but those public goods whose
free provision benefits the society in general, and why might governments take part in various quasi-business activities designed to serve
a myriad of special ends.

One answer has been suggested above.

An-

other is that many of these goods are not pure public goods but quasipublic goods.

The exclusion principle still holds, at least in part.

This being the case, it is appropriate for a government to levy some
kind of charge rather than paying for the good completely out of general tax revenue.
It has been suggested by the Tax Foundation that
four major reasons underlie government provision of goods
and services for a fee. These are: (1) the expectation of
undesirable by-products if produced privately; (2) low profitability of the enterprise; (3) cost advantages related to
joint products, one of which must £e government provided; (4)
tradition or historical accident. l
The nature of urban governments is such that more of the services they
provide fit these categories than is the case with national governments.
Consequently, user charges playa more important role in municipal finances than in national finances.

In the United States, for example,
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about 15 percent of local government revenue is derived from user
charges while the federal government receives some two percent of its
12
revenue from this source.
It will be shown that this difference is
not as great in the Central American countries where the national governments provide many of the chargeable services rendered by local
governments in Anglo America.
A brief listing of some of the commonly provided urban services
indicates their amenability to user charges.

Among these are urban

mass transit, water, sewage, on-street parking, hospitals, bridges and
tunnels, garbage pick-up, public housing rental, operation of sanitary
landfills, and vector control.

A major difficulty with these is deter-

mining the proper rate of charge and the proportion of service cost to
be user-charged rather than financed out of general tax revenue.

The

general view is that user charges need not cover the entire cost of
the service provided, that a partial subsidy from general tax revenues
is appropriate.

Some economists, however, hold that if user charges

are to be applied they should pay the entire cost of the service.

Alan

Prest, speaking specifically of developing nations such as Costa Rica
and El Salvador, maintains the user charges
must cover all current operating costs, appropriate depreciation allowances (a replacement value basis for renewable
assets, an alternative use value for non-renewable assets), a
contribution towards capital costs of expansion and a contribution towards the costs of public overhead expenditures. 13
In addition to the problems attendant upon revenue raising per se,
municipalities must also deal with legal and political restrictions,
to which higher levels of government are not subject.

Municipal gov-

ernments, wherever found, are creatures of superior governments and
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have only such freedom in revenue raising as these superior governments
are prepared to grant.

In practice this generally means that the most

lucrative sources, income and excise taxes for example, are appropriated by national or state governments, leaving the municipalities only
such purely local sources as property taxes and user charges on urban
services.

Moreover, the higher level of government often places formal

limits on the amount of the local levy or requires that any change in
rate or new charge or tax be submitted for its approval before going
into effect.
The second major set of restrictions on local government revenue
raising is political rather than legal.

In many jurisdictions certain

sets of revenue measures are submitted to the electorate for its direct
approval in plebiscites or referenda.

The governing body then must not

only decide on a revenue policy but also sell it to the voters.

And

experience has shown that electors often adopt some criterion other
than general societal welfare when voting on money matters.

Even if

not consulted directly on revenue measures, voters often express their
opinions, usually negative, when those officials who have introduced
these measures seek reelection.

Local government officials are far

more vulnerable in this respect than those at higher levels.

It has

been suggested, in fact, that city councilmen are often voted out of
office in a form of indirect protest against, or at least frustration
with, tax increases at higher levels of government.

Municipal offi-

cials, particularly those with aspirations to higher office, may be
understandably reluctant to adopt revenue policies calling for higher
taxes or user charges even when they are convinced that such increases
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would be in the city's best interests.
Finally, municipal revenue raising in Latin America, where the
municipalities are even weaker than in Anglo America, has some characteristics and problems of its own.

De Moraes lists some of these:

the

patrimonial base of much of the municipal levy, the determination of
many rates ad speciem rather than ad valorem, and a revenue raising
system based generally on medieval criteria.
In the majority of cases there is no direct relationship
with a justified base for taxation and the only important argument in favor of maintaining [this system] is that it produces income (albeit in insufficient amounts).14
He sees the consequences of this as "a static economy, deficient public
services and a strong tendency to centralization" and suggests an overall long-run scheme for improvement.
8 and 9, pages 90 and 91.

This plan is summarized in Figures

Chapter VII below will detail the extent to

which his criticisms are accurate with respect to San Jose and San Salvador, and indicate the extent to which progress is being made toward
fulfillment of his developmental paradigm.
As shown in Figure 8, de Moraes suggests that municipal tax systerns can also evolve from the current systems, which he characterizes
as medieval, to a future system in which the economy is fully understood
and the tax system can be fine tuned to both generate adequate revenue
and encourage economic development.

In actuality, individual municipal

tax systems are more likely to be located somewhere along a continuum
than contained totally within one of his three boxes.

We see, for ex-

ample, tax systems using both ad valorem and ad speciem impositions.
We will however, determine which of his models San Jos~ and San Salvador most closely resemble.

System
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Figure 8.
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Figure 9 suggests some alternative strategies for modifying tax
systems, and the likely financial effects of these on various levels of
government.

De Moraes shows an appreciation for the redistribution of

costs and benefits--and the actual increase, in some cases, of costs.
His alternatives do not--as in fact his theory generally does not-consider the political nature of the tax structure.

Nonetheless, it is

the best, and only, effort of its kind undertaken to date and will be
used as a standard against which to evaluate the tax systems of San
Salvador and San Jose.
PUBLIC HOUSING
As was the case with revenue, public housing policy is both important qua policy and an intriguing if complex field of investigation
for the policy analyst.

The housing shortage, it is said, is no more

than an ugly rumor circulated by people who have no place to live.
Joseph Fried, however, has stated:
So far as the housing situation in the developing countries
of Asia, Africa and Latin America is concerned, the only word
that can possibly describe it is catastrophic. 15
Various figures are given to supply a quantitative dimension to this
catastrophe.

A number of these will be considered below but as one

example Marcia Keith and colleagues calculated the minimum number of
new dwellings that would need to be built in 1975 alone as 19,360 in
Costa Rica and 35,991 in El Salvador.

Of these 11,334 of the Costa

Rican units and 24,825 of the Salvadorean would be required in urban
16
areas.
The most visible evidence of the housing crisis in Latin America,
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and in most of the developing world, is the existence of shanty towns
or squatter settlements on the margins of the larger cities, or on va17
Inhabitants have constructed makeshift shelcant land within them.
ters of plywood, cardboard, flattened tin cans and oil drums and anything else they have been able to assemble.

These settlements may reach

considerable size; over 1,000,000 people are said to inhabit horne-made
shantytowns on the outskirts of Calcutta and more than 600,000 squatters
occupy the barriadas of Lima.
These squatters, mainly recent migrants, have exhibited a surprising degree of organizational skill in their construction of their colonies.

Alan Paton gives this account of the process of creating a shan-

tytown in Capetown from the squatters' viewpoint.
-Do you hear what Dubula says? That We must put up our own
houses here in Orlando?
-And where do we put up the houses?
-On the open ground by the railway line, Dubula says.
-And of what do we build the houses?
-Anything you can find. Sacks and planks and grass from the
veldt and poles from the plantations.
-And when it rains?
-Siyafa. Then we die.

***

There is the open ground by the railway line, but what of the
rain and the winter? They say we must go there, all go together, fourteen days from today. They say we must get together the planks and the sacks and the tins and the poles,
and all move together. They say we must all pay a shilling
a week to the committee, and they will move all our rubbish
and put up lavatories for us, so that there is no sickness.
But what of the rain and the winter?

***

Two weeks from today, that is the day of the moving. Corne my
husband, let us get the planks and the tins and the sacks and
the poles. I do not like the place where we are. There are
planks at the Bragwanath Hospital, left there by the builders.
Let us go tonight and carry them away. There is corrugated
iron at the Reformatory, they use it to cover the bricks. Let
us go tonight and carry it away. There are sacks at the
Nancefield Station, lying neatly packed in bundles. Let us
go tonight and carry them away. There are trees at the Crown
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Mines.

Let us go tonight and cut a few poles quietly.

***

This night they are busy in Orlando. At one house after another the lights are burning. I shall carry the iron, and
and you my wife the child, and you my son two poles, and you
small one, bring as many sacks as you are able, down to the
land by the railway lines. Many people are moving there, you
can hear the sound of digging and hammering already. It is
good that the night is warm and there is no rain. Thank you,
Mr. Dubula, we are satisfied with this piece of ground. Thank
you, Mr. Dubula, here is our shilling for the committee.

***

Shantytown is up overnight. What a surprise for the people
when they wake up in the morning. Smoke comes up through the
sacks, and one or two have a chimney already. There was a
nice chimney-pipe lying there at the Kliptown Police Station,
but I was not such a fool as to take it. 18
Although these settlements are better than no housing at all, it
is obvious that they are not regarded by either the inhabitants or the
government as satisfactory long-term solutions to the housing problem.
It is equally obvious that the squatters, and many others, do not have
the financial resources to successfully compete in the private housing
market, especially in rapidly growing cities.

Public housing policies

arise, at least In part, as responses to situations of this sort and it
is with these policies, the actors involved, the uses to which public
housing may be put, and the motives involved that the housing sections
of this essay are concerned.

It is this great variety in possible per-

mutations and combinations of responses, actors, uses and motives that
make the housing policy field in Costa Rica and El Salvador so attractive to the analyst.
One possible policy response suggested from time to time is the
simple transfer of funds to the ill-housed, enabling them to compete in
the private housing market.

This might work in areas where there was

available a large amount of vacant if expensive housing.

In rapidly
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growing areas such as San Salvador and San Jose, however, this practice
would do no more than inflate the price of an already scarce commodity.
Moreover, it is difficult for the granting agency to ensure the money
is spent for housing.

Some economists argue that this transfer payment

approach would have the advantage of not distorting consumer preferences, but on the whole this is not a practical approach to alleviatlng
the lot of the poorly housed.
Netzer has pointed out that in market economies, governments
have equipped themselves with a large number of policy tools
designed to increase the accessible supply of good quality
housing, either in general or for selected income groups, by
lowering the price at which housing is offered to consumers
or offering gpecial incentives for public and private builders
of housing. 1
He divides these policies into four major types according to their principal effects, viz.
1. Subsidizing the initial outlay for land and construction
of housing.
2. Making mortgage credit cheaper and more readily available.
3. Changing factors that affect the costs of construction and
land and, thereby, the price at which a newly completed, unsubsidized housing unit can be sold or rented.
4. Affecting the tax burdens borne by housing occupants and
investors in housing. 20
The idea of subsidizing land and construction developed in Europe
and was imported into the Americas.

Agencies were created, either

autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies of the national government or
local public authorities, which issued bonds to raise the funds required
for new housing.

Rents, scaled to income, were collected from the ten-

ants (in some cases the public housing clients purchased rather than
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rented, but rental is more common) and subsidies from the national government were used to make up the difference between revenue collected
and costs.

Tenancy in this kind of housing has, in the United States

generally, been restricted to the very poor.
It is worth noting that some of the problems which have severely
hampered this type of program in the United States have been weaker or
absent in much of Latin America.
'project' is missing.

The supposed stigma of living in a

Despite the accelerating pace of suburbanization

on the Anglo-American model, the outskirts of the city where land for
subsidized housing is available are not necessarily the preserve of
middle-income homeowners.

In addition, the poor are usually not as

ethnically distinct and distinguishable from their middle-class neighbors as is the case in many U.S. cities; hence there is not the same
degree of antipathy toward them.

We might expect to see, therefore,

greater success with this sort of operation in San Jose and San Salvador than in Los Angeles or Detroit.
The making of mortgage credit cheaper and more available generally takes one of three forms.

Of these, the most widespread is the

provision of national government guarantees or insurance of conventional mortgages.

Lenders, their losses covered, can then afford to

offer mortgages at lower rates over longer terms with a smaller down
payment.

This scheme has benefited primarily lower middle- to middle-

class families that may have been short on cash but had adequate longterm income prospects; it did little to help the truly poor.
The second credit policy involves the borrowing of funds by government at the lower rates it can command and the relending, at these
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lower rates, to individual builders and house buyers.
policy is actually an expansion of the second.

The third credit

Here government pro-

vides mortgage credit at rates even below its own cost of borrowing.
In effect it subsidizes the individual borrowers.

While these policies

reach farther into the low-income ranks than the first credit policy,
once again they do not benefit the poorest.

Often they are used to

provide favored treatment to select groups; in the U.S., veterans, and
in Latin America, public employees.

It is worth speculating on the

possible policy implications in this field of a totally nationalized
banking system such as is found in Costa Rica.
Policies designed to actually decrease the costs of land assembly
and housing construction are to be preferred, economically and politically, to the provision of subsidies.

A difficulty here is that even if

massive construction cost savings were achieved, the savings to the tenant would be small.

If, for example, a reduction of one-quarter in ma-

terials costs and one-third in on-site labor costs were realized,
monthly housing costs to consumers would decrease by less than ten per21
cent.
Nonetheless, there are possibilities for savings here.

One way

would be to replace outdated material standards for construction with
performance standards.

Other options include experimentation, more

widespread abroad than in the U.S., with such concepts as cooperative
housing construction and various forms of self-help.

It would seem that

the organizational skills and spirit of cooperation manifested by the
squatters in their construction of tugurios could be channeled, with
some governmental aid, into the construction of adequate permanent hous-
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ing.

The extent to which this can be done will be examined below in

our specific discussion of housing policies in Costa Rica and EI Salvador.
The final policy tool to be considered here is the adoption of
policies to reduce taxes on housing.

Local property taxes cannot be

passed on, either by homeowners or by landlords to tenants already
spending the maximum they can possibly afford on housing.

As a result,

landlords either evict their poorest tenants where this is feasible or
cut other costs such as maintenance.

Once-adequate housing may thus

deteriorate to the point where it is no longer habitable.

The nature

of the depreciation allowance under income tax regulations may affect,
usually adversely, the quality of rental housing constructed.

In this

respect, as in so many cases, central government policy is often at
odds with local government wishes.

Where the landlord is an agency of

the central government, it not only does not pay local property tax itself but removes from the rolls land that could be used for tax-paying
private activities.

Moreover, most local governments depend so heavily

on the property tax that major reductions would severely restrict their
ability to provide essential services.

Useful policy tools here will

arise only from expanded intergovernmental cooperation.
The actors in the field of provision of low-cost public housing
are many and varied.

The largest group is, of course, the clientele or

potential clientele of the housing.

In closest contact with the clients

is the proximate supplier of the housing, generally a local or national
governmental agency.

Closely related to this agency are the other

agencies providing such support services as water and electricity.

Un-
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derlying all of this is the funding agency.
often the federal government.

In the U.S. this is most

In Latin America, the national govern-

ments are usually unable to undertake the full funding of public housing; thus extranational actors come into the policy picture.

These may

be foreign governments such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) or international bodies such as the Banco Interamericano
de Desarollo (BID) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD).

Private extranational actors such as the Ford Foun-

dation may also be involved.

In addition to external funding agencies,

outside actors providing technical expertise and aid may play a part in
the policy process as well.

Finally, nationally based private agencies

may also be involved in the provision of low-cost housing.

They will

be considered here primarily in order to compare them with governmental
agencies in terms of performance, efficiency, choice of client groups,
motives and the nature of the decisionmaking process.
Public housing policy may have many uses in addition to the obvious one of providing lower-income people with a place to live. The
22
government may use it for social experimentation.
For example, it
may wish to see if providing housing units of a certain size affects
the birth rate or encourages the nuclear vis-a-vis the extended family.
Housing policy may also be used to generate employment, both directly
in the construction of housing units and indirectly in that workers engaged in this construction may develop or upgrade skills that are marketable in other sectors.

In addition, housing policy may have a

breeder effect, as for example encouraging the development of a local
building materials industry.
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Sean Elliott suggests still another use, increasing productivity.
He reports that the study of Vicos in Peru showed that housing per se
was strongly related to worker productivity, enough so to justify the
capital outlay.

Elliott concluded that "low cost housing construction

in Latin America is justified on economic as well as political and
23
social grounds."
This being the case, housing can be regarded as a
capital good as well as a consumer good and occupy a whole different
place in the development expenditure hierarchy.

Finally, public hous-

ing may be used to influence migration and settlement patterns.

This

may be done locally to guide land use within the municipality or on a
national scale to locate settlement appropriately in relation to
planned employment opportunities and service delivery networks.
As varied as the uses to which public housing policy may be put
are the motives that inspire its creation.

The political system may

simply be responding to a manifest need for shelter.

Or it may see

certain housing provisions as fitting into a general plan.
ation of tugurios may be regarded as good housekeeping.

The elimin-

Perhaps the

government wishes to neutralize negative externalities from the illhoused sector of the populace such as the spread of fire, crime or vice
into middle-class neighborhoods.

It could be that the authorities wish

to obviate the possibility of a cholera epidemic.

The motives underly-

ing the provision of low-cost public housing may be purely political;
the system may be trading housing for votes, support, or overt recognition of its legitimacy.
on the verge of rebellion.

Or it may be necessary to pacify a citizenry
Most likely, no one motive underlies all

public housing policy but it is worth investigating to see which ones
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tend to be the strongest instigating forces in which polity under what
conditions.
There does not exist a pure theory of public housing provision
applicable in all situations as there exists a set of taxation principIes.

Nonetheless, there do exist criteria for the efficient operation

of a low-cost, money-losing public housing scheme as well as a fairly
generally usable set of objectives for housing policy in developing
areas.

Musgrave offers the following observation on efficiency from a

public finance viewpoint:
In the efficient system, a loss operation in low-cost housing involves (1) a policy of distributional adjustment in
favor of low incomes, since only low-cost housing is involved;
(2) a recognition of housing as a merit want, since the distributional adjustment is not made in cash; and (3) a preference for public production management, since otherwise 10wcost housing might have been provided by subsidies to private
firms. 24
Charles Abrams recognizes that housing objectives in developing
countries must by their very nature be situational, varying with such
factors as financial resources, housing shortfall, level of economic
development, state of the current housing supply, geographical considerations, and a myriad of social and political pressures.

With this

caveat in mind, he offers a set of policy objectives that "are probably
appropriate for most countries."

These thirteen objectives are:

1. Priority in Housing Production for Lower-Income Families
2. Opportunity for Homeownership by Low-Income Families at Low
Costs
3. A Housing Program Offering Reasonable Choices of Environment
4. A Sound Financing Policy Enabling Low- and Moderate-Income
Families to Buy Homes
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5. Encouragement of Savings
6. A Sound System of Subsidies
7. A More Effective Building Industry
8. Reduction of Home Construction Costs
9. The Placement of Industry Where a Minimum of Housing Has
to Be Built
10. A Reasonable Program for Rehousing Squatters
11. Prevention of Squatting
12. Encouragement of Cooperation
25

13. Sensible Rent Controls or Their Repeal.

Many of these objectives have already been considered in our discussion of the sorts of policy tools governments have adopted to aid in
the provision of accessible housing.

These objectives will be examined

in more detail as we consider which of them are particularly appropriate
in San Jose and San Salvador, and the degree of success in meeting them
in these urban areas.

Two of the objectives, however, a sound system

of subsidies and a reasonable program for rehousing squatters, merit
further discussion here.
Whatever the precise nature of the subsidy, whether it takes the
form of cash subsidy, deficit subsidy, interest rebate, writedown of
land or building costs or some other form, four general rules guide the
dispensation of subsidies.

In the first place, a subsidy should serve

a public purpose and be part of a defined, long-term objective.

The

legislative authorization should be clear and unambiguous, and not allow
excessive administrative discretion.

To this end the appropriation

should be made periodically and not renewed without careful scrutiny
of the agency's operations.
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Secondly, if there is a necessary choice to be made between single and multiple purpose subsidies, the multiple service subsidy is to
be preferred.

Subsidies for low-cost housing are rated high here be-

cause the same dollar not only provides housing but also, it is claimed,
stimulates employment, reduces social tensions caused by squatting and
cuts down on the whole variety of negative externalities associated
with the housing shortage.
Third, the subsidy should be defined and certain, open and not
hidden.

It must be realized, however, that there are occasions upon

which political realities will require that the subsidy be kept out of
sight.
Finally, subsidies should be distributed equitably and without
favoritism within the group they are designed to serve.

That is, if

subsidies are destined for members of a certain income class, each member of that class should have equal access to the subsidy.

Subsidies

should not be used, for example, to reward the politically faithful who
meet income criteria.

Again, it should be remembered that these are

ideal principles of subsidization and political realities could cause
to last two especially to be honored primarily in the breach.
A program for rehousing squatters must contain two major elements:
a fixed, known date for their removal from the squatter settlement and
someplace for them to move at this time.

The primary concern, there-

fore, is with the provision of housing, without which there can be no
successful relocation.

As far as possible, relocation of squatters

should be carried out en masse, mcving whole colonies if possible rather
than one household at a time.

The government should not dismiss the
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possibility that certain shantytowns might best be turned over to the
squatters, with aid provided to help them upgrade their on-site housing
and appropriate compensation paid to the owners of the appropriated
property.

It is worth noting that the problems facing governments in

the relocation of squatters in the developing nations parallel closely
those of the U.S. in its Urban Renewal programs.

Had the public au-

thorities in the U.S. heeded these basic relocation principles, it is
possible that much of the citizen disenchantment with the 'Federal Bulldozer' could have been averted.
In the section above we have noted briefly some of the factors involved in public housing policy.

Possible actors, motives, uses and

policy responses have been considered.

Some basic principles of effi-

ciency in low-cost housing and objectives of housing policy for developing countries have been mentioned.

It is with this tableau as backdrop
/

that the housing policies affecting the urban areas of San Jose and San
Salvador will be examined in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER V
BACKGROUND FACTORS
It has been stated that we assume a number of political, social
and economic background factors affect both the policymaking process
and the policy products in San Jos~ and San Salvador.
have been listed above, page 11.

These factors

In this chapter these specific fac-

tors are examined with a view to both assessing their individual impacts and determining which ones vary sufficiently between the two
cities as to possibly account for differences in policy.
POLITICAL FACTORS
The political considerations, again, are
1. Structure of city government
2. Relations between municipal and national governments
3. Role of parties and elections
4. Importance of non-governmental groups in the policy
process
5. Policy preferences of leaders of city governments
These categories are not all mutually exclusive; certain elements might
as well be considered in one as in another.

Nonetheless an attempt

will be made here to examine the various data under the most logically
appropriate headings.
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Structure of City Government
Under the structure of city government the following are included:

constitutional provisions, legal duties and obligations, leg-

islative and administrative organization.

A reasonable argument could

be made for treating the constitutional milieux of the cities in the
section on national-local relations.

However, we have decided that be-

cause of the preeminence of this topic and its function as a base for
examination of other political factors it merits discussion prior to
any of the others.

The sections of the constitutions dealing with mu-

nicipal governments are as brief as they are important.

Consequently,

they are reproduced here in their entirety.
In the Costa Rican Constitution, the eight articles dealing most
directly with municipal government are compiled into one chapter as
shown below.
Article 168. For purposes of public administration, the national territory is divided into provinces; these are divided
into cantons and the cantons into districts. The law may establish special circwnscriptions.
The Legislative Assembly, by observing the requirements for
the partial amendment of this Constitution, may create new
provinces,' provided that the respective proposal is previously
approved by a plebiscite which the Assembly shall order to be
held in the province or provinces which are to be divided.
The creation of new cantons must be approved by the Legislative Assembly by a vote of not less than two thirds of the
entire membership.
Article 169. The administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be entrusted to a municipal government, consisting of a deliberative body composed of municipal regidores selected by popular election and such executive official as the law may determine.
Article 170.

Municipal corporations are autonomous.

Article 171.

Munic~pal

regidores shall be elected for a term
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of four years and the position shall be compulsory.
The law shall specify the number of regidores and the manner
in which they shall serve. However, the municipalities of
the central cantons of provinces shall consist of not less
that five titular regidores and a like number of alternates.
The municipal officials shall be installed on July first of
the corresponding year.
Article 172. Each district shall be represented in the municipality of the respective canton by a titular sindico and alternate, with the right to speak but not to vote.
Article 173.

Municipal ordinances may be:

1) Objected to by the official whom the law designates, by a
veto with explanation;
2) Appealed by any interested party.
In either case, if the municipality does not revoke or amend
the ordinance objected to or appealed, the case shall be referred to such court of the judicial power as the law may
specify, for final decision.
Article 174. The law shall specify those cases which the
municipalities require legislative authorization to contract
loans, encumber their properties or revenues, or alienate
movable or immovable property.
Article 175. The municipalities shall fix their ordinary and
extraordinary budgets which, in order to take effect, must be
approv~d by the comptroller general, who shall supervise their
executlon. 1
Additional constitutional provisions affecting municipalities in
Costa Rica provide that:

the ordinary budget include all probable rev-

enues and authorized expenditures for the fiscal year, expenditures may
not exceed probable revenues and the fiscal year is the calendar year
(Article 176); contracts for execution of public works, purchases and
sales or leases of property must be through bids (Article 182); the
comptroller general is to examine and approve or disapprove the municpal budgets, their execution and liquidation (Article l84[2J).
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In the Salvadorean Constitution, Chapter One of the section on the
Administrative System contains the seven articles specifically addressed to local government.

These are:

Article 101. For purposes of political administration, the
territory of the republic is divided into departments, the
number and boundaries of which shall be fixed by law. Each
department shall have a governor and a substitute governor,
appointed by the executive power.
Article 102. To be a governor the following qualifications
are required: to be a Salvadorian, a layman, over twentyfive years of age, to be in exercise of the rights of citizenship, having been so for three years immediately preceding his appointment, to be of well-known morality and education, and a native or resident of the department. In the
latter case, two years' residence immediately preceding appointment is necessary.
Article 103. For purposes of local government, the departments are divided into municipalities, which are governed by
municipal councils consisting of a mayor (alcalde), a syndic
(sindico) and two or more aldermen (regidores), the number of
whom shall be in proportion to the population.
The members of the municipal council shall be elected for a
term of two years, may be reelected, and their qualifications
shall be determined by law.
Article 104. Municipal funds may not be centralized in the
general funds of the state and may not be used except for municipal services.
The municipal councils shall administer their resources for
the benefit of the community, and shall submit detailed and
documented accounts of their administration to the appropriate
court.
Article 105. The law shall specify the powers of the munlClpal councils, which shall be purely economic and administrative.
The municipal councils are autonomous in the exercise of their
functions. As juridical persons, they are liable for their
acts as a body, or their individual members may be so liable,
as the law may prescribe.
They shall prepare their schedules of local taxes, to be submitted to the Legislative Assembly for enactment as laws, and
that body may make any changes deemed necessary.
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Article 106. Municipal councils may appoint their own officials
and employ~es without the intervention of any other authority.
Article 107. The executive power shall see that municipal
councils comply with the laws, but he shall always respect
municipal independence. 2
Further provisions of the Salvadorean Constitution relating to
municipalities provide that:

the National Assembly is to authorize

the executive power, by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the deputies, to guarantee obligations of public interest contracted by municipal entities (Article 47-16); all rules governing conduct of public
employees, the establishment of a career administrative service, and
the prohibition of strikes by public employees, extend to municipal
employees (Article 111); contracts for public works or the acquisition
of personal property for which public funds are to be expended must be
submitted to public bids (Article 127); neither the legislative nor
the executive branch may relieve officials and employees who manage
municipal funds of the obligation to pay sums of money retained by
them, nor dispense with the payment of debts due the municipalities
(Article 133).
A number of similarities, and differences, between the two constitutions as they relate to municipalities are immediately evident.
Among the similarities, both begin by describing the subnational territorial system, of which the municipalities constitute an important
part.

Legal and political linkages between these and the intermediate

units, termed departments in El Salvador and provinces in Costa Rica,
will be examined below in the section on intergovernmental relations.
Nonetheless a brief description of the structure is appropriate here.
Costa Rica is divided into seven provinces.

The province of San
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Jose contains about ten percent of the land area and 30 percent of
the inhabitants of the country.

This province is in turn divided into

20 cantons, the central one of which is also named San Jose.
canton is in its turn composed of 11 districts, four of
the rank of city and seven the rank of barrio.

~lich

The
have

Minor subdivisions,

some of which are also called barrios and others poblados also exist.
These, however, have no legal standing and may be regarded as neighborhoods.

The four districts mentioned above with the rank of city--

Carmen, Merced, Hospital and Catedral--together constitute the City of
San Jose.
c~rned;

This, however, is not the unit with which we are here con-

our concern is with the municipality, which includes all 11

districts.

Its formal title is the Municipality of the Central Canton

of San Jose.

Unless otherwise specified all legal or political refer-

ences to San Jos~ are to this municipality.
El Salvador, although much smaller than Costa Rica, is divided
into 14 departments located in three zones:
East.

West, Central and

The departments are composed of districts which are in turn sub-

divided into municipalities.

Municipalities are classed according to

size as cities, villas or pueblos.

This ranking is merely a 'hierachy

3

of honor';

there are no differences in powers or duties among the var-

ious classes of municipalities.

The Department of San Salvador con-

tains the District of San Salvador in which is located the Municipality
(or City) of San Salvador, the legal entity with which we are most concerned.

There exist within the municipalities smaller divisions called

cantons which are analagous to barrios (second meaning) and poblados in
Costa Rica.

These will not be considered further for two reasons:
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they have no

legal-political standing and the differing use of the

term canton in the two countries could lead to confusion on the part of
the reader.

A complication arises in that certain statistics are col-

lected for, and the general plan encompasses, Metropolitan San Salvador
(Metro) which includes the entire District of San Salvador and part of
the District of Nueva San Salvador in the adjacent department, La Libertad, but does not include the rest of the Department of San Salvador.

This complication will be dealt with as it arises in the course

of this essay.
In each country the

co~stitution

provides that local government

shall exist to look after local interests and, moreover, that such local government is to be elected by the citizenry it serves.

El Salva-

dor and Costa Rica both require the size of the governing body to be
related to the size of the population governed.

Each constitution im-

poses severe constraints upon the municipality's fiscal freedom; budgets and tax structures must be approved by agencies of the national
government.

Furthermore, the municipality in each country is consti-

tutionally required to let public works and purchase contracts only
through open competitive bids.
Municipal autonomy is referred to in both constitutions; on this
topic there are some similarities and some differences.

The Costa

Rican Constitution provides that "the municipal councils are autonomous
in the exercise of their functions" and that they "may appoint their
own officials and employees without the intervention of any other authority" but their powers are limited to the "purely economic and administrative," revealing apparent antimony within the constitution it-
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self.
At this point some divergence in the two constitutions, in their
provisions respecting municipalities, may be noted.

Costa Rican munic-

ipal officials are to be elected for four years, Salvadorean for two
years.

EI Salvador provides for the separate election of an alcalde

(mayor) and sindico (legal officer) along with the regidores (councillors); Costa Rica provides for the election of only the regidores, who
as a body are to select and appoint the executive officers.

It is

worth noting here, to avoid further confusion, the difference in the
term sindico as used in the two countries.

In EI Salvador the term

refers, as mentioned above, to the municipality's chief legal officer.
In this he combines the roles of counsel, solicitor, attorney, auditor
and bill collector, and is second only to the alcalde in power and
prestige.

The Costa Rican sindico is chosen by a neighborhood to be

its spokesman.

He is nothing more.

He attends council meetings with

the right, as the Constitution puts it, "to speak but not to vote."

To

avoid difficulties the term sindico will not be used further in this
essay.

The English term syndic is dismissed as vague and imprecise.

Sindico in the Salvadorean sense will be rendered as legal officer; in
the Costa Rican sense, as neighborhood representative.
The very existence of the office of sindico in the Costa Rican
sense points up another constitutional difference.

While this sort of

popular participation in municipal decisionmaking is mandated in the
Costa Rican Constitution, it is nowhere mentioned in the Salvadorean.
The latter does, however, contain two provisions not found in the former.

One requires that municipal funds held in trust not be comingled
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with general national funds; the other that city councillors are liable severally as well as jointly for their acts.
Apparent differences in constitutions may not mean actual differences in law or practice.

One country's constitution may speak to an

issue which the other ignores, but statutes may make up for the omission.

Costa Rica, for example, constitutionally compels acceptance of

the office of regidor by any person elected thereto while the Salvadorean Constitution is silent on this point.

However, the Salvadorean

Law of Municipal Concern (hereafter referred to as the Municipal Act)
does make acceptance of the office mandatory.

Likewise in El Salvador

the Constitution allows for the reelection of regidores; in Costa Rica
the Constitution says nothing on this point but the Municipal Code provides for such reelection.

Further, the Constitution of El Salvador

mandates a career civil service system for municipal employees.

The

Constitution of Costa Rica does not but this nation's Labor and Municipal Codes effectively set one up.
These, then, are the important constitutional provisions relating
to municipalities in E1 Salvador and Costa Rica.

But as basic as the

constitutions are to an understanding of municipal operations they are
only necessary and not sufficient.

Constitutional rights and duties

provide the skeleton for the municipal system.

It remains now for us

to examine the muscles and sinews and blood.
The duties and obligations of municipalities in the two Central
American republics include the usual ones familiar to those students
acquaint~d

with the Anglo-American municipality as well as a number

that are less familiar.

Municipal corporations in El Salvador, like
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many in North America, are responsible for, among other concerns:
maintaining public order; construction and repair of streets; compiling vehicle and pedestrian statistics; promotion of institutions to
improve public morality; maintenance of public transportation; regulation of usage of roads, streets and bridges, with respect to subsurface
drains, powerlines, and automobiles; setting up public health authorities; maintaining both a civil register (births, deaths, marriages and
divorces) and a voter's list; and establishing libraries and elementary
schools.

Unlike most North American cities, those in El Salvador are

also required to:

conserve fish in rivers and lakes; guard the water-

sheds; insure twenty-four hour pharmacy service; publish books and
monographs diffusing useful knowledge; regulate both transactions in
the municipal market and weights and measures; and protect against forest fires.

This last requirement, in fact, is specified to the extent

that Article 17 of the Municipal Act requires each municipality, at its
first session of the year, to appoint a forest ranger paid out of municipal funds.

This same Article levies a fine on any property owner

who allows the destruction of any tree or bush on his property, if this
plant cover is deemed necessary for the well being of the city's watershed.
In those matters of particular concern to this study, municipalities are obligated to collect all monies owing them, keep assessments
up to date, and pay their own bills each month.

No mention is made of

any municipal responsibility for the provision of publicly funded or
assisted housing.
Costa Rican municipalities are broadly charged with "the admin-
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istration of local services and interests toward the end of promoting
the integral development of the cantons in harmony with national devel5

opment."

More precisely, they are to:

promote the progress of cul-

ture, science and art; establish public libraries; hold seminars and
conferences, give energetic impulses to education by, among other practices, awarding scholarships to low-income students; guard the physical and mental health of the inhabitants; and establish an integrated
policy of urban planning.

This last is to guarantee, at least, elec-

tricity, communications, water, sewers, streetlighting, construction
and repair of streets and a program of parks, gardens and open spaces.
Among other duties of municipalities are:

economic development,

including agricultural; promotion of full employment; conservation of
natural resources; maintenance of public order and security; and the
encouragement of internal and external tourism.

Finally, the cities

are to:
promote the C1V1C conscience of the population to the end
of [creating] citizens exercising the principles of democratic self determination, participating opportunely and conscientiously in the activity of municipal government. 6
The municipalities of Costa Rica are also required to cooperate with
one another in the provision of works or services when this would lead
to better public service.

Any agreements signed by municipalities in

this sphere are legally binding upon them and must be approved beforehand by the Comptroller General.
Two separate sections of the Municipal Code address the matter of
public housing.

In Article 41-5 the municipalities are required to

"establish . . . housing programs of social interest" in the urban area
and in Article 41-6 are ordered to "formulate . . . an adequate plan
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for the construction and upgrading of rural housing."

Provisions of

the Municipal Code dealing with revenue specify that municipalities
are to collect their revenues every quarter, levying a two percent
monthly service charge on any amount overdue, and that tax rates are
to be revised periodically.

Municipalities are given the right to

adopt any tax, charge or other form of revenue except those used by
the national government.

More details are provided in the section be-

below on national and municipal tax structures.
Legislative organization varies considerably between the two
cities.

In North American terms, San Salvador has a strong mayor sys-

tem with the council elected at large, while San Jose has a council
manager form, also with at-large elections.

In both cities elections

are on a partisan basis but there exist important differences.

Each

contending party in San Salvador offers an entire slate--mayor, legal
officer and councillors--and the entire slate is elected or defeated.
Councillors in San Jose are elected according to the proportion of the
popular vote their party receives, using the quotient or modified
7

d'Hondt system.

This is discussed more fully in the section on elec-

tions, and in Appendix C.
/

More precisely, San Jose is governed by a legislative body of 13
councillors and 13 alternates.

Alternates serve in the case of ab-

sence of a councillor from a meeting for any reason whatsoever.

The

party composition of the councillors and the alternates is the same.
If, for example, one PLN councillor is absent, the PLN alternate on
top of the list substitutes for him.

Thus the representation of the

various parties remains the same, even if all councillors should be
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absent and replaced by alternates.

Municipal elections take place

every four years on the same date as presidential and national ass embly elections.

There is also a neighborhood

alternate, from each of the 11 districts.
plained above, to speak but not to vote.

representative~

with an

They have the right, as exThe council elects its own

president by secret ballot for a renewable one-year term.

Both coun-

cillors and alternates vote but only regular councillors are eligible
to hold the office.

A majority of the votes cast is necessary for

election.
Each district, 11 in San Jos~, also has a five-member district
council.

One member must be the elected district representative;

usually the alternate is also a member.

Th.e remaining district coun-

cillors are appointed by the municipal council from among the inhabitants of the district for a two-year term.

They may be reappointed.

Article 64 of the Municipal Code assigns district councils six functions:
a) serving as organs linking the municipality and the communities
b) being organs of collaboration with the municipality
c) controlling the municipal works carried out in the district and informing the municipal executive as to how
well they are being done
d) preparing annually a list of the public works most
needed in the district
e) receiving contributions or raising other funds and immediately turning them over to the municipality, with
the funds earmarked for purposes agreed upon by the
district council
f) whatever else falls under the care of the council, congruent with its nature and ends.
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The Comptroller General has determined that district councils, like
municipal corporations, are juridical persons.

In practice, however,

their role seems to be purely advisory.
The legislative structure of San Salvador is much simpler than
that of San Jose.

A mayor, a legal officer, 12 councillors and

two alternates are elected for two-year terms.

Municipal and national

assembly elections, may not, by law, coincide with presidential elections.

As both a member of the council and chief executive officer,

the mayor is the preeminent political figure in the city.

No neighbor-

hood representatives are elected, nor is there any equivalent of the
district councils found in Costa Rican municipalities.
Committees are to be set up in both municipal councils.

Four

standing committees are in fact mandated by the Salvadorean Municipal
Act.

These are:
a) Public instruction, police, jails and public works
b) Roads, streets, plazas and sanitation
c) Streetlighting, street cleaning and public decoration
d) Markets, s~aughterhouses, water services, weights, monies
and measures.

Other committees established by the San Salvador council include:

ser-

vices, community action, finance, administration and personnel, and
planning.

The four required committees are to be made up of council-

lors; individuals may be asked to serve on the other committees if the
council feels this is necessary.
requests.

Individuals are free to refuse these

Committees have the power to oversee municipal services in

their purview and to demand data and reports from administrative personnel but cannot issue orders or spend funds independent of the council
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as a whole.
San Jos~ has established eight standing committees and may from
time to time augment these with interim committees as the council feels
appropriate.

The eight standing committees are:

finance and budget-

ing, public works, juridical matters and police, public health and deco?ation, transit and urbanization, social work and scholarships, culture and sport, and protocol and public relations.
to all of these by the president of the council.

Members are named
Finance and public

works are to have seven members, of whom four must be councillors or
alternates.

The other standing committees are made up of five members

of whom three must be councillors, alternates, or neighborhood representatives.

Interim committees may contain any number of councillors

not less than three.

No councillor or alternate may be named to more

than two standing committees nor head more than one.
Each committee at its first meeting, which must be held within
15 days of its creation, is to name a president and a vice president and hire a secretary.

The secretary is to be a municipal employee,

paid a salary determined by the committee.

If the council president

deems it necessary he may appoint a municipal employee from the area of
concern to serve as coordinator between the committee and the municipality.

Although it is not required, make up of the committees usually

parallels the political composition of the council as a whole.

If the

committee cannot agree on a report or recommendation to the council,
majority and minority reports may be presented for the council's consideration.
One final aspect of the legislative organization of the municipal-
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ities of San Salvador and San Jos~ is the frequency with which the respective councils meet and the parliamentary procedures at the meetings.

Article 68 of the Salvadorean Municipal Act requires one meet-

ing of the municipal council each month, between the first and the
fifth.

Extraordinary sessions may be called by the mayor or a major-

ity of the councillors, with 24 hours
are seldom called.

l~dtten

notice.

Such sessions

The agenda for meetings, again specified by stat-

ute, consists of:
1) the mayor gives an account of how the policies and directives of the previous meetings are being carried out
and mentions any important happenings since that meeting
2) the municipal secretary gives an account of all correspondence received, resolutions and other business that
the council ought to be cognizant of, or requiring its
resolution
3) the standing committees report on their work
4) the interim committees report on their work
5) the council considers, discusses and resolves any new
business arising from the above.
The council is to resolve every issue raised at the meeting at which
it is raised.

A majority of the councillors are necessary for a quo-

rum, and passage of any act or resolution requires a majority of the
votes cast.
the tie.

In case of a tie the mayor gets a second vote to break

Councillors may be fined up to ten colones for absenting

themselves from a council meeting without due cause.
In San Jose the municipal council schedules three regular rneeta week:

on Monday, Thursday and Friday.

Extraordinary sessions may

be called; however, since the per diem is paid for only 12 (or fewer)
meetings a month, these sessions seldom occur.

On

Mondays and Fridays
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the agenda consists of:
1) Reading of the minutes of the previous meeting
2) Correspondence
3) Accounts
4) Committee reports
5) Matters of urgent concern, as defined by the council
president
6) New business.
The chiefs of the various city departments are required to attend these
meetings.
Thursday meetings are designed to serve a different purpose.
Consequently their agenda appears thus:
1) Reading of the minutes
2) Matters of urgent concern
3) Audiences
4) Correspondence (if time allows)
5) New business.
The audiences consist of
receiving individuals, groups of neighbors, representatives
of communities or associations, with an interest in treating
matters of canton or district character, and whom, having previously solicited, the council president has fixed an audience
for that day.9
Department heads are not required to attend this meeting unless a matter to be raised during the audiences concerns their departments.
A quorum consists of eight councillors in their chairs and ready
to begin within 15 minutes of the time for which the meeting is
scheduled.

A majority of those present and voting are necessary to

pass most resolutions.

Certain matters, however, such as the firing or
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suspension of the auditor or municipal executive, require a vote of
two-thirds of all regular councillors.

Councillors absent from a meet-

ing, excused or not, do not receive the 150 colones (¢150) per diem.
An alternate taking a regular councillor's place receives the per diem;

other alternates do not.

The neighborhood representatives in attend-

ance at sessions receive a per diem of ¢li2.50.
Although the legislative structure of San Salvador is much simpIer than that of San Jose, the former municipality has a vastly more
10
complex administrative structure.
Organograms of the two structures
may be found on pages 125 and 127.

An expanded table of the structure

for each city is located in the Appendices.

It is appropriate at this

point however to examine very briefly the organizations in the two municipalities and to note some of the important differences between them.
San Salvador is considered first, because it has the more complex
structure.

It is worth recalling here that the chief executive officer

(alcalde) is elected in San Salvador and thus serves as both administrative and political leader.

The same is true of the legal officer,

the number two person in both political and administrative hierarchies.
The legal officer not only runs the legal office but also provides such
services to the other entities as may be necessary.

As shown in the

chart, three areas are directly under the alcalde--police, public relations, and secretary.

The secretary is the highest ranking appointee;

although not protected by civil service he usually serves through several administrations.

Chief concerns of the secretary are correspond-

ence, petitions and other communications with the council, and maintenance of the municipal archives.

Figure 10.

Municipality of San Salvador administrative structure.
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Other than the four areas mentioned above, municipal services
and employees are directed by the general office of administrative management.

The office is technically headed by the secretary.

diately below this office are the five support services:

Imme-

physical

plant, intendancy, purchasing, auditor and personnel office.

Included

as parts of the physical plant are motor pool and general stores.

Most

of these units serve the same functions as their counterparts in AngloAmerican municipalities; the intendancy however has no perfect, or even
approximate, counterpart.

It is responsible for:

providing uniforms

for drivers, porters, messengers and police; looking after cleaning
supplies; provision of meals to certain municipal employees; cleanliness of public toilets and baths; and maintenance and repair of office
equipment and parking meters.
Below the five support services are the 12 line functions
described in more detail in Appendix D.
The administative organization of San Jos~ is somewhat simpler
than that of San Salvador.

Here it will be examined from a functional

viewpoint, rather than according to administrative unit.

Both the bud-

get and the assignment of personnel are organized in this way; thus it
seems the more appropriate approach.

A detailed breakdown of the mu-

nicipal bureaucracy is found in Appendix E.
Heading the administration of San Jos~, however viewed, is the
municipal executive.

Unlike the case in San Salvador, he is appointed

by majority vote of the council and not elected by the voters.

The

appointment runs four years, roughly concurrent with the term of the
11
A vote of two-thirds of the
municipal council, and may be renewed.

Economic and
Social Services
Figure 11.

Municipality of San Jose administrative structure
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total membership of the council, nine out of the 13 councillors, is
required for removal from office.
Generally the powers and duties of the municipal executive are
similar to those of the manager in a North American city with a counci1manager form of government.

Article 57 a) of the Municipal Code en-

titles and requires the executive to
exercise the functions inherent in the role of general administrator and chief of the municipal departments. overseeing their organization, functioning and coordination
and insuring the faithful fulfillment of municipal ordinances and laws and rules in general.
The executive is a 'pure' city manager; there are no municipal employees, save the auditor, outside his jurisdiction.
Immediately beneath the municipal executive are the five offices
which together constitute the Directorate General of Municipal Development Policy.

These offices are secretary, auditor, legal office, pub-

lie relations and municipal planning.

The secretary, as in San Salva-

dor, basically serves the council and runs the municipal archives.
auditing and public relations functions are the usual.

The

The legal of-

fice provides comprehensive services, filling the roles of counsel, solicitor, and in some cases, prosecutor.

All municipal legal work is

centralized here.

The planning office carries out such urban planning,
12
The seven line
primarily physical, as the Municipal Code requires.
functions are presented more completely in Appendix E.
General organization of the two municipal governments, then, is
as described above.

Briefly, some of the more significant differences

between San Salvador and San Jos~ are:
1) greater complexity of the administrative organization
in San Salvador
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2) executive as elected politician in San Salvador and appointed administrator in San Jose
3) existence of a planning function at the municipal level
in San Jose but not in San Salvador
4) municipal provision of police services in San Salvador
5) collection of vital statistics at the municipal level
in San Salvador
6) financial contributions to education in San Jose
7) essentially agricultural services such as extension
programs and livestock handling in San Salvador
8) issuance of cedu1as by the municipality in San Salvador
9) presence of a formal community development function in
San Salvador.
These differences are not only important as contrasts between
the two municipalities per se, they also represent variations in relations between national and municipal governments in the two countries.

These are examined in greater detail in the next section.

Services provided by the Municipality of San Salvador but not by San
Jose are generally undertaken in Costa Rica by the central government,
and vice versa.

In EI Salvador, for example, municipal planning in

general and preparation of the Metropolitan Development Plan for San
Salvador in particular are the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works and the National Council for Economic Planning (CONAPLAN).
In Costa Rica, police services are provided by the Ministry of Public
Security, cedulas are issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
and community development is the responsibility of the National Directorate for Community Development (DINADECO).
It should be noted that a number of what are regarded as essen-
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tially municipal services in Anglo America are not provided by either
municipality.

Neither San Salvador nor San Jos~ provides the public

water supply or constructs sewers; these are central government functions.

Streetlighting is provided by private companies in both cases.

Fire protection is provided by volunteers in San Salvador and by the
National Insurance Institute (INS) in San Jos~.

All of these things

point to a vastly different set of relationships between municipalities
and superior governments in the two Central American nations than those
existing in North America.
Relations Between Municipal And National Governments
Generally, relations between the municipalities and the national
governments are of three broad types:

direct fiscal and administrative

relations; service area relations, usually between the local government
and autonomous agencies; and political relationships.

A number of

these have been discussed in the previous section; they will be recalled only briefly here.
Both countries, it was noted, are subdivided into political divisions, called provinces in Costa Rica and departments in EI Salvador.
Each subdivision has a governor appointed by the national executive.
In Costa Rica this is a ceremonial position with little power and no
direct connection with local government.
In EI Salvador, however, the governor has a good deal of direct
control over the municipality.

He is to inspect the general operation

of the municipalities and can hold the responsible mayors answerable
for any shortcomings he finds.
tions to him.

Legal officers are to report any infrac-

He is in charge of the national police in his jurisdic-
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tion and can take control of the municipal police when he deems it
necessary.

Moreover, he can even fine mayors for failing to comply

with his orders.

In case of the governor's absence or incapacity,

his place is taken by the mayor of the chief city within the department.
The importance of fiscal relations between mlmicipal and central
governments cannot be exaggerated.

Central controls, it will be re-

membered, are similar in the two countries.

In El Salvador, the na-

tional Court of Accounts must approve the municipal budget before it
comes into effect; in Costa Rica the Comptroller General has this responsibility.

Municipal expenditures over a certain amount also re-

quire central approval.

In San Salvador the Vo.Bo. of the Ministry of

the Interior is required for all expenditures over ¢5,000.

Only San

Salvador has a limit this high; other municipalities, depending on
their population, have limits of ¢100 to ¢3,OOO.
E.S.)

($1.00 U.S.

= ¢2.50

The limits mean that

the municipalities are obliged to solicit permission for the
purchase of a simple desk, perhaps because it is considered
that this act of the municipalities could compromise the national sovereignty.13
In Costa Rica the Comptroller General has the power to modify
any municipal budgets as he sees fit.

Central government approval is

required for any ordinance encumbering funds in the amount of ¢5,000
or over, any contract involving ¢lO,OOO or over and any real estate
transaction for more than ¢50,000.

($1.00 U.S.

= ¢8.45

C.R.)

Addi-

tional fiscal controls over the Municipality of San Jose include the
requirements that expenditures and revenues balance each month and
that any funds raised in a certain district of the city be expended
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in that district.
In both Costa Rica and El Salvador all municipal taxes--and
changes in municipal tax rates--must be approved by the national legislature become coming into effect, and both countries are singularly
reluctant to approve new taxes for their capitals.

In our discussion

of specific issues we will examine the attempts by San Salvador to reform its tax structure, and the blocking of this attempt at the national level.

For San Jose we will chronicle the difficulties faced

by the municipality in its ultimately successful effort to install
parking meters.

It should be noted, moreover, that although most

Costa Rican municipalities have their requests for new taxes and rate
changes rather routinely approved, San Jose has not been allowed a
tax increase since 1935.
If these fiscal relations appear one-sided, control-oriented
and, from the municipal point of view, obstructionist, there is in
Costa Rica a balancing factor.

The national government does provide

money for the municipal treasuries, and more, proportionately, for
San Jos~ than for other cities.
section on taxes.

Specifics will be examined in the

No such subventions benefit San Salvador.

In fact,

the central government does provide some funding for other cities but
none at all for the capital.

Control, then, characterizes the central

government's role in the financial affairs of San Salvador.
"If strict fiscal controls are one side of the coin of municipal dependency, the role of the central government in many of the
14
Ebel investigated 21 services
city services is the other."
generally regarded as municipal and found only two, street cleaning
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and street nomenclature, completely under the control of the Municipality of San Salvador.

(Garbage collection is also a totally munic-

ipal function; it is not one of the services he examined.)

The munic-

ipality, however, played some role, albeit usually a secondary one, in
the provision of ten other services.
A variety of non-municipal actors take part.

Water and sewage,

for example, are totally outside municipal control, being provided by
the semi-autonomous National Administration of Aqueducts and Sewers
(ANDA).

Traffic control is completely in the hands of the Ministry of

Public Works and Transport (MOPT).

Street construction and mainte-

nance is the function of the Directorate of Urbanism and Architecture
(DUA), another semi-autonomous agency, but there is some participation
by the municipality.

Policing is provided by the Ministry of the In-

terior (MI) and the municipality.

Streets are lighted by the private,

Canadian-owned, San Salvador Illumination Company (CAESS) under municipal regulation.
the municipality.

Building permits require the Vo.Bo. of IVU, DUA and
The hand of the central government is found in even

the most unlikely places.

MOPT, for example, has a role in the munic-

ipal markets while CONAPLAN takes part in the planning of the municipal fair.
Chavez Mena has levelled criticism at yet another aspect

of na-

tional government interference with municipal concerns of San Salva15

dor.

He charges it with franchising private corporations to carry

on profitable activities that might well otherwise be carried on by
municipal enterprises.
transportation.

One example of this is the provision of public

As alien as the thought may be to a North American

l~

mind, bus service in San Salvador, and for that matter in San Jose,
does make money.
Functional relations between the Municipality of San Jose and
the Costa Rican government resemble the Salvadorean situation.

Again

we find both new and used water being carried about by an autonomous
agency, the National Service of Aqueducts and Sewers (SNAA), which
also has veto power over housing developments.

All policing, except

the guards at the municipal markets, is provided by the central government.

Street lighting and mass transit services come from private

corporations.

There are some services, however, in which the Costa

Rican municipality plays a greater role than its Salvadorean counterpart.

Among these are traffic control, road maintenance, and urban

planning.

Figure 12 below compares the participation of central and

local governments in the provision of selected services generally regarded as municipal.

When more than one agency has a significant

part, they are listed in order of degree of participation.
Generally speaking, the municipalities are not happy with the
assumption of what they regard as their prerogatives by agencies of
the central government.

Active response, however, has been quite

different in the two municipalities.

San Salvador, making the best of

what it considers a bad situation, cooperates readily with the agen~

San Jose, on the other hand, engages in constant bickering,
16
espcially with SNAA.

cies.

It is worthwhile here to speculate as to possible reasons for
this difference.

One might be the greater openness of the Costa Rican

political system--San Jose can 'get away with it'; San Salvador is not
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Service

San Jose

San Salvador

Police

MPJG

MI
Municipality

Fire

INS

Volunteer

Street construction and
maintenance

Municipality

OUA

Street cleaning

Municipality

Municipality

Street nomenclature

CIN

Municipality

Street lighting

Fuerza y Luz

CAESS

Garbage collection

Municipality
MSP

Municipality

Water

SNAA

ANOA

Public transportation

Private

Private

Parks and recreation

Municipali ty
MNJ
OGD

Municipal i ty
FOCCO

Sewers

SNAA

ANOA

Cemeteries

Municipality

Municipality
CONAPLAN

Traffic control

Municipality

MOPT

Building permits

Municipal i ty
INVU

IVU
OUA
Municipality

Public health

DIGAMS
Municipality

MSP

Community development

DINADECO

Municipality
FOCCO

Planning

OFIPLAN
Municipality

DUA
CONAPLAN

Markets

Municipality

Municipality
MOPT

Public housing

INVU

IVU

Abbreviations:
MPJG
CIN

Ministry of Police, Justice and Grace
Interinstitutional Commission on Nomenclature
f.6P
Ministry of Public Health
MNJ
National Youth Movement
FOCCO
Office for Community Development and Self Help
DGD
Directorate General of Sports
DIGAMS
Directorate General for Medical and Social Assistance
OFIPLAN Presidential planning office
Figure 12.

Agencies providing municipal services.
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permitted to.

Another possible explanation is that many other munic-

ipalities also oppose some of the agencies in Costa Rica; few, if any,
do openly in E1 Salvador.
Some differences in the institutional settings of the agencies
within the national government structure might also account for the
difference.

In Costa Rica these agencies are autonomous, not part of

or subject to the control of any ministry.

They are creatures of,

have budgets approved by and are responsible to the Legislature.
gives them a great deal of internal administrative freedom.

This

It also

renders them subject to greater political pressures by legislators.
And Costa Rican legislators are, in turn, subject to more political
pressure from their constituents.
In El Salvador,
autOTIOlti0US.

on the other hand, these agencies are semi-

Each is attached to a ministry of the central government.

The agency must subordinate its aims and activities to the larger objectives of the ministry.

The agency gains, however, the advantage of

being a part of the national executive.

It is insulated from any

possible legislative political pressure and is responsible, through
its minister, only to the president.

And the President of E1 Salvador

is much less susceptible to political pressure from his constituents
than is the member of the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly.
One other peripheral but related difference may be noted here.
A citizen, particularly one without political clout, who is unhappy
with his water supply (most fit in this category) will approach his
city councillor about it in San Jose.
Salvador.

This is not the case in San

It is unclear whether the councillor in San Jos~ is ap-
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proached because prior to SNAA's formation in 1961 the municipality
looked after its own water supply, or because the citizen perceives
the councillor as more accessible than the SNAA bureaucracy, or if the
councillor is viewed as actually being able to correct the situation.
To this point our discussion of the relationships between municipalities and the autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies has stressed
the negative.

In both countries, however, there exist agencies spe-

cifically designed to assist the municipalities.

In El Salvador this

agency, attached to the Ministry of the Interior, is the Municipal De17
and in Costa Rica it is the Institute for
velopment Bank (FINAMUN),
Municipal Development and Assistance (IFAM).
The Municipal Development Bank was set up by the Legislature in
1966 and was assigned as its functions:
a) To make loans to the Municipalities in order that they be
able to realize their works and services
b) To give technical assistance to the Municipalities when
this is necessary, being able to recommend sound financial
and administrative practices in the following cases
1) In the programming, budgeting, financing, and construction
of municipal public works and services
2) In the improvement of the internal administrative organization and systems for collecting, accounting, auditing and financial administration, in order to obtain an increase in municipal income
3) In whatever other type of technical assistance that the
Bank can provide through its nature and aims and which does
not contravene the provisions of this law. 18
Eight years later, however, in 1974, there was still no sign of
any financing.

The explanation offered by the municipalities was pre-

dictable--central government obstructionism.

Critics claim the bank

was set up so that only the four largest municipalities could possibly
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take advantage of it, and, further, that any municipality not having
the official party (PCN) in power could forget about any assistance.
There was a faint glimmer of optimism, however.

Rumors abounded that

FINAMUN was going to be, at long last, funded and staffed.

Nonethe-

less, one Salvadorean municipal official was able to accurately complain:
To date there exists no institution charged with the mission
of augmenting the financial resources of the Municipalities,
much less of providing technical assistance. 19
The same cannot be said of Costa Rica, where IFAM, in existence
since 1971, is taking definite, concrete steps to aid the municipalities.

IFAM's two grand objectives are to 1) strengthen the municipal

regime from a legal-political point of view, and 2) convert the munic20

ipalities into true enterprises of local and regional development.
More pragmatically, IFAM makes loans to the municipalities and
guarantees those they obtain elsewhere, conducts seminars for municipal officials both appointed and elected, serves as an instrument for
inter-municipal cooperation, provides various forms of technical assistance, carries out feasibility studies and issues monographs on
various topics of municipal interest.

IFAM also coordinates the work

of international experts assisting the municipalities.

A typical case

occurred when IFAM provided a small municipality with a Peace Corps
Volunteer civil engineer to design and oversee the construction of a
21
local water system.
The governing board of IFAM is appointed by the Council of Gov22
ernment.
Of the seven members, two must be the Minister of Government and the Minister of Public Works.

Three must be chosen from a
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list provided by the political party whose candidate ran second in the
preceding presidential election.
Council have a free choice.

In only two cases, then, does the

There is no requirement that appointees

have any municipal experience or affiliation to serve their four-year
terms.

IFAM has, however, been on the whole very well staffed.
The final point to be considered in re relations between local

and national government is the partisan political factor.
the situation is very different in the two countries.

Here again

In San Salvador,

the city council is engaged in open political warfare with the national
government.

Since 1950 the official party (PRUD-PCN) has controlled

both the National Assembly and the presidency; since 1961 it has heen
out of power in San Salvador.
Not only has the single-party municipal council been in partisan
opposition to the national government, it has been the most powerful,
perhaps the only, source of real opposition.

Next to the presidency,

the alcaldia of San Salvador is certainly the most visible and probably the most powerful political position in the country.

The alcalde

of the capital city is usually viewed as the single most likely opposition candidate in the next presidential election.

Napoleon Duarte,

for example, two-term PDC alcalde of San Salvador, did run for president against Arturo Molina in 1972.

Duarte was implicated in a bloody

abortive coup that followed his unsuccessful candidacy.
The situation is very different in Costa Rica where the president of the San Jos~ municipal council is virtually invisible, even in
San Jose, and where the same spectrum of parties is to be found in the
council are in the National Assembly.

Consider the following table:
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TABLE I
SEATS HELD IN SAN JOSE AND COSTA RICA, BY PARTY
Year

Party

National Assembly
Number
Percent
of seats

San Jose Council
Nwnber Percent
of seats

1962

PLN
PUN
PRN
AD

29
9
18
1

51
16
32
2

5
1
5

45
10
45

1966

PLN
PUN
PRN
PUCR

29
26

51
46

5
2

2

4

1

42
17
33
8

1970

PLN
PUN
PASO
CD

32
22
2
1

56
39
4
2

6
4
1

55
36
10

1974

PLN
PUN
PASO
PRD
PRN
PNI
PUAC
PD

25
17
1
4
1
7
1
1

44
30
2
7
2
12
2
2

5
3
1
2
1
1

38
23
8
15

4

8
8

SOURCE: Costa Rica, Tribuna Suprema de Elecciones, Computo de Votos.
(1972, 1966, 1970 and 1974 issues).
It can be readily seen that in every case the PLN held the
largest number of seats in both the assembly and the council.

More-

over, in every case except the period 1966 to 1970, the party having
the second largest representation in the assembly also had the second
largest representation on the council.

It was anticipated, therefore,

that municipal tax legislation, especially when passed unanimously,
would have much less difficulty being approved by the national government than in El Salvador.

It was expected this would be a major dif-
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ference in the policy process between the two polities.

There turned

out to be no difference at all in the legislative assemblies' actions;
tax increases were routinely denied to both San Salvador and San Jose.
Parties And Elections
As shown above, parties and elections playa major role in determining control of the municipal governments in both San Jose and
San Salvador.

However, there are substantial differences between the

practices of the two cities.

We consider first the nature of the par-

ties and then of the electoral process.
Both El Salvador and Costa Rica have a broad spectrum of parties
operating at the municipal level.

However, those in San Salvador are

far more ideological and less personalistic than those in Costa Rica.
This is particularly true of the Salvadorean PDC.

It offers the

voters a detailed platform of mutually supportive planks all based in
the tenets of Christian Democracy as found in many Latin American
countries.

Its pre-election appeals to the electorate are couched in

terms of this Christian Democratic philosophy.

Primarily, it empha-

sizes the role of the community in the nation state and two sets of
policy offerings.

To the small urban middle class it offers adminis-

trative reform and expanded municipal services.

To the mass of the

urban poor and near poor it offers a chance to participate in the political life of the city through neighborhood action programs, primarily under the auspices of the local offices of the Department of Community Action.
The PCN, the official party, does not go into such detail.

It
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emphasizes the integrity of its candidates, and alludes to the benefits the urban dwellers will realize in having their city governed by
the party in power nationally.

As the central governing party, it

places much less emphasis on the city.

PCN's primary loyalties are to

maintenance of the status quo, economic development, and 'Los Catorces
Grandes,' the fourteen extended families who are said to control the
Salvadorean economy.
These two parties occupy the broad center of the political spectrum in El Salvador:

PDC on the center-left and PCN on the center-

right.

To the left of the PDC is the National Revolutionary Movement

(MNR).

To the right of the PCN are the Salvadorean Popular Party

(PPS) and the United Democratic Independent Front (FUDI).

The latter

is primarily an ad hoc vehicle for the personal political ambition of
General Jos~ Alberto 'Chele' Medrano.

Medrano was dismissed from his

post as Chief of the National Guard and from the official party as a
political liability; he was identified in the public mind with an apparent policy of occasional police murders in the late 1960s.

FUDI is

the only recognized political party that is totally personalistic.
One more party might be mentioned, the Democratic Nationalist
Union (UDN).

It occupied a reformist position between MNR and PDC.

Primarily, it was the party of the intellectuals.

In the 1972 elec-

tion it banded together with MNR and PDC to form an United Opposition
Front (UNO).

In 1972 and subsequent municipal elections it has been

UNO that has challenged the other parties--PCN, PPS, FUDI--at the
polls.

The PDC dominates this coalition, MNR maintains its identity

except at election time, but UDN does not seem to have survived the
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merger with its larger erstwhile partners.
As indicated above in Table I, from four to eight parties gener23

ally contest municipal elections in San Jose.
are represented on the municipal council.

Currently six parties

While these parties are

more personalistic than, and do not fit into ideological slots as
neatly as, Salvadorean parties, some identification as to their broad
general viewpoints may be attempted.
parties may be generally arrayed thus.

From left to right, then, these
Indisputedly anchoring the

left wing is the Socialist Action Party (PASO).

In Western Europe

PASO would be known as the Communist Party, but the Communist Party is
illegal in Costa Rica.

No party currently fills the generic social

democratic slot on the moderate left.

In left center, the PLN occu-

pies the same Christian Democratic position as PDC in San Salvador.
The National Unification Party (PUN) is roughly in the center and the
Party of Democratic Renovation (PRD), a business-oriented group espousing efficient administration over all else, is slightly to the
right.

The National Republican Party (PNR) and National Independence

Party (PNI) occupy the same sort of ideological territory on the moderate right.
It has been noted that the parties in San Jose are not as ideologically distinguishable as are those in San Salvador--this does not
mean their adherents' sense of party identification is any weaker.
The voters in an election determine the number of seats each party will
have, but the party has ranked its candidates on the ballot, essentially determining in what order individuals will fill the seats it
wins.

Choice of an individual councillor is, therefore, effectively
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out of the hands of the electorate but the voters do have the choice
of party.

The voters lack the opportunity to support an individual

for a particular office.

Such empathy as the voter feels, then, is

with the party and not with anyone candidate.

The party is the en-

tity for which votes are cast.
In both cities the party composition of the governing body is
determined by elections.

In each case the electorate includes all

residents of the municipality over 18 years of age who are citizens of their respective countries.

There is no voter registration

procedure--citizens are automatically added to the voting rolls when
they obtain, at age eighteen, their cedulas--the ubiquitous identity
cards without which one has no civil status.
Elections are governed by electoral boards which oversee all aspects including registration of parties, campaign practices and vote
counting.

Initial rulings and judgments are made by the municipal

juntas; they can be overruled by the central boards which appoint
them.

The Costa Rican ultimate authority in electoral matters is the

Supreme Election Tribunal (TSE).

The three members of this tribunal,

expanded to five during election years, are Justices of the Supreme
Court.

They are universally regarded as being as free from corruption

and partisan political pressure as is humanly possible.
No such kudos are directed to the Salvadorean Central Electoral
Council (CCE).

Its members are selected by the National Assembly.

CCE is allegedly independent and unbiased but is generally believed to
be yet another arm of the official party.
To participate in an election, national or municipal, in Costa
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Rica or EI Salvador, political parties must be registered with the appropriate electoral board.

Not only the party itself must be approved

but also its slate of candidates for a particular office.

Slates for

municipal offices may be rejected by local juntas; this decision may
be appealed to the central authority.

In fact, most claims of fraud--

and they are legion--Ieveled in connection with Salvadorean municipal
elections involve alleged improper disqualification of slates of candidates.

Slates are generally disqualified for one of two reasons;

either the slate was improperly selected or one or more individual
candidates may be ruled ineligible for the position sought.

In the

latter case, in Costa Rica, the offending candidate may be replaced
and the slate reinstated; no such second chance is usually available
in EI Salvador.
Party slates serve quite different purposes in the two cities.
In EI Salvador slates are offered to the voters on an all-or-nothing,
takes-us-or-Ieave-us basis.

The party winning the greatest number of

votes in the municipal election wins all the offices:

mayor, legal

officer and 100 percent of the councillors.
By contrast, in Costa Rica the slate is an indication to the
voters of the order in which the party's seats on the municipal council will be filled.

(Elections to the National Assembly are carried

out the same way; each party has a slate of candidates in each province.)

The order of appearance of the candidates on the ballots,

then, is not a matter of chance but of party preference.

The individ-

ual on top of the party's list of candidates is the most important,
the one on the bottom the most expendable.
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Elections in Costa Rica, both municipal and national, are carried
out under the quotient or modified d'Hondt system of proportional re24

presentation.
dix C.

This system is explained in more detail below, Appen-

For present

purposes, however, two significant political re-

suIts of this system need be mentioned.

First, like most proportional

representation systems, it favors small minority parties.

Second, it

makes position on the party's slate very important to the individual
candidate.

The election determines how many of a party's candidates

are elected but position on the ballot determines which candidates.
If the party wins two seats, they are filled by the first two persons
listed on the ballot.
Selection of candidates is a very important matter, and very
different concerns are involved in the two polities.

In San Salvador,

the candidate for mayor is chosen by a national party caucus.

The

rest of the slate is chosen by the candidate for mayor in consultation
with local and national party leaders.

Disaffected members of all

parties save the PCN often claim that meetings for this purpose occur
at a time and place different than that announced, for the purpose of
allowing a small cabal rather than the general party leadership to
choose the candidates.

Needless to say, the official party is quick to

publicize this lack of candor and unity on the part of its opposition.
Balancing the municipal ticket is regarded as critical.

Each

party selects a couple of women, a smattering of professionals-lawyers, physicians, dentists--and representatives from laboT, education and the small merchant class.

Every effort is made to promote

these candidates as individuals and as advocates of the interests of
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a specific group.
Candidates for municipal office in San Jose are chosen by the
party faithful of the canton with the advice and consent of the national party leadership.

Unlike San Salvador, little attempt is made

to promote the candidates as individuals.

The one personality ac-

tively publicized by the party is its presidential candidate.

Can-

didates for municipal office, then, are neither seen as individuals
nor as representatives of certain groups or interests, but as members
of the party.

Consequently no attempt whatever is made to balance

the ticket occupationally.

Almost as critical as the selection of

candidates for the slate is their positioning thereon.

The top can-

didate of virtually any party is assured a seat; the bottom candidates of even an overwhelming majority party are unlikely to be selected.

Candidates who accept the limbo of a low position on the

ticket in one election are usually rewarded by being moved up in a
subsequent election, as those above them move on to seek national
office.

New candidates for the bottom slots are then chosen, gen-

erally from those who have served as alternates or neighborhood representatives.
Open campaigning for office usually begins about two months before the election.

It will be remembered that in Costa Rica presiden-

tial, legislative and municipal elections are held concurrently while
in El Salvador presidential elections are separated.
sult of this campaign styles differ markedly.

Partly as a re-

In Costa Rica emphasis

is upon the presidential candidate and the party.

City council hope-

fuls and even candidates for the National Assembly to some extent are
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just along for the ride.
few.

Explicit platforms or policy statements are

If enunciated, they come from the mouths of the presidential

candidates.
Each party has its banner, its own distinctive colors.
are plastered about the country.

Massive advertising blitzes are car-

ried on via the newspapers and on radio.
however, is the parade.

The heart of the campaign,

These parades occur with greater and greater

frequency as the election nears.
daily events.

These

During the last two weeks they are

The general aura ranges from chaos in small towns and

villages to pandemonium in San

Jos~.

Not only does each party have

its own colors, it also has its own distinctive automobile horn sound.
A typical evening in San Jose shortly before the election finds several caravans of party adherents each honking out the party signal or
waving the party banner as they surge through narrow downtown streets.
To the foreigner it seems as though the contest is between the beeeepbeeeep-beeeeps and the be-be-be-beep-beeps.

Issues are not allowed to

intrude.
Styles are much different in San Salvador.

UNO, dominated by

PDC, publishes and distributes carefully thought out and prepared
leaflets laying out past accomplishments of the municipal government
and outlining its future plans.

The background and competence of each

candidate for office is explained.

There are no continuous parades

analagous to those in San Jose but occasionally well-publicized mass
rallies are held.

PPS activities generally parallel those of UNO but

are more subdued, while PCN festoons the streets with banners proclaiming their candidates to be men of integrity.
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Relationships among parties are quite dissimilar in San Salvador
and San

Jos~.

In Costa Rica parties virtually ignore one another's

existence and campaign as in a vacuum--only if some faux pas leaves
the party holding the presidency momentarily open to criticism or embarrassment will one party refer or allude to another.

Salvadorean

parties on the other hand constantly compare programs and candidates,
position for position.

As soon as the members of the oppositions'

slates are known, the parties attempt to discredit them personally and
professionally.

Advertisements appear regularly in the San Salvador

dailies, paid for by Party X, alleging that Party Y's labor-affiliated
candidate for councillor sold out the workers to some malevolent entity in exchange for personal enrichment.
attacks grow more vitriolic.

As election day nears the

By the last week the tone of the cam-

paign can turn outright nasty.

One party rushes into print with docu26
mentation showing another party's candidate to be a bastard.
This
party responds with material of its own and says in effect, "Our man
may be a bastard but at least he's a Salvadorean bastard.

Your man is

a Honduran bastard, and moreover, a Honduran bastard with forged pa27

peTs."

Eventually the campaign comes to an end, the election is held
and the municipal council takes office.

Questions are often raised as

to the openness and honesty of Salvadorean elections.

Most of these

doubts, however, relate primarily to the presidential election.

UNO-

PDC, in opposition to the official party, has been in power in San
Salvador for over 15 years.

No such doubts as to freedom or hon-

esty plague the Costa Rican elections.

At all levels they are among
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the most fairly conducted in the world.

On the other side of the

coin, they are also probably the world's most expensive elections.
Expenditures per vote cast are estimated to be three times the cost
per vote in the United States.
Methods of candidate selection, campaign strategies, rhetoric
and voting procedures may seem strange, perhaps even suspect, to North
American observers.

Nonetheless, it is popular elections, contested

by recognizable political parties, that determine control of the machinery of municipal government in both San Salvador and San Jose.
Non-governmental Actors
Among the basic assumptions of most models of the policy process
is the supposition that policy is made, at least within the boundaries
of the political system, by formal policymakers.

In San Jos~ and San

Salvador, as in many other polities, additional, informal actors may
be found playing roles not formally ascribed them.

In a subsequent

section dealing with muncipal public finance policy we will look at
some specific sorts of informal actors; it will suffice here to look
at such actors generally, their points of access to the policy process
and the causes and effects of their intervention.
Outsiders attempting to influence the policy process usually do
so at the legitimation phase, for a variety of very good reasons.
tors who feel themselves potent enough

Ac-

to influence the course of

legislation usually wish to preserve the status quo, to prevent the
municipality making some change such as raising a tax rate.

Gener-

ally, such outside actors do not first press their case with the municipality.

Often they first hear of this legislation they feel will ad-
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versely affect them after it has passed and become fait accompli as
far as the municipal council is concerned.

As a consequence, the af-

fected individual or group has no other recourse but to try and dissuade the central authorities from approving the unwanted ordinance.
A number of factors make this approach quite convenient.
San Jose and San Salvador are capital cities.

Both

As such, members of

the legislative assembly, cabinet ministers and other high national
government officials are close at hand.

Moreover, those seeking to

block the legitimation of the muniCipal legislation are usually' community influentials,' used to dealing with upper-echelon national government officials and in many cases are personally or professionally
acquainted with them.

Central government officials are also easier to

locate than municipal officials, being both more readily identified
and more likely to be in or about their offices.
One reason national legislators are often inclined to disallow
muniCipal legislation, especially tax bills, is that political costs
to them are likely to be less than the political benefits.

They can

appear to the voters as fiscally responsible, always an attractive
posture.

A municipal councillor has to balance any anti-tax position

with the demands of the canton's voters, or their leaders, for increased spending on municipal services.

Opposition to such demands

could lead to a councillor's being dropped by the party at the next
election, if the party perceived this opposition as likely to cost it
votes.

A Member of the Assembly, with a province-wide constituency,

would obviously be under less direct and less one-sided pressure, even
were he elected from San Jose Province.

A legislator from an outlying
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corner of the country would be viewed positively as standing up to the
profligate capital's attempt to raise taxes, some portion of which
would ultimately be paid by his constituents but which they would view
as benefiting only the capital city residents.
Pursuing the capital city syndrome further, certain acts of the
capital municipality could be regarded as matters of national or even
international concern.

Capital cities are usually the locales for

home offices of national corporations and country headquarters of
multinational corporations.

Should municipal actions negatively im-

pact on these corporate heartlands, the case for national counteraction would be buttressed.
The outright animosity between municipal and central governments
in San Salvador may be mentioned again.

Often the mere fact that the

Municipality of San Salvador has passed an ordinance, particularly a
tax ordinance, is sufficient reason for the central government to consider vetoing it.

Adversely affected members of the business commun-

ity in particular are well aware of this and do not hesitate to argue
their position, usually with some success, before the Minister of the
Interior and, if necessary, the assembly.
Outside actors attempt to influence the policy process, then, in
both cities.

Usually the method of choice is the seeking of national

government intervention at the legitimation stage.

These informal

policy participants are usually community influentials, and are usually successful.

Animosity between city and nation in EI Salvador ex-

acerbates the situation there but any resultant differences between
San Jos~ and San Salvador in this respect are differences of degree
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and not of kind.
Policy Preferences Of Local Government Leaders
The final political factor to be considered here is the role of,
or weight given to, the policy preferences of local government leaders.
Once again major differences exist in this field between San Salvador
and San Jo se.
To a large extent, the elected officials take over the reins of
municipal government in San Salvador with very few strings attached.
To be sure, the party, particularly PDC-UNO, has indicated to the citizenry during the campaign where it stands and what it intends to do.
These pledges, however, like campaign promises everywhere, are both
flexible and negotiable.
In the political wings the national government is indeed waiting
to disallow such legislation as it feels appropriate.

But despite the

animosity between central and city governments, not all ordinances or
accords are vetoed on partisan or other grounds.

The municipality

simply deals with too many mundane and prosaic matters for the nation
to be concerned with them all.

Even the most ardent supporters of

central control allow that a great deal of municipal activity cannot
possibly be regarded as nationwide in its effects.
There exists, morec;.::er, no externally imposed national party
line to which the PDC-UNO council must adhere.

EI Salvador is a small

country; San Salvador is the capital city and the chief source of PDC
political power, national:y as well as locally.

The local power

structure, it has been shown, is inextricably linked to and a part, a
dominant part, of the national party hierarchy.

Not only, then, is
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there no intraparty cleavage but it is recognized that the municipality provides the best showcase for party policies, a showcase that
might someday induce the voters to choose PDC nationally.
The policy preferences of local government leaders in San Salvador are thus readily and routinely translated into policy outputs of
the one-party municipal council.

And, it must be remembered, the two

most important administrative posts are filled by elected party members.

Except for those accords, generally tax related, that are dis-

allowed by the national government, the policy preferences of the municipal government leaders become the operational policies of the Municipality of San Salvador.
Policy preferences of local government leaders in San Jose are
given no such respect.

They are not ignored, but neither are they

automatically transmuted into legislation let alone into practice.
One reason for this is the difference in the party situation.

Actu-

ally there are two important differences in the party situation.

One

of these is the presence, as we have seen above, of several political
parties in the San Jose municipal council, a very different case from
the Salvadorean.

Second, the local government leadership does not

constitute, although it is not necessarily excluded from, the national
party leadership.

This is particularly so for the party controlling

the presidency or the national assembly.
Further, there is a partnership with the usual shackles between
local and national government in Costa Rica that is unknown in El Salvador.
ters.

The national government issues policy statements on local matIt is not only politically but fiscally prudent for local gov-
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ernment to heed these, even to the point of suppressing its own policy
preferences.

Perhaps most important, the central government provides

considerable financial assistance to local government.

Much of this

is statutorily mandated and not subject to curtailment for heterodoxy
in policy aims but the remainder is discretionary--amounts are to be
allocated to municipalities but particular municipalities are nowhere
specified.

The central government therefore, buys an arena for its

policy preferences and those of local leaders are often reduced to
secondary considerations.
Finally, the municipal council in San Jose is obligated to not
only hear but also to give some cognizance to the policy preferences
of the neighborhood representatives.

It will be remembered that mon-

ies raised in a neighborhood are to be spent in that same neighborhood
regardless of other priorities council may have.

Policy preferences

of municipal government officials, then, are diluted by edicts and
money from above as well as by narrow submunicipal interests from below.
It can be seen, then, that the status accorded the policy preferences of local government leaders varies greatly between San Jos~
and San Salvador.

And this is only one of the political factors ex-

hibiting this variance.

Others have been analyzed above.

It remains

to' be seen how these differences, when combined with any differences
noted below in economic and social factor, influence policy process
and policy product.

Do the differences we have examined, in fact,

manifest themselves in any important policy effects?
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ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic background factors, like the political factors mentioned above, are traditionally, and rationally, regarded as affecting
policy.

The factors to be considered here are economic structure, la-

bor force composition and unemployment, public-private mix, distributional aspects, and national revenue and expenditure patterns.
Economic Structure
The measure chosen for economic structure is the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).

(For comparative purposes all figures are given in
28
Central American Pesos. $1.00 U.S. = $1.00 C.A.)
The makeup of the
GDP at current prices, for the six years immediately preceding this
study, is given in Table II.
TABLE II
STRUCTURE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CURRENT PRICES
Costa Rica (000,000 $C.A.)
1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

Agriculture
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity
Transportation
Commerce
Finance
Rents
Government
Services

165.0
132.0
30.0
10.5
27.S
10S.3
19.9
55.5
74.3
70.S

lSI. 9
l4S.1
34.7
12.1
30.S
119.1
22.9
5S.0
S1. 2
75.4

209.8
162.5
35.7
15.0
35.9
131. 6
27.5
60.6
92.5
82.9

218.7
182.9
42.S
16.2
3S.l
157.7
32.4
63.9
103.0
91.2

230.5
202.3
54.6
19.2
43.9
175.3
35.6
67.0
121.9
98.5

252.4
226.6
60.4
21. 8
4S.6
195.4
41. 7
71.3
140.5
10S.5

Total

694.2

764.4

S54.l

947.0

1048.9

1167.2
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TABLE II--Continued.
E1 Salvador (000,000 $C.A.)
1967
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity
Transportation
Commerce
Finance
Rents
Government
Services

240.0
170.3
27.3
12.6
39.1
211. 2
16.9
34.3
67.0
67.7

Total

879.0

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

241.1

292.5
195.6
28.9

68.0
74.6

242.8
187.9
27.0
14.4
49.2
216.2
20.5
37. ~;
76.2
80.6

49.1
217.4
23.0
38.0
80.1
86.2

291.6
209.4
32.0
16.1
52.6
234.8
24.8
44.0
87.6
92.3

291.2
226.8
40.8
17.2
55.8
257.5
26.2
42.8
95.4
98.9

909.5

944.7

1020.1

1071.5

1142.1

180.4

22.7
14.0

45.5
215.9
18.4
36.1

15.5

SOURCES: Banco Central de Costa Rica; Banco Central de Reserva de E1
Salvador.
Two factors are immediately evident--the economies of the two countries
are very similar in size, and in 1972, for the first time, the GDP of
Costa Rica exceeded that of El Salvador.
Table III gives the percentage composition of the GDP for each
country over the same time span.
two are apparent.

Again, the similarities between the

In both cases agriculture dominates and manufactur-

ing accounts for about one-fifth of the total.

Commerce is relatively

more important in E1 Salvador than in Costa Rica, but only slightly;
the reverse holds true for rental income.

In neither case has there

been any significant shift in importance of the various sectors during
the six-year period.
In Table IV the structure of the GDP is again presented, but in
constant (1962) pesos.

One important difference from the current price

situation appears--the total Salvadorean economy is larger every year
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than the Costa Rican.

The latter nation has obviously been subject to

a higher rate of inflation.
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Costa Rica

Agriculture
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity
Transportation
Commerce
Finance
Rents
Government
Services

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

23.8
19.0
4.3
1.5
4.0
15.6
2.9
8.0
10.7
10.2

23.8
19.4
4.5
1.6
4.0
15.6
3.0
7.6
10.6
9.0

24.6
19.0
4.2
1.8
4.2
15.4
3.2
7.1
10.8
9.7

23.1
19.3
4.5
1.7
4.0
16.7
3.4
6.8
10.9
9.6

22.0
19.3
5.2
1.8
4.2
16.7
3.4
6.4
11. 6
9.4

21.6
19.4
5.2
1.9
4.2
16.7
3.6
6.1
12.0
9.3

28.4
19.1
2.8
1.5
5.0
21.1
2.2
3.7
7.8
8.4

26.9
19.4
3.0
1.5
4.9
21. 7
2.3
3.7
8.1
8.5

25.3
19.7
3.5
1.5
4.8
22.3
2.3
3.7
8.3
8.6

El Salvador
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity
Transportation
Commerce
Finance
Rents
Government
Services

27.1
19.9
3.1
1.4
4.4
23.8
1.9
3.9
7.5
7.6

26.3
19.7
2.5
1.5
5.0
23.6
2.0
3.9
7.4
8.1

25.5
19.7
2.8
1.5
5.2
22.7
2.2
3.9
8.0
8.5

Table V presents the year-to-year growth of the GOP, both at
current prices and, more imformatively, in constant 1962 pesos.

Using

current prices, the Costa Rican GOP is seen to grow considerably
faster than that of El Salvador.

When inflation is accounted for,

Costa Rica still has the faster growing economy but the differences
are not so marked.
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TABLE IV
STRUCTURE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FIXED (1962) PRICES
(000,000 $C.A.)
Costa Rica
1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

Agriculture
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity
Transportation
Commerce
Finance
Rents
Government
Services

158.7
126.9
28.9
10.1
26.7
104.2
19.1
53.4
71.5
68.1

168.2
136.9
32.1
11. 2
28.5
110.1
21.2
53.6
75.1
69.7

188.9
146.3
32.1
13.5
32.3
118.5
24.8
54.6
83.3
74.6

188.1
157.3
36.8
13.9
32.8
135.7
27.9
55.0
88.6
78.5

192.4
168.9
45.6
16.0
36.6
146.4
29.7
55.9
101.8
82.2

201.3
180.8
48.2
17.4
38.8
155.9
33.3
56.9
112.1
86.6

Total

667.6

706.7

768.8

814.6

875.6

931.1

260.3
189.0
28.2
19.6
51. 8
230.4
20.8
37.2
79.8
84.6

264.1
196.3
37.5
21.8
54.4
245.4
23.9
39.8
85.4
89.7

1001.7

1058.4

E1 Salvador
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity
Transportation
Commerce
Finance
Rents
Government
Services

223.1
162.0
27.0
14.2
41.0
225.3
16.2
32.6
64.3
64.5

227.1
168.9
22.7
16.1
46.4
232.8
17.6
33.7
63.8
69.4

235.4
170.2
25.6
16.6
47.6
232.8

75.1

250.9
176.8
25.5
18.0
51.2
226.2
20.4
36.2
73.2
79.2

Total

870.3

898.4

929.8

957.4

19.6

34.9
71.6

SOURCES: Banco Central de Costa Rica; Banco Central de Reserva de E1
Salvador.
One other point of comparison between the economies may be mentioned here.

UNICEF has divided the economies of the Latin American
29
countries into six levels of development.
In the lowest level,
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along with Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Honduras, they have
placed El Salvador.

In the second highest level they have placed

Costa Rica, along side of Cuba, Panama, and Venezuela and surpassed
only by Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.
TABLE V
PERCENTAGE

CHfu~GE

Current Prices
Costa Rica

IN GDP
Fixed 1962 Prices

El Salvador

Costa Rica

El Salvador

1967-68

10.1

5.0

5.8

3.2

1968-69

11. 7

3.9

6.6

3.4

1969-70

10.9

8.0

6.0

3.0

1970-7l

11.1

5.2

7.5

4.6

1971-72

11. 3

6.6

6.3

5.7

1967-72

68.1

36.6

39.5

21.6

Average

11. 3

6.1

6.6

3.6

Labor Force And Unemployment
Labor force and unemployment data present another important aspect of a nation's economy.

Unfortunately for analytical purposes,

data on employment are neither as detailed nor as reliable as data on
GDP.

Nonetheless, Table VI indicates the labor force composition and

unemployment rates for the two nations and their capital areas.
In making comparisons on the basis of these figures, their shortcomings and limitations must be taken into account.

Among other fac-

tors complicating a comparative analysis are two major ones:

1) the

figures for San Jose are for the urban area of San Jose Province while
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those for San Salvador are for the Metropolitan Area; in both cases
this is the statistical reporting unit most closely approximating the
municipality, and 2) in Costa Rica the economically active population
is calculated from the population twelve years and over while in El
Salvador the minimum age to be counted is ten.
TABLE VI
AVERAGE LABOR FORCE BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 1972 (%)
Costa Rica

El Salvador

San Jose

San Salvador

37.1
11.9
6.4
0.8
4.0
10.8
2.6
21. 3
5.0

45.6
8.3
2.1
0.3
2.6
7.4
0.7
13.1
19.5

4.5
19.3
7.2
1.6
5.1
17.8
5.6
35.3
3.7

3.4
18.3
5.5
0.6
5.3
17.2
3.1
35.1
11.4

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Economically
Active
Population

550,410
(48%)

1,314,857
(46%)

145,450
(48%)

218,476
(39%)

Economically
Inactive
Population

589,040
(52%)

1,537,118
(54%)

154,750
(52%)

342,028
(61%)

1,141,740

2,852,045

300,200

560,504

39,080
7.1%

264,231
20.1%

9,860
6.8%

30,150
13.8%

Agriculture
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity
Transportation
Commerce
Finance
Service
Other

Total

Total
Unemployed
Number
Rate

SOURCES: / Costa Rica Census of 1973; El Salvador, Direccion General
de Estadistica y Censos.
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With these caveats in mind some evident comparisons may be made.
The economically inactive population exceeds the active population in
all cases; the difference is considerably more pronounced in San Salvador.

In Costa Rica as a whole, a greater portion of

th~

labor force

is engaged in manufacturing, commerce and services than in El Salvador
while the latter leads in agricultural workers and those of unspecified or unknown occupation.

It may also be readily seen that the ur-

ban area labor forces, unlike the national ones, resemble one another
very closely.
Unemployment is much more serious in El Salvador than in Costa
Rica with a rate almost three times as high for the nation and over
twice as high for the capital area.

It will also be noted that, in

both cases, unemployment is lower in the metropolitan areas than in
the rest of the country with the difference being far more marked in
El Salvador.
Moreover, there are other factors not shown in the table and almost impossible to document.

In both cases unemployment is definitely

understated by developed-nations' standards and in both cases unemployment among those under age 20 is at least twice that for the
total work force.

Finally, in both countries the labor force is grow-

ing faster than job opportunities.
Public-Private Mix
Despite a tradition of expanded public service delivery in Costa
Rica and the absence of such tradition in San Salvador, very little
difference may be detected between the actual public-private mixes of
the two national economies as shown in Table VII.
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TABLE VII
PERCENT COMPOSITION OF GDP BY SECTOR (PUBLIC-PRIVATE MIX)
Costa Rica

Percent Private
Percent Public

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

83.3
16.7

83.4
16.6

82.8
17.2

82.3
17.7

83.1
16.9

81.9
18.1

87.1
12.9

86.5
13.5

86.1
13.9

84.9
15.1

El Salvador
Percent Private
Percent Public

87.8
12.2

88.0
12.0

SOURCES: Banco Central de Costa Rica; El Salvador, CONAPLAN, Indicadores, 1974.
It may be seen that in both countries there is slow but (with
one exception) steady increase in the percentage of the GDP that is
generated in the public sector.

As defined here, the public sector

activities include the central governments, autonomous and semiautonomous agencies, and local governments.

Although the relative

size of public sector participation is similar in both countries, the
internal composition of the public sector is quite different, as will
be shown below in the analyses of governmental expenditure patterns.
Distributional Aspects
Distributional aspects of the economy may be broadly interpreted
as including two sorts of considerations--per capita and by economic
class.

Table VIII shows per capita GDP at both current and 1962

prices, and the year-to-year changes.
Two significant differences between Costa Rica and El Salvador
are immediately apparent.

Productivity, as measured by per capita

GDP, is almost twice as high in Costa Rica as in El Salvador.

More-
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over, the difference is becoming greater.

Salvadorean productivity

was virtually stagnant over the six-year period while the Costa Rican
averaged more than three percent annual increase.
TABLE VIII
PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, AND CHANGES, 1967-1972
Current Prices ($C.A.)

Fixed (1962) Prices ($C.A.)

Per Capita GDP

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Costa Rica

E1 Salvador

Costa Rica

E1 Salvador

436
468
507
545
587
633

285
285
286
299
304
313

419
432
456
469
490
505

280
279
280
278
281
287

Annual Changes in Per Capita GDP
1967-1968
1968-1969
1969-1970
1970-1971
1971-1972
1967-1972
Average

7.3
8.3
7.5
7.7
7.8
45.2
7.5

0.3
4.5
1.7
3.0
9.8
1.6

3.1
5.6
2.9
4.5
3.1
20.5
3.4

-0.3
0.3
-0.7
1.1
2.1
2.5
0.4

That per capita income figures show the same general pattern as
per capita GDP is shown in Table IX.
TABLE IX
PER CAPITA INCOME, 1960 AND 1970

1960
1970
SOURCE:

Current Prices ($C.A.)

Fixed (1962) Prices ($C.A.)

Costa Rica

E1 Salvador

Costa Rica

El Salvador

364
469

230
298

381
403

257
256

UNICEF, Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales.
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Again, we find E1 Salvador stagnating in the decade 1960 to 1970 with
the apparent growth totally eroded by inflation.

Costa Rica, on the

other hand, despite its higher rate of inflation, enjoyed an annual
average gain of over two percent during this period.
Although the per capita income is both higher and increasing
more rapidly in Costa Rica, it is no more evenly distributed there
than in El Salvador.

Table X shows both distribution by income class

and how this distribution varies between the argricultural and nonagricultural sectors.
TABLE X
INCOME DISTRIBUTION, BY INCOME CLASS, 1970

Costa Rica
El Salvador

Poorest
20%

Next
30%

Next
30%

Next
15%

Richest
5%

5.5 9"
5.5%

12.5%
10.5%

22.0%
22.6%

25.0%
28.4%

35.0%
32.9%

Share of total income received by poorest and richest classes, 1970
Costa Rica

El Salvador

Poorest 20%

Richest 5%

Poorest 20%

Richest 5%

Nonagricultural
Sector

4.7%

25.5%

4.2%

22.7%

Agricultural
Sector

9.0%

42.5%

7.0%

39.5%

SOURCE:

UNICEF, Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales.

The general figures by class are very similar for the two, with Costa
Rica demonstrating a slightly greater concentration in the highest income group.

In both countries income is much more concentrated in the

agricultural than in the nonagricultural sector.

These data would
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suggest the existence of a middle/lower middle class in the nonagricultural sector that is either absent or very small in the agricultural sector.

By implication this would support the idea of the 'mid-

dIe class' as an urban phenomenon.
Another measure of equality or inequality of income distribution
is provided by the Gini index.

Barbara Stallings calculated the in30
come Gini for Costa Rica as 0.51 and for El Salvador as 0.52.
By
this measure, then, no significant difference exists between the two
countries.

(The extreme cases for Latin America are Ecuador with 0.32

and Columbia with 0.62; the U.S. scores 0.40.)

Gini indices of land

distribution for the two countries show Costa Rica with 0.78 and El
Salvador with 0.83.

These figures jibe with our income distribution

data showing wealth to be considerably more concentrated in the countryside than in the cities.

(Again, for comparative purposes, the

land Gini in the U.S. is estimated at 0.71; the extremes for Latin
America are Mexico with 0.69 and Peru with 0.93.)
In summary, then, we see Costa Rica exhibiting a considerable
and growing productivity and an average income advantage over El Salvador.

But we note as well the income is similarly maldistributed in

the two countries; in both, the poorest half of the population receives less than 20 percent of the income while the wealthiest fifth
of the population garners some 60 percent of the total.
National Government Revenue Patterns
The revenue and expenditure patterns of national governments are
of particular concern for a number of reasons.
tics and economics most directly interface.

It is here that poli-

It is here than political
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decisions are made about the allocation and distribution of a significant portion of the societies' economic resources.

And it is these

patterns that form the tableaux against which we will examine the actual creation of local government revenue policy.
All countries claiming some degree of adherence to a market system fill their public fisc with a mixture of direct taxes, indirect
taxes, and non-tax charges.
tions.

Costa Rica and EI Salvador are no excep-

Most also engage in some sort of borrowing, but borrowing will

not be considered in this particular section.
be upon current income.

Capital investments depend to a large extent

on internal or external borrowing.
year-to-year variations.
is uncertain.

Our concentration will

They are sporadic, showing wide

Borrowing, particularly external borrowing,

The actual pattern of general government revenue is

likely to be distorted by these occasional influxes of special purpose
As a topic of analysis, then, and as an indicator of the over-

money.

all government mindset on revenue raising, current income is a more
useful measure than total income.
Tax structures in both Costa Rica and EI Salvador are incredibly
complex.

To consider their minutae in this paper would be both inap-

propriate and unjustifiable in terms of time and effort.

A general

picture of the current income structure of the Costa Rican national
government is presented in Table XI along with some indication of
changes in the five years immediately preceding this study.

Parallel

information for EI Salvador is provided in Table XII.
Before comparing the separate countries over time, and one with
the other contemporaneously, we will briefly describe what sorts of

TABLE XI
COSTA RICA NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INCOME, 1967 AND 1972

Income 1967
Current income
Taxes
Direct taxes
Income
Property
Other
Indirect taxes
Import
Export
Excise
Other
Judicial activities
Non-tax sources
Transfer payments
Other
Income 1972
Current Income
Taxes
Direct taxes
Income
Property
Other
Indirect taxes
Import
Export
Excise
Other
Judicial activities
Non-tax sources
Transfer payments
Other

Current Pesos
($000)

Constant Pesos
($000) (1962)

Per Capita ($)
Current Constant

Percent of
Current Income

Percent
of Taxes

Percent
of GDP

110,982
97,469
38,346
31,662
6,684

106,734
93,738
36,878
30,450
6,428

73.30
64.37
25.32

70.49
61.91
24.36

100.00
87.8
34.6
28.5
6.0

100.0
39.3
32.5
6.9

16.0
14.0
5.5
4.6
1.0

59,124
26,939
1,457
28,976

56,861
25,908
1,401
27,867

39.04

37.55

53.3
24.3
1.3
26.1

60.7
27.6
1.5
29.7

8.5
3.9
0.2
4.2

1,753
13,513
4,864
8,649

1,686
12,996
4,678
8,318

1.16

1.12

1.6
12.2

1.8

0.3
2.0

157,288
141,168
34,392
33,523
869

125,469
112,610
27,435
26,741
693

85.45
76.69
18.68

68.16
61.18
14.90

100.0
89.8
21.9
21. 3
0.6

100.0
24.4
23.7
0.6

12.1
2.9
2.9
< 0.1

106,776
32,387
1,795
64,394
6,032
2,169
15,938
2,365
13,753

85,175
25,835
1,432
51,367
4,812
1,730
12,714
1,887
10,970

58.01

46.27

1.17

0.94

67.9
20.6
1.1
40.9
3.8
1.4
10.1

75.6
22.9
1.3
45.6
4.3
1.5

9.1
2.8
0.2
5.5
0.5
0.2
1.4

13.5

I-'
(J\
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TABLE XII
EL SALVADOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INCOME, 1967 AND 1972
Current Pesos
($000)
Income 1967
Current income
Taxes
Direct taxes
Income
Property
Other
Indirect taxes
Import
Export
Excise
Other
Judicial activities
Non-tax sources
Transfer payments
Other
Income 1972
Current income
Taxes
Direct taxes
Income
Property
Other
Indirect taxes
Import
Export
Excise
Other
Judicial activities
Non-tax sources
Transfer payments
Other

Constant Pesos
($000) (1962)

Per Capita ($)
Current Constant

Percent of
Current Income

Percent
of Taxes

Percent
of GDP

100.0
22.3
18.0
4.3

10.3
9.6
2.1
1.7
0.4

90,762
84,355
18,803
15,418
3,655

84,371
78,415
17,479
14,081
3,398

24.67
22.93
5.11

22.93
21.31
4.75

100.0
92.9
20.7
16.7
4.0

61,703
23,754
12,424
22,551
2,974
3,849
6,358
1,102
5,256

57,358
22,081
11,549
20,963
2,765
3,578
5,910
1,024
4,884

16.77

15.59

1.05

0.98

68.0
26.2
13.7
24.8
3.2
4.2
7.0

73.1
28.2
14.7
26.7
3.5
4.6

132,352
121,960
28,948
20,836
8,086
26
81,107
28,349
19,000
29,513
4,246
11 ,905
10,392
3,256
7,136

122,652
113,022
26,827
19,309
7,493
24
75,163
26,271
17,608
27,350
3,935
11 ,033
9,630
3,017
6,613

37.29
34.36
8.16

34.56
31.84
7.56

22.85

21.81

3.35

3.11

100.0
92.1
21.9
15.7
6.1
0.1
61.3
21.4
14.4
22.3
3.2
9.0
7.9

100.0
23.7
17.1
6.6
<0.1
66.5
23.2
15.6
24.2
3.5
9.8

7.0
2.7
1.4
2.6
0.3
0.4
0.7

11.6
]0.7
2.5
1.8
0.7
(0.1
7.1
2.5
1.7
2.6
0.4
1.0
0.9

......
Q\

\0
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charges are included within each of the broad categories tabulated.
Income taxes include levies on personal and corporate incomes as
well as on inheritances.

In Costa Rica, only income derived from

Costa Rican sources is taxed.
the same rate.

Companies and individuals are taxed at

There is no capital gains tax and dividends from com-

panies that have paid Costa Rican income tax are not taxed.

El Salva-

dor is the only country in Central American to have separate tax rates
for juridical and individual taxpayers, and to tax undistributed profits.
Moreover, El Salvador extends the income tax concept downward to
enable lower-income persons, who would otherwise fall outside the
realm of income taxes, to participate.

This is accomplished through

the medium of the vialidad, a four-part tax on almost everything.
Part A is a tax on 'liquid capital' and is actually included under
property taxes.

Liquid capital includes, but is not limited to, real

estate, livestock, mortgages, accounts receivable, loans outstanding,
cash, savings, bank deposits and business investments including professional offices and automobiles.

Part B is a flat rate of $4.00 per

annum assessed on all persons following the liberal professions-lawyers, doctors, clergy and the like; army officers are specifically
exempted.

Part C is a special income tax on salaries and wages of any

amount and Part D is levied on artisans and workers, with categories
from large, well-capitalized enterprises to 'artisans without shops'
and unskilled workers.

The only exceptions to the vialidad are mi-

nors, persons over sixty, members of the armed forces, school teachers
and married women--unless, of course, any of these own property.
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Property taxes include, in El Salvador, Part A of the vialidad
and, in Costa Rica, real property and gift taxes.

Unlike the rest of

Central America, El Salvador levies no special tax on insufficiently
31
used land.
Indirect taxes include import duties, export taxes and levies on
internal consumption.

Imposts on imports and exports are both general

and specific, both ad speciem and ad valorem.

In addition to commer-

cial duties, individuals often pay import and export taxes on personal
shipments of goods with nominal or no cash value.

For example, this

writer was required to pay no less than seven taxes, each a pittance,
as import duties on a package of newspaper clippings sent him in Costa
Rica from the United States"
In Costa Rica, over one-half of all export taxes come from a special levy on each hundredweight of sugar exported; similar taxes are
imposed in El Salvador on coffee and shrimp.

The coffee tax accounts

for more than 80 percent of the total export tax.
Excise taxes are the largest single segment of current income
for both national governments.
two countries.

The structure is much the same in the

Generally, the taxed commodities are liquor, gasoline,

soft drinks, tobacco and matches.
complex and confusing.

The details of the excise tax are

Costa Rica lists, in summary, over 160 differ32

ent ones, including 11 distinct taxes on liquor alone.
A third class of tax revenue found in both countries but unknown
in the United States is entitled Juridical Acts.

In Costa Rica this

includes a tax on public spectacles and in El Salvador proceeds from
traffic fines and the activities of the finance police.

In both coun-
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tries, however, the bulk of the money generated in this category comes
from the sale of stamps and stamped paper.

Most legal/official paper-

work is required to be drawn up on paper prestamped or imprinted with
a certain value.

The cost of the paper generally increases with the

amount of the transaction.

Among the documents which by law must be

executed on stamped paper are wills, contracts, petitions to courts,·
depositions and applications to various administrative offices.

Such

paper is generally purchased at retail; the retailer having already
paid the tax, and used as needed.

Stamps are usually purchased and

cancelled in one transaction, and affixed to stamped paper.
p~rticular

Fees for

activities are often listed as a paper of some amount and

a stamp of some amount.
Again, a personal example may prove instructive.

The writer

wished photocopies of materials of which a government agency had only
one copy.

Administrative regulations forbade the use of the agency's

copying machine for any but specified agency business, even if paid
for on the spot.

It was decided, however, that the agency head would

entertain a properly executed petition for temporary removal of the
documents for copying outside the office at a commercial copy center.
The petition was to be presented on a two colon paper with a stamp of
five colones.

The paper was purchased from a stationer, the petition

typed thereon, signed and dated.

(Had the petition been longer than

one page, or had a mistake been made that required starting anew, additional sheets of stamped paper would have to have been purchased and
used.)

The petition was then presented to the agency's fiscal officer

who sold, affixed and cancelled the five colon stamp.

The petition
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was then presented to the agency head who approved it and the writer,
with passport held as bond and accompanied by a functionary of the
agency, was permitted to carry off the documents and have them commercially photocopied.
Non-tax revenues are derived from a variety of sources.
the more lucrative are:

Among

patents, copyrights and trademarks; fees for

various consular activities; and charges for various licenses, permits
and government services.

It should be noted that the figures in this

section apply only to general government revenues.

Hence user charges

for utilities such as electricity and telephone service provided by
autonomous or semi-autonomous government agencies are not included.
One final aspect to be considered before the actual comparison
of the revenue structures is the collection procedure.
are easy.

Income taxes

As in most jurisdictions they are withheld at the source

for salaries and wages and quarterly payments are required from corporations and the self-employed.
ently in the two countries.

Property taxes are handled differ-

In El Salvador, bills are mailed out, with

the taxes to be paid to the Direct Tax Office.

Little difficulty is

encountered in collecting these because these must be paid in order to
receive a current boleto de vialidad.

This tax receipt is required,

along with the cedula, before any formal or official activities such
as applying for a passport or renewing a driver'S license, may be undertaken.
In Costa Rica the practice differs considerably.

As one prop-

erty owner described it:
There is no notice of tax. They change the rates maybe
every five years. If you get a letter it means you are in
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trouble. Fines are levied but there is apparently no means of
collection. You go down" automatically two or three times a
year and pay. Control and bookkeeping are bad. They may
charge you for someone else's property. Pay in the bank.
There's no automatic yearly increase in tax--only if you do
something to the house does the value go up.33
It

should be noted that almost all financial transactions with the

Costa Rican government are carried on through the banks; it makes no
difference which one, since all are government-owned.
Indirect taxes are usually collected at the source, e.g., the
liquor or match factory in the case of excise taxes.

In El Salvador,

sufficient excise stamps to cover the expected size of a given shipment are purchased from the Indirect Tax Office and affixed before the
shipment leaves the source.
chased from a bank.

In Costa Rica, again, the seals are pur-

Import and export charges are levied by the Cus-

toms Office, and collected on the spot.

This is one of the rare cases

in Costa Rica where payments are not made through a national bank.
Scofflaws and tax evaders are to be found in the two Central
American republics as well as elsewhere.

Once more, two very differ-

ent mechanisms have been established to deal with non-payment.

El

Salvador has set up a special branch of the Tax Office known as the
Finance Police.

This force is to root out and prosecute malefactors

and compel them to pay their share to the public purse.

The efforts

of the Finance Police are directed especially at two kinds of tax
avoiders:

smugglers, and even more so, at those who collect taxes

from their customers (e.g., gasoline wholesalers) and fail to remit
the funds to the government.
Costa Rica has chosen to rely more on the free enterprise system
and less on the coercive powers of the state.

A system has been cre-
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ated of fiscales especificos.

These are special attorneys who are

assigned debts owed to the central government, both taxes and other
arrears.

Fiscales especificos may collect these debts any way they

see fit, by judicial or extrajudicial means.

They receive a percent-

age of all monies so collected.
With this background on the general revenue structure, it remains to compare the two countries and see how each has altered over
the five-year period.
changes in Costa Rica.

Returning to Table XI we can examine the
Using the constant 1962 peso figures we note

that current income and tax revenues increased, both by about onefifth.

We note further, however, that direct taxes decreased by over

25 percent but that this decrease was more than offset by a
50 percent increase in indirect taxes.

One of the more intriguing

figures was the drop in per capita taxes; a very small drop, only one
percent, but a decrease nonetheless.

Another unexpected decrease was

in the portion of the GDP taken up by taxes; in this case the drop was
a substantial 13 percent.

This decrease is particularly remark-

able given Costa Rica's tradition of a constantly expanding government
role in the society and economy.
Within the tax structure itself a number of major shifts may be
detected.

The most obvious and most significant of these is the move

from an indirect-direct tax ration of 1.5:1 to 3:1.

In other words,

indirect taxes were relatively twice as important in 1972 as in 1967.
Probing deeper into the internal makeup of each tax category, the composition of the shift may be determined.

Income taxes declined se-

verely in importance; property taxes almost disappeared.

On the in-
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direct tax side miscellaneous taxes, unknown in 1967, made up more
than four percent of the total tax revenue in 1972, just about compensating for the decline in importance of import duties.

The major in-

crease took place in excise taxes which soared from less than 30
percent of the total to more than 45 percent, consolidating their
position as the single most lucrative tax source.
Specific causes behind some of these shifts are worthy of mention.

The miscellaneous indirect tax category is made up almost ex-

clusively of a 7.5 percent ad valorem tax on coffee beans delivered to
beneficios.

The property tax was for the most part turned over to the

municipalities.
inflation.

During this period Costa Rica underwent considerable

Most prices increased faster than most wages and salaries.

Excise taxes on the rapidly escalating prices of goods provided the
government with a fiscal surplus.

The built-in flexibility of these

taxes thus increased their total share under the inflationary circumstances.

It would seem that demand for most of the commodities against

which excise taxes are levied is quite inelastic with respect to price.
Table XII shows the changes in central government revenue in El
Salvador over the period 1967-1972.

Immediately evident is the in-

crease, in constant pesos, of both current income and taxes over the
period, both by more than 40 percent.

Direct taxes rose by over

50 percent and indirect taxes by 30 percent.

Per capita tax

burden also increased, by almost 50 percent.

A decrease, however,

was noted in the portion of the GOP devoted to taxes; it went down by
12 percent.
Some shifts also occurred in the composition of the tax struc-

177
ture, although not as marked as in Costa Rica.

Direct taxes became

relatively more important, although not by much.
declined.

Import duties' share

The largest change was in the category of juridical acts

which more than doubled its proportional contribution.

In summary,

then, the Salvadorean tax structure in 1972 appeared very much as it
34

had in 1967.
Comparing the tax structures of Costa Rica and El Salvador as
both existed in 1972, some significant factors are evident.

One of

the most obvious shows that per capita taxes in Costa Rica are twice
those in El Salvador.

In both countries, excise taxes are the largest

single source of income, but they are almost twice as important in
Costa Rica as in El Salvador.

Proportionally, El Salvador is eight

times as dependent on export taxes as is Costa Rica.

Assuming the tax

is added to the price of outbound commodities, primarily coffee, El
Salvador is thus able to effectively export 15 percent of its
total tax burden.

In the realm of direct taxes, Costa Rica derives a

greater proportion of its revenue from income taxes but the difference
is almost exactly countered by El Salvador's greater use of the property tax.

Finally, juridical activities provide only about one percent

of Costa Rican tax revenue while accounting for almost ten percent in
El Salvador.
We can conclude our comparison of tax structures with some qualitative assessment of the differences found.

Costa Rica uses its fis-

cal policy almost exclusively for money-raising purposes; El Salvador
also uses its for economic growth purposes.

Speaking of a series of

recent revisions to the Salvadorean tax system, Virginia Watkin gives
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as their major rationale:
To change the tariff system from one which was primarily
fiscal or money making in object to one which would encourage
the investment of capital in productive activity, promote the
rational use of labor, and encourage the efficient investment
of monetary reserves as well as provide the government with
revenue. 35
A variety of sociopolitical factors underlie this difference in
approach to fiscal policy.

First, Costa Rica needs the money more.

It has undertaken a wide range of expensive social programs which require continuous funding.

El Salvador has committed far less resources

to this activity, and has not raised the expectation level of its citizenry nearly as high.
Second, Costa Rica by virtue of its more open, accessible political system needs be more responsive, with cash as well as symbols,
to the demands of its people for more, and more expensive, services.
Salvadorean decisionmakers are somewhat more isolated, and insulated,
from mass political pressures.

They are thus freer to engage in eco-

nomically rational long-term planning and investment strategies.

More-

over, they are encouraged in this by the economic elite, the main
source of political pressure on the policymakers.
Third, as noted above in the section on national economies, Costa
Rica has a more productive and advanced economy than does El Salvador.
The former country, then, is not under the same compulsion as the latter to address their fiscal policy toward economic development.
One additional comment here might be addressed to those accustomed to thinking of national government revenue structures in the context of more developed nations.

North Americans tend to associate na-

tional taxes with income taxes, personal and corporate.

To their eyes,

l~

the tax structures of Costa Rica and El Salvador with their heavy dependence on indirect taxes may seem a bit bizal're.

It must be remem-

bered however, that to have the income tax as national fiscal backbone
requires a considerable income-taxable population.

The most readily

income-taxable group, the middle-class wage and salary earner, is far
too small in the Central American countries to carry this burden.

The

indirect taxes, although tending to be regressive, do spread the burden more evenly throughout the population.
National Government Expenditure Patterns
The final economic factors to be considered here are the expenditure patterns of the two national governments.

Data on these patterns

may be found in Table XIII for Costa Rica and in Table XIV for El Salvador.

Analyses will first be carried out on changes within each of

the countries from 1967 to 1972, followed by a comparison of the two
countries for the latter year.
Immediately evident in examining the changes over time in the
Costa Rica pattern is the substantial increase in total expenditure.
Overall
cent.

expenditures, in constant pesos, increased by about 150 perSome of this increase can be accounted for by the cost of serv-

ing an expanded population but per capita expenditures also more than
doubled.

The

gr~atest

change was in the area of Public Health and

Social Assistance, but the Economic and Education categories also
showed massive increases.
In terms of distribution, Education continued to be the most expensive activity with Economic expenditures in second place.

These

two, and Public Health, each added about eight percent of the total to

TABLE XIII
COSTA RICA NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1967 AND 1972
Expenditures - 1967

Sector
Economic
Education
Public Hea1th/
Social Assistance
Other Social
Defense
Justice
Other
Total

Current Pesos
($000)

Constant Pesos
($000) (1962)

Per Capita ($)
Current Constant

Percent of
Expenditures

Percent
of GDP

19,878
25,682

19,118
24,701

13.12
16.96

12.63
16.31

17.6
22.8

2.9
3.7

2,217
618

2,132
594

1.46
0.41

1.41
0.39

2.0
0.1

0.3
",0.1

42.56

40.94

57.1

9.3

74.53

71.68

100.0

16.3

Included in category 'Other'
61,989
64,450
112,845

108.536

Expenditures - 1972
Economic
Education
Public Heal th/
Social Assistance
Other Social
Defense
Justice
Other
Total

53,931
64,017

43,017
51,062

47.24
56.06

37.68
44.72

25.3
30.0

4.6

22,415
6,949

17,879
5,540

19.63
6.09

15.66
4.86

10.5
3.3

1.9
0.6

13,245
53,014

10,565
42,286

11.60
46.43

9.25
37.03

6.2
24.8

1.1
4.5

213,570

170,352

187.06

149.21

100.0

18.3

5.5

,

SOURCES: UNICEF, Las Sociedades Actua1es, for 1967 figures; Contra1oria General, Memoria Anua1 1973,
for 1972 figures.
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TABLE XIV
EL SALVADOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1967 AND 1972
Expenditures - 1967
Current Pesos
($000)

Constant Pesos
($000) (1962)

Per Capita ($)
Current Constant

Percent of
Expenditures

Percent
of GDP

25,340
22,364

25,089
22,143

8.20
7.24

8.12
7.17

28.0
24.7

2.9
2.5

3.75
0.34

3.71
0.34

12.8

1.1

1.3
0.1

9.79

9.69

33.4

3.4

29.31

29.02

100.0

10.3

Sector
Economic
Education
Public Hea1th/
Social Assistance
Other Social
Defense
Justice
Other

11 ,593

Total

90,573

11 ,478
1,039
1,029
Included in category 'Other"
Included in category 'Other'
29,938
30,237
89,677

Expenditures - 1972
Economic
Education
Public Hea1th/
Social Assistance
Other Social
Defense
Justice
Other
Total
SOURCES:

35,218
42,218

32,637
39,631

9.60
11.65

8.90
10.80

22.9
27.9

3.1
3.7

16,475
9,584
9,658
10,085
29,698

15,268
8,882
8,950
9,346
27,522

4.49
2.61
2.63
2.75
8.09

4.16
2.42
2.44
2.55
7.50

10.7
6.2
6.3
6.6
19.4

1.4
0.8
0.8
0.9
2.6

153,484

142,236

41.82

38.76

100.0

13.4

UNICEF, Las Sociedades Actua1es, for 1967 figures; CONAPLAN, Indicadores, for 1972 figures.
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their outlays at the expense of, primarily, general administration.
Overall, the portion of the GDP devoted to general expenditures of the
national government increased from 16.3 percent to 18.3 percent during
the five-year period.
El Salvador also showed an increase from 1967 to 1972, but of
less than 60 percent when measured in constant pesos.
expenditures increased by about one-third.

Per capita

Although other sectors

showed a greater proportional increase, Education outlays went up the
most absolutely.
A number of changes in the distribution of expenditures occurred
over the five-year period.

In probably the most significant of these,

Education moved past Economics to become the most expensive sector of
Salvadorean government activity.

In another important change Other

Social activities increased their share of expenditures more than fivefold.

The portion of outlay spent on Public Health and Social Assist-

ance declined slightly.

Overall expenditure consumed 13.4 percent of

the GDP in 1972, an increase of 3.1 percent over the 1967 figures.
Two points of comparison between Costa Rican and Salvadorean central government expenditure patterns stand out at once.

One is the

much larger absolute and per capita outlay by Costa Rica; the other is
the general similarity in

distribution.

On a per capita basis, Costa

Rica spends almost four times as much as El Salvador; in the Education
and Economic sectors more than four times.

Costa Rica spends a slightly

higher percentage on Education and Economic; the difference just about
accounts for the portion El Salvador spends on Defense.

Justice and

Public Health account for about the same proportion of the outlay in
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both cases.

Finally, it may be noted that El Salvador is increasing

the share of its GDP spent on public activities faster than is Costa
Rica.

At the present rate of change, however, it would take another

23 years before the two countries spent equal shares of their GDPs in
the public sector.
SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS
Again, policymaking theory holds that a variety of demographic
and other social factors may affect both the policy process and the
outputs therefrom.
are:

Among the factors postulated as playing this role

population, its age and sex structure and rate of increase; in-

ternal migration patterns; levels of educational achievement; and
group structure.
Population And Trends
The populations of El Salvador and Costa Rica, and the urban
areas of their capital cities, as of the most recent census, are presented in Table XV.

Population changes for the decade preceding these

headcounts are also presented.
Several significant comparisons and contrasts suggest themselves.
Although Costa Rica had a very high annual population growth, that of
El Salvador was even higher.

In Costa Rica, the urban population grew

more than two and a half times as quickly as the rural population; in
El Salvador urban growth was only slightly faster than rural growth.
In both cases the countries remain about three-fifths rural and twofifths urban in terms of population.
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TABLE XV
POPULATION AND DECENNIAL CHANGES
Costa Rica

1963
1973
Change
1963-1973

Rural
POEu1ation

PerCent

Urban
POEu1ation

PerCent

Total
POEu1ation

875,731
1,085,973

65.5
59.0

460,543
754,758

34.5
41.0

1,336,274
1,840,731

210,242

-6.5

294,215

+6.5

504,457

Average Annual
Percent Change

2.4

6.4

3.8

E1 Salvador
1961
1971
Change
1961-1971

1,544,100
2,149,100

61.5
60.5

966,900
1,405,600

38.5
39.5

2,511,000
3,554,700

605,000

-1.0

438,700

+1.0

1,043,700

Average Annual
Percent Change

3.9

4.5

San Jose
Population
Population

San Salvador

1963
1973

327,279
318,970

Change

1961
1971

351,726
560,504

91,691

208,778

2.8

5.9

Average Annual
Percent Change
SOURCES:

4.2

E1 Salvador Census of 1971; Costa Rica Census of 1973

./

Unexpectedly, San Jose gre\y

not only more slowly than Costa Rican

urban centers generally but also more slowly than the country as a
whole.

This is not in keeping with traditional wisdom as to growth

rates of primate cities.

San Salvador, on the other hand, increased

its population at a greater rate than both E1 Salvador and other Salvadorean urban centers.
will be suggested below.

Some possible reasons for this differential
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Although accurate intercensal population estimates are difficult
to obtain, indications are that in the most recent years the rate of
population growth slowed in both countries.

El Salvador dropped to

3.9 percent in 1974; this was still the highest rate of natural in36
Costa Rica's rate of population
crease of any nation in the world.
growth is believed to have dropped below two percent annually.

Among

the evidence offered to support this belief is the closure of some
schools for lack of pupils.
A peculiar difficulty arises with the 1971 census in EI Sa1vador.

At that time hostilities and tensions associated with the so-

called 'Soccer War' were still at their peak.

A large but indetermi-

nate number of Salvadorean nationals, usually squatters and/or resi37
dents of Honduras, were temporarily driven back into EI Salvador.
It is not known how many of these were or ought to be counted in the
census, nor where within EI Salvador they were located.

CONAPLAN as38

sumes most of them did not appear in the census figures.
Age and Sex Structure
The structure of the population by age and sex for both countries
and urban areas is shown in Table XVI.

Once again some worthwhile com-

parisons, both internally between city and country, and crossnationally, may be made.

In both Costa Rica and El Salvador the country as

a whole shows a higher proportion of persons under age fourteen than
does the capital city.

On the other hand, both cities show a higher

proportion of those between fifteeen and fifty years of age.
Two aspects of the age distribution in Costa Rica deserve mention:

one, the number of children in the youngest age bracket is less
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TABLE XVI
AGE -- SEX DISTRIBUTION

Costa Rica

75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25

D

N = 1, 760,560

•

San Jose

N = 418,970

10

8

E1 Salvador

6

2
4
0
2
4
Percent of Total Population

6

8

N = 3,549,260
San salvador.
N

= 560,504

10

8

6

24
20
15 - 19
14
10
- 9
- 4 years
10

75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10

CJ

4
2
0
2
4
Percent of Total Population

Sources: Costa Rica Census of 1973
San Salvador Census of 1971

6

8

years and older
- 74
- 69
- 64
- 59
- 54
- 49
44
39
- 34
29

10

years and older
- 74
- 69
- 64
59
- 54
- 49
44
39
- 34
- 29
24
19
- 14
- 9
4 years
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throughout the country than the number in the five-to-nine category.
In San

Jos~

each of the two lowest age categories has fewer members

than the one immediately above it.

This supports our contention of a

decreasing rate of population growth in Costa Rica, a decrease that is
more marked in San Jos~ than in the remainder of the country.
In each case the Index of Femininity (IF) is higher for the city
than for the nation at every age over ten and exceeds 100 in
every case over age 15.

This holds even though Costa Rica as a

whole has a population that is over 50 percent male.

Indices of

Femininity may be found in Table XVII.
TABLE XVII
INDICES OF FEMININITY (IF)
Age

Costa Rica

E1 Salvador

San Jose
""

San Salvador

Total
0-4 years
5 - 9 years
10 - 14 years
15 - 19 years
20 - 24 years
25 - 29 years
30 - 34 years
35 - 39 years
40 - 44 years
45 - 49 years
50 - 54 years
55 - 59 years
60 - 64 years
65 - 69 years
70 - 74 years
75 years and older

98
95
96
97
101
103
101
104
103
96
99
97
98
100
105
101
101

102
99
96
96
104
104
110
105
105
101
107
110
106
100
107
97
127

112
94
98
103
121
120
116
118
125
115
113
114

115
95
103
104
130
119
117
119
125
120
130
133
139
137
127
148
174

113

135
144
132
152

Number of Females
Index of Femininity
SOURCES:

=

x 100
Number of Mal es

E1 Salvador Census of 1971; Costa Rica Census of 1973.
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In absolute numbers, the greatest excesses of females over males
in San

Jos~

and San Salvador is found in the 14 to 44 age bracket.

IFs reach their maxima in the oldest age brackets, pointing up simply
that here as elsewhere, women live longer than men.
Two possibilities are suggested by the data above:

one, that

there is a movement into the capital cities from the rest of the country by young adults; and two, that the majority of the young adults so
migrating are women.

It will be shown below the extent to which other

data and observations support these migratory hypotheses.
Internal Migration
Scholarly literature on migration from countryside to city in
Latin America (and in the developing nations in general) abounds.
Theories and explanations are offered, causes and effects are suggested, analyses proliferate.
nomenon are rare.

Nonetheless, reliable data on this phe-

A few general tenets may be mentioned.

Inmigration

to cities, especially to capital cities, and even more especially to
primate cities such as San
migration.

Jos~

and San Salvador is larger than out-

Primate cities, therefore, are expected to grow much more

quickly than rural areas.

Factors leading to migration include both

attraction factors to the cities and repulsion factors from the countryside.

Marcia Koth and associates, for example, have identified
39
fifteen of these.
Other basic tenets hold that migrants are over-

whelmingly poor and male.
In this study we will be concerned only with those aspects of
migration that impinge directly on our central theme or that suggest
some alternatives to traditional wisdom.

To reiterate an earlier
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statement, reliable data on internal migration are indeed scarce.

It

is theoretically possible to get a quantitative picture of migration
from either a macro or a micro viewpoint.

In a macro approach, one

would need data on initial population, birth rate, death rate and final population for a jurisdiction for a particular time period.
algebraically, M = Pt - Po (l

+

Put

NRR) where M = migrating population, Pt

= population at end of time period t, Po = population at beginning of
time period t and NRR

= net reproduction rate (birth rates - death

rates over time period t).

Po(NRR) then, would give the population at

the end of time period t if only natural increase had occurred.

The

difference between this figure and the actual head count at the end of
the period would give the size and direction of the migration.
No recent studies have adopted this approach.

Again, at least

part of the reason for this must be the uncertainty attached to population statistics, particularly in Costa Rica.
however did adopt this approach.

Two earlier studies

The highlights of their findings are

presented below, with the ususal caveat.
In a 1970 study Jeffry Gibson looked at urbanization in Costa
40

Rica and E1 Salvador, as well as Honduras.
Table XVIII.

The results are shown in

Two points need be mentioned here.

migration to provinces, not to urban areas.

The figures are for

It may be assumed that the

bulk of the migrants settled in the urban areas but this is not specified.

In addition, migration numbers and annual percent increases do

not seem to jibe.

•

In a slightly earlier study for the United Nations (also using
figures to 1963) J. van den Boomen examined the San Salvador Metropo1i-
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He not only calculated the size of migration but deter-

tan Area.

mined a number of characteristics of the migrants such as place of origin and age at time of migration.

He found some 125,000 migrants in

metropolitan San Salvador, about 42 percent of the population.
Further, he determined that over 80 percent were under 30 years
of age when they moved and that three-quarters had migrated from towns
of more than 10,000 population.
TABLE XVIII
NET INMIGRATION

Period

San Jose"

San Salvador

1930-1950
1950-1963

20,700
25,200

68,600
48,700

Annual growth rate due to migration
1930-1950
1950-1963

4.5%
4.6%

3.0%
4.5%

Actual first-time period for San Jos~ is 1927-1950.)

(Note:
SOURCE:

Jeffry Gibson, Demographic Analysis of Urbanization.

The micro approach to calculating migration involves sampling
from a selected population and extrapolating the results. This ap42
proach was followed by White in his 1969 study.
He interviewed 270
migrants randomly selected from seven areas of San Salvador chosen to
represent different types types and qualities of housing but excluding
.
43
upper-middle class and above.
Some of his more noteworthy conc1usions were:

that only one-quarter of the people entering San Salvador

came from the countryside; that the majority of the migrants were
young women, hence more than a quarter of the metropolitan population
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is women of childbearing age while less than one-fifth of the rural
population is; and that half the women and 40 percent of the men who
migrate to the capital do so for economic reasons.

One interesting

finding was that 12 percent of the women move to the capital to join
a man while another 13 percent do so to get away from one--husband,
father or step-father.
White's findings, therefore, are consistent with our supposition
from the age-sex distribution data that migration to San Salvador is
occurring, and that the migrants tend to be young women.

Our findings

do not support the conventional view of the migrant population as predominantly male.
The greatest discrepancy between the implications of our data
and traditional wisdom lies in San Jose.

San Jose is indisputedly a

primate city yet during the 1963-1973 decade it grew more slowly than
not only other Costa Rican urban centers but also than the country as
a whole.

Part of this, it is reasonable to assume, is the result of

a lower natural reproduction rate in the city, as suggested by the
population pyramid (Table XVI).

The case can be made, logically,

that women in the capital are better educated, have greater access to
medical advice and birth control methods and consequently choose to
have fewer children.

We have, however, no data to support this con-

tention (nor to refute it).
With land distributed slightly more equitably in Costa Rica, and
the much lower rural population density than in El Salvador, the push
from the countryside to the city is less in the former country.

This

could account for some decreased migration and hence for San Jose's
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slower growth.

In addition, it will be shown below that government

decentralization policies, especially those of INVU are specifically
designed to discourage growth in the metropolitan areas.

Moreover,

U.S.-type suburbanization is luring members of San Jose's growing
middle class to residences outside the urban zone of San Jose Province.

We can therefore offer explanations in the abstract for this

phenomenon of slow urban growth but lacking reliable statistics we
cannot prove our contentions.
In examining population movements within El Salvador another potential source of cityward migration was discovered.
concept has not heretofore appeared in the literature.

This particular
Without know-

ing how generally applicable it is in other countries it is presented
here.

Standard pictures of the rural life in developing areas show

small farmers eking out a subsistence livelihood on their minifundia
and working occasionally for a large landholder, either as rent for
their small plots or to augment their marginal existence.

Those who

decide they cannot make it on the land move to town.
In San Salvador, however, a landless rural class has developed
the migrant farm laborer.

An

indeterminate number of (usually) men

follow the crops, much as migrant farm laborers do in the U.S.

They

move from one end of the country to the other harvesting cotton, coffee and sugar cane.
various cities.
between jobs.

In the course of their travels they pass through

Initially they may simply spend a day of two there
The stays become longer.

Having visited a number of

towns in this fashion, they may consciously choose one for longer
stops or eventual settlement.

On the one hand then, these farm labor-
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ers are 'accidental' migrants to the city in a way that no other group,
save only perhaps military draftees, is.

On the other hand, they ration-

ally select their urban residence, not reacting simply to proximity or
the pull of the capital as the usual migrant is assumedto do.
Educational Achievement
Level of educational achievement is generally regarded as a socia1 background factor influencing the quality of policymaking in both
municipal and national situations.

In this section we look very

briefly at the educational accomplishments In the two countries.

Both

Costa Rica and E1 Salvador follow a system of education involving only
slightly different nomenclature than in the U.S.

Primary school en-

compasses the first six years, and is the only school most pupils ever
know.

Upon completing this, the student obtains a certificate a110w-

ing him to enter secondary school.

The latter requires five years to

complete and the graduate is awarded the title 'Bachelor of Sciences
and Letters.'
From here the students may enter the University or attend spe44
Those who enter university with the intention of
cia1ized schools.
becoming, for example, physicians or lawyers, go directly into the
professional schools; pre-law or pre-medicine courses of study as are
found in the U.S. universities are unknown in Central America.
ally, a course of study in the university requires six years.

GenerTeach-

ing faculty are usually part-time, earning the bulk of their income
from outside practice of their professions.
Traditionally, Costa Rica and E1 Salvador have each had one Nationa1 University, state-supported but otherwise autonomous.

Both
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schools are currently housed in attractive suburban campuses.

In 1966

a new university, Jos€ Simeon Canas University of Central America, a
Roman Catholic institution, was opened in the outskits of San Salvador.
Table XIX indicates the relative educational achievements of the
two countries.
TABLE XIX
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS
Costa Rica

E1 Salvador

Literacy Rate - Age 10 and over
1950
1960
1970

79%
84%
89%

38%
49 9"
58%

Percent of age group attending school - 1970
5-14 years
15-19 years
20-29 years

67%
41%
5%

54%
24%
2%

Percent of the population graduated from university - 1970
1%
SOURCE:

UNICEF, Las Sociedades Actua1es.

Although precise figures do not exist, educational levels are
higher in the capital cities.

It is estimated that over 95 per-

cent of those between ten and sixity years of age are literate in
San Jose; the 1971 census found the literacy rate for San Salvador
to be 88 percent.

Further, it is estimated that the percent of

the population with a university education is three to five times
higher for the capitals than for the countries as a whole.

It can

readily be seen that the Costa Rican population, by whatever measure
is more advanced educationally than the Salvadorean.

In recent years,

45
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however, El Salvador is closing the gap, especially in terms of basic
46
litera.cy.
Group Structure
Although the 'average' citizen of El Salvador or Costa Rica
might not associate himself with as many or as diverse organizations
as his counterpart in the U.S., groups are not unimportant in these
two countries.

In a 1973 study, for example, John Booth found 66 per-

cent of Costa Rican family heads to be members of one or more volun47

tary groups.
In this section we look briefly at three sorts of groups:

busi-

ness associations, unions and student organizations, and civic
48

groups.

The nature of politics in Costa Rica

and El Salvador would

lead us to suspect that business associations might be more powerful
and influential in the latter country than in the former.
research supports this contention.

Empirical

In Costa Rica the chief spokes-

group for business interests is the Asociacion Nacional de Fomento
Economico (ANFE).
porate members.

It is small, with perhaps 300 individual and corIt adopts an uncompromising laissez-faire liberal ap-

proach that is very much at odds with the social service orientation
of the usually dominant PLN.

The ideology and rhetoric of ANFE is

carried to the people by La Nacion, Costa Rica's most highly regarded
but not politically influential daily newspaper.
In aligning itself automatically against the PLN on almost every
issue, ANFE has not traditionally been able to influence policy to any
major extent.

(This could change now that a more business-oriented

government with control of both Presidency and Assembly took office
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in July, 1978.)

In fact, business organizations in general have been

weaker than might be expected.

One reason for this is that almost all

businesses and business organizations act politically only through
ANFE.

If ANFE is not effective, they seek no other approach.

A sec-

ond reason is that coffee growers, the strongest agricultural sector,
present no united front.

Despite the existence of the Junta de De-

fense de Caf~ (JUDECA) and its potential power, coffee growers constantly attempt to undersell one another in the international market,
vitiating JUDECA and virtually eliminating their political influence.
No such political mistakes are made by the business organizations
of El Salvador.

The largest and most important of these is the Aso-

ciacion Nacional de Empresas Privadas (ANEP).

ANEP has some 400 cor-

porate and 11,000 total members including 11 organizations, chief
among which are the Sociedad de Comerciantes e Industriales Salvadorenos, the Comite de Bancos, Seguros y Financieras and the Camara
de Comercio e Industria (CACI).

ANEP and its constituent members

benefit from the domination of the national political scene by PCN,
their ideological fellow.

Nonetheless, ANEP takes nothing for granted

and, along with CACI maintains a professional staff to look out for
its interests at both the national and municipal levels.
In the agricultural realm as well, organization is tighter than
in Costa Rica.

Unlike the internal feuding that characterizes JUDECA,

cooperation and profit maximization predominate in the quasigovernmental Compania Salvadore~a del Cafe (COSDEC).
The most powerful and active unions, in both countries, are the
teachers' associations.

Costa Rica's Asociacion Nacional de Educadores
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(ANDE) is probably the most politically influential group of any kind
in the country.

It has a membership of

13~OOO

and is basically a

closed shop; all educators in any establishment receiving public funds
are required to join.

It lobbies very intensively for its own inter-

ests with considerable effect.

(It will be interesting to see the im-

pacts on ANDE's political power of the decreasing need for teachers resulting from the reduced numbers of young children.)
The Asociaci6n Nacional de Educadores Salvadore~os (ANDES) is
even more active than ANDE.

It may be, however, that ANDES is so mil-

itant as to cause some backlash against it.

Moreover it is divided in-

ternally into factions of varying degrees of intransigence, and this
dissension weakens its effectiveness in dealing with outside agencies,
particularly with the national government.
Unions of other public employees are also found in both countries.

In EI Salvador these unions are legion; most small groups have

their own organization, especially the more skilled tradesmen and those
in critical occupations (e.g., garbage collectors).

Despite the number

of unions, the majority of public employees are not covered.

The sit-

uation in Costa Rica is quite similar although the number of individual
unions is smaller.

The most important of these is the Asociaci6n Na-

cional de Empleados Publicos (ANEP) but even ANEP represents only about
five percent of the public employees, mainly lower status blue-collar
workers.
Private-sector labor unions are found in Costa Rica but they are
not so numerous, so well organized or so militant as those in EI Salvador.

No overall organization such as the AFL-CIO exists in EI Sal-
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vador.

Probably the closest is the Federaci6n Unitaria Sindical de El

Salvador (FUSS), an extremely militant group.

Its tactics run more to

general strikes attempting to seek government-mandated wage increases
than to negotiations with or actions against individual employers or
employer associations.

One interesting feature of the Salvadorean la-

bor scene is the presence of worker federations maintained basically as
wings of the major political parties.

The two most important of these

are PCN's Confederaci6n General de Sindicatos (CGS) and PDC's Union Nacional de Obreros Cristianos (UNOC).
Both national universities have student organizations but they
differ greatly.

The Federacibn de Estudiantes Costarricenses (FECR) is

not generally politically active.

Sporadically it rouses itself to pro-

test against such matters of particular student interest such as increased bus fares and higher tuition but then lapses back into its
wonted apathy.

Its Salvadorean counterpart, the Asociacion General de

Estudiantes Universitarios Salvadorenos (AGEUS) is far more militant
but no more effective.

One recent government response to its demands

was the complete closure of the National University from July through
December, 1972.
Of most immediate interest to this study are the community organizations.

In El Salvador these are of two kinds.

One is the service

club such as the Lions and the Rotary Women who occasionally venture into the realm of municipal politics.

Because of their service orienta-

tion they are often successful in achieving aims of low political sensitivity (e.g., having garbage cans placed in downtown San Salvador).
The other type of group is the community associations.

They have no
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corporate status, no financial base and are effectively controlled by
FOCCO.

In general, the community groups tend to be ad hoc and transi-

tory in nature and their sphere of interest limited to their immediate
neighborhood.
In Costa Rica, however, some 300 development associations are
found at the district, canton and provincial levels.

As indicated

above in the section on political structure, they are entitled by law
to a certain share of municipal revenue.
lic corporations.

They also have status as pub-

Like their Salvadorean counterparts, their interests

are limited to their immediate neighborhoods but they tend to be successful in such matters as obtaining improvements to community playgrounds.

DINADECO trains leaders for these groups but does not control

them, unlike FOCCO.

Municipal officials often regard them as nuisances

but are obliged to pay some attention to them although not in the setting of general municipal policy.
In summary, then, the following comparisons may be made between
the various categories of groups in Costa Rica and El Salvador.

In

Costa Rica the business groups have aligned themselves in low-key opposition to the dominant PLN and generally play no important role in
policymaking; in El Salvador the business groups are aligned with the
dominant PCN and play a substantial role in policymaking, even to the
49
extent of occupying two of the nine seats on CONAPLAN.
The Costa Rican government acts very much as patron to its citizens, including the working class.

Most employees therefore feel very

little necessity for active trade unionism and the movement, though not
officially discouraged, is weak.

The Salvadorean government does not
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play this role of patrOn to the same extent; trade unionism is militant
although not terribly successful in its attempts to gain wage and benefit increases through central government action.
active in both countries.

Teachers' unions are

In Costa Rica they are united and lobby suc-

cessfully for their interests; in EI Salvador they are given to internecine warfare and are less successful in achieving favorable government
action.
Associations of university students, traditional pressure groups
in Latin America, operate with similar lack of success in both countries.

Costa Rican university students are generally so low keyed and

apolitical as to be ignored; the more radical, militant and activist
Salvadorean students seem only to generate resentment against themselves.
Community groups are active, recognized, permanent, funded and
often effective in Costa Rica.

Their Salvadorean counterparts are less

active, spatially constrained, transitory and usually without finances.
The most successful ones are branches of international service clubs in
their sporadic forays into the local political scences.

Such community

groups as exist in Salvadorean neighborhoods, particular lower-class
and public-housing developments, are looked on by both PCN and PDC primarily as instruments to be manipulated for their own partisan political purposes.
lliE GENERAL PLAN
It is a tenet of the planning creed that an overall plan for the
development of an area will provide some framework within which ra-
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tional policymaking can take place. There exists a Plan for metropol50
itan development in San Salvador
and none in San Jose. It might be
expected therefore, that the policy processes in San Salvador and the
outcomes thereof might be affected and improved.
A thorough examination of the General Plan, however, makes this
appear unlikely.

In the first place, the Plan is designed to react to

expected population growth, not to influence it.

Second, the Plan

basically perpetuates current land use and transportation patterns; it
does not suggest altering them.

Third, it is couched for the most

part in such vague terms as to make implementation both difficult in
itself and even more difficult to measure or evaluate.

Fourth, there

is no reason to expect much attempt at implementation--plans for metropolitan San Salvador have been created for the past thirty years;
all sit languishing in the office of the Director General of Urbanism
and Architecture.

Fifth, the Plan appears to have been drawn up in a

vacuum; linkages to the outside are hardly mentioned.

And finally,

the greatest shortcoming from the point of view of this study, no role
whatsoever for municipal government is even hinted at; the existence
of twenty-two local governments in the area, including San Salvador,
is ignored.

Given this situation, our initial assumption that the existence
of the Plan would have an effect on municipal policymaking in San Salvador seems unlikely to hold.

Nonetheless we look in subsequent chap-

ters to see if we can find any difference between our two municipalities that can be traced to the Plan.
The above, then, is the examination of the various political,
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economic and social background factors we feel likely to influence the
policy process and the outputs therefrom in San Jos~ and San Salvador,
and to account for anticipated differences between the two municipalities.
In the following chapter we discuss the nature of the policy
process as we actually find it, both in general and more specifically
for the making of revenue policy at the local level in the municipalities.

This process and its results are related and tied to the back-

ground factors in both Chapter VII and Chapter VIII.

Chapter VII con-

siders very specific connections between certain of the factors and
day-to-day housing and municipal finance programs.

Chapter VIII ex-

amines more holistically the relationships between the total package
of background factors and the overall policy process and its consequences.
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CHAPTER V NOTES
1. Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica 1949 (as amended)
(Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1965).
2. Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador 1962 (Washington,
D.C.: Pan American Union, 1966).
3. There is an exception to classification by size: the chief municipality of each district receives the title of city, regardless of
its population. Thus, for example, Suchitoto with 5,300 persons
is classified as a city while Cuscatancingo with a population of
18,800 is a pueblo.
4. See the discussion of Rojas, "El Codigo Municipal," above, p. 35.
5. Costa Rica, Municipal Code, Article 4.
6. Costa Rica, MuniciEal Code, Articles 4-10.
7. The party composition of the 1974-1978 San Jose Municipal Council
was PLN - 5, PUN - 3, RD - 2, PNI - 1, PRN - 1, and PASO - 1.
8. El Salvador, Municipal Act, Article 74.
9. Municipality of the Central Canton of San Jose, Regulations Governing Internal Organization, Administration and Debate of the MuniciEal Council, Article 7.
10. The administrative structure
treme flux during the period
and accompanying description
shot of the structure at one

of San Salvador was in a state of exof the field work. The organogram
constitute the best available snappoint in time.

11. The Council's term actually begins and ends two months earlier.
The most recently completed Council term, for example, ran from
1 May 1974 to 30 April 1978, while that of the Municipal Executive
ran from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1978.
12. See page 117 above.

,

.

."

13. Cliavez Mena, "OrganlzaclOn Municipal," p. 30.
14. Ebel, "The Decision-Making Process in San Salvador," p. 191.
15. Personal interview, 8 April 1974.
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16. For a complete account, see Alfred Cuzan, "Urban Resource Allocation and Policy Performance: Center-Local Linkages in El Salvador
and Costa Rica," paper presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the
American Society for Public Administration, Chicago, 1-4 April
1975.
17. Not to be confused with the General Treasury of Specific Municipal
Funds, an agency of the national government with which all municipalities are to deposit their funds.
18. El Salvador, Law of Municipal Finance Organization, Article 4.
19. Personal interview, 18 April 1974.
20. Costa Rica, Instituto de Fomento y Asesoria Municipal (IFAM), Filosofia, Objectivos y Programas de Trabajo, San Jose, 1971, p. 17.
21. This was the only Peace Corps Volunteer in either Costa Rica or El
Salvador working on an urban project.
22. The President, two Vice-Presidents and the Cabinet constitute the
Council of Government.
23. A number of smaller, usually agrarian-populist, parties contest
elections in outlying areas but are not found in San Jose.
24. A straight proportional representation system, on a department
basis, is used for elections to the Salvadorean National Assembly.
25. In both polities, as is traditional in Latin America, a great many
physicians, surgeons and dentists are very active politically,
even to the point of seeking fairly minor political office. These
medical politicians may be found in all political parties. In
North America this phenomenon is virtually unknown.
26. This is somewhat surprising as most Salvadoreans are technically
illegitimate and there is no particular stigma attached to illegitimacy.
27. Literally. These charges and countercharges appeared in La Prensa
Grafica during the 1974 municipal election campaign in San Salvador.
28. The monetary unit used for comparative purposes here is the Central American peso which is equal in value to the U.S. dollar and
will be indicated by $C.A. Figures were initially in Salvadorean
or Costa Rican colones and were converted into Central American
pesos by the writer. Conversion values used were $1.00 C.A. =
¢2.50 Salvadorean and $1.00 C.A. = ¢6.62 Costa Rican. The symbol
¢ is used for colones of both countries.
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29. UNICEF, SIECA, and ODECA, Informe Final: Conferencia Sobre La
Familia, La Infancia y La Juventud de Centroam~rica y Panam~ (Guatemala: Editorial Jos~ de Pineda Ibarra, 1973), p. 116.
30. Barbara Stallings, Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America, SAGE Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 3 (Beverly Hills:
SAGE Publications, 1972), p. 59.
31. Visual evidence of this can be seen in the existence of vacant
lots in the heart of San Salvador. No such unused real estate may
be seen in other Central American capitals.

,

32. Montero, "Evolucion del Sistema Tributaria," Tables 8 and 11 (unpaged). This does not include a variety of municipal taxes on the
liquor trade.
33. Personal interview, 25 March 1974.
34. It has, however, changed greatly from the 1940s and 1950s when import duties supplied 40 percent to 50 percent of total revenues.
See Wa11ich, Public Finance, p. 52.
35. Virginia C. Watkin, Taxes and Tax Harmonization in Central America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Law School, 1967), p. 233.
36. San Jose (Costa Rica) La Nacion, 25 February 1974, p. 22A.
37. Estimates range from 63,000 to 300,000.
p. 185.
38. El Salvador, CONAPLAN, Indicadores:
San Salvador, p. 13.

See White, El Salvador,

Economicos y Sociales 1973,

39. Koth, Housing in Latin America, p. 19.
40. Jeffry Gibson, A Democratic Analysis of Urbanization: Evolution
of a System of Cities in Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica,
Latin American Studies Program Dissertation Series, no. 20
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1970).
41. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Aspectos Demograficos
y Socioeconomicos del Area Metropolitana de San Salvador, prepared
by J. van den Boomen, (E/CN.12/CCE/ 333/TAO/LAT/54) January 1,
1966.
42. White, El Salvador.
43. Ibid., p. 159. This is the only one of the studies in which the
methodology is specified.
44. In Costa Rica, Normal School and Schools for the Performing Arts.
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In El Salvador, Normal School and Schools of Nursing, Social Work,
Agronomy, Physical Education and Engineering Technology. Students
entering Trade Schools usually do so at the end of their primary
schooling.
45. Two explanations are offered for the genesis of this university.
One attributes it to the uneasinesss of the Church and some sectors of the economic elite over the 'Marxist bias' of the National
University. Faculty members of the new university, however, perceive that their offerings of such disciplines as Industrial Engineering and Planning fill a vacuum left by the National University's concentration on Law, Philosophy, Art and Humanities.
46. A literate person is defined as one who can read, write and understand a simple paragraph. Those who can only write their names
are classed as illiterate.
47. John Booth, "A Replication: Modes of Political Participation in
Costa Rica," WPQ 29 (1976): 628. A sample of 1,446 family heads
was interviewed.
48. For a more thorough analysis of group participation, see Cuzan~
"Central-Local Linkages"; and Ebe1, "Decision-Making Process in
San Salvador."
49. The other members of CONAPLAN are the Ministers of Finance, Economy, Agriculture, Labor and Public Works; and the Presidents of
the Central Reserve Bank and of the Republic.
50. El Salvador, Ministerio de Obras Publicas, San Salvador:
Desarol10 Municipal, San Salvador, [1973J.

Plan de

CHAPTER VI
THE POLICY PROCESS
In Chapter III we presented a general view of the policy process
and our model of choice for analysis thereof.

Here we apply the anal-

ysis to our particular areas of interest, most particularly to municipal revenue policy.

This chapter focuses on process, and more speci-

fically on process within what we have defined as the boundaries of
the political system.

Policy output, that is, the current set of pol-

icy practices, will be described below in the subsequent chapter.
In the section on housing policy, emphasis is on the general nature of the process--what matters are to be considered, what questions
are to be asked.

Because of the national character of housing policy,

no specific cases are examined in the area.
examined in the revenue section.

Two cases are, however,

In San Salvador we look at a case of

aborted overall tax reform and in San Jose at a successful case of a
policy to introduce a new tax.
Case studies may be approached in one of two ways.

From one

viewpoint, the case is the heart of the analysis; all other material
is only background against which to examine the particular case.

From

the other viewpoint, the case is merely illustrative of general principles presented elsewhere.
Which of these approaches is chosen is influenced to a large extent by available information.

Where a number of different policies
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of the same type (e.g., revenue) can be located and traced from beginning to end, and where more general data are sparse and/or no welldefined framework for analysis exists, the former, inductive, approach
is obviously appropriate.

Where a reasonably well-developed theory

exists, where data on the general situation have been assembled and
where a framework for analysis is in place, the latter, deductive,
approach fits.

This is the approach selected here.

Particularly in the matter of revenue policy, we have on the one
hand definite hypotheses and a framework for analysis and on the other
hand a shortage of complete, informative cases.

Our case studies,

therefore, serve primarily as illustrations and as checks on our general assumptions.
HOUSING POLICY
Public housing policy in both Costa Rica and El Salvador is national, not municipal.

National agencies have been set up in both

cases to deal with housing.

In El Salvador, municipalities are speci-

fically excluded from housing planning.

General provisions of 'good'

public housing policy are indicated above in Chapter IV.

The results

of all this policyrnaking, the current package of rules and regulations
and the actual provision of dwelling units, will be presented below in
Chapter VII.

Comparisons and contrasts will be indicated among INVU,

IVU and FUNDASAL.

Consequently, this chapter will consider housing

policy only very briefly.
It is fair to state that with the establishment and funding of
INVU and IVU respectively, both countries have completed the metapolicy-
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making stage.

In the ongoing policy process in the realm of publicly

supported housing, a variety of decisions need to be made on a more or
less continuing basis.
The first issue the agency decides is the location of a public
housing project.

(For analytical purposes each publicly assisted hous-

ing project, whether for sale or rent, will be regarded as one policy
package.)

Location is the single most critical decision for a number

of reasons, reasons that are not always the same in Costa Rica as in
EI Salvador.
Most public housing in EI Salvador is in the capital metropolitan area; much of the government housing in Costa Rica is in outlying
sections of the country.

Even if we restrict analysis to the urban

areas of San Jos~ and San Salvador, the locational considerations are
different.

In the San Salvador area, IVU must select its sites from

those undeveloped areas not already dedicated to some non-housing use,
and then work on acquiring them.

INVU, on the other hand, owns a

,

variety of sites (former coffee fincas) in the outskirts of San Jose.
Its decision, then, is which ones, if any, to build on.

Another very

real constraint exists in San Salvador; ANDA simply does not have the
capacity to provide acceptably priced water to elevations above 900
meters.
Following the decision as to location and influenced by the site
and situational factors of the real estate chosen, policy as to type
of construction is considered.

Again, a number of subdecisions must

be made before coherent policy can emerge.

One question that needs be

answered very early is, 'Do we build single-family units or multiple-
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family units or some combination of both?'

It will be shown below

that some external considerations, beyond the agency's judgments as to
what best suits the needs of their clients, are involved at this stage
of the decisionmaking process.
Two subsidiary questions regarding construction arise at this
point--what sorts of construction material to use and how complete the
housing ought to be.

The former question is the more easily answered.

Engineers and accountants can invoke a purely rational decisionmaking
model and come up with a single best (most cost efficient) solution.
Again, a difference between INVU and IVU is noted;

I~~

takes the

state of the art as defined by the contractors/bidders as a given.
thus reduces its options, and its decisionmaking costs.

It

IVU operates

its own materials technology laboratories seeking better and cheaper
materials; it must decide when and how much of its own technology to
employ and test.
The other question, how far to go, is a hard political one and
must be answered nearer the top of the agency hierarchy.
can be, and are

Arguments

given for providing only cleared patches of earth and

construction materials, for providing furnished turnkey housing, and
for every intermediate position.

The usual result of this argument

will be indicated below.
The underlying purpose behind all these activities is, of course,
providing housing for poeple.

Not enough housing can be provided, how-

ever for everyone who is unable to purchase or rent in the private
housing market.

As a result, two pairs of decisions are necessary at

this stage in the policy process.

One deals with whether ruralites
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or urbanites are to be sheltered; the other with the appropriate income level population to be served.
Again, arguments can be made for concentrating on rural housing
and equally valid counter arguments for an urban emphasis.

Koth sum-

marizes the five general arguments for rural housing:
1. Urban housing programs encourage cityward migration with
its attendant problems.
2. Better housing in a rural area leads to more employment
there and thus a tendency for people to remain.
3. Provision of housing in rural areas creates the potential
for development of small family shop industries as bases for
future industrial specialization.
4. Education of rurals through self help programs and the
like integrates them into the national culture.
5. Provision of housing in rural areas can encourage colonization on un- or under-used land. l
Another argument made from time to time for concentration on rural
housing provision is that the rural areas have the greatest need, i.e.,
that shortfall, both absolutely and proportionately, is greater in
rural areas.

Gustavo Antonini, for example, estimates a 1970 housing

deficit for Costa Rica of 115,545 units of which 94,156 or 81.5 per2

cent are needed in rural areas.
Proponents of an urban emphasis for public housing provision offer their own reasons in favor of this emphasis.

The four most usual

are:
1. Urbanization is inevitable, now is the time to make the
transition smooth.
2. The rapid expansion of cities requires rapid expansion of
services, including housing, to prevent epidemics.
3. Housing programs in urban areas generate greater external
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economies, e.g., bettering the health and psyches of industrial workers.
4. 'Probably the most important,' political agitators in urban
slum areas find fertile ground for spreading disaffection-better housing may decrease conflict. 3 ,4
The actual concentration of effort in Costa Rica and El Salvador will
be indicated below in Chapter VII.
In much the same manner, arguments are made for emphasizing
housing for the poorest classes as opposed to housing for the lowermiddle classes, those who can almost but not quite compete in the general housing market.
ciency.

The basic dispute is between humanity and effi-

Those arguing for the lowest classes suggest that they need

it more, that the lower-middle class will eventually be able to shift
for itself; not so for the poorest.

The arguments for the lower-middle

class hold that they will be able to pay their rent or mortgage, getting money back into the pot for additional housing; that this is the
fastest stimulus to an increase in the construction industry, an industry in which the poor could get work and move to the lower-middle
class; and that it is simply too expensive to house the lowest classes.
Again, the policies chosen by the agencies will be presented below.
Choosing a socioeconomic class to benefit from public housing
activity is not sufficiently precise for program purposes.
house families, not socioeconomic classes.

Projects

And again, the families

most in need of public housing may be just the ones who do not fit in
a project--no skills to finish a self-helf unit, too many children, or
problems with contagious disease, for example.
The last set of major considerations that go into the process of
making decisions about publicly assisted housing involves financing.
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Financing policy is Janus ian:

the one face looks outward to the over-

all financing of the project while the other looks inward to the financing by the inhabitants of their individual shares.
Financing of housing at the macro level is more a search for
money than a selection among alternative funding opportunities.

A

number of major problems constrain and inhibit investment in housing.
The wealthy classes in Central America have been traditionally disinclined to make any non-argricultural investments in real estate, save
for luxury construction or for speculative purposes.

Private entre-

preneurs can realize faster and larger returns from other investment
opportunities, particularly in an inflationary climate such as that of
Costa Rica.

National governments do not have the sums of money needed
5

generally available to them.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to

seek external sources of funding.

With external sources of funding

come additional participants in the policymaking process, and additional constraints.
Consider, for example, the following provisions which are but
some of the restrictions mandated by one external funding agency, Banco
Interamericano de Desarollo (BID), on any public housing projects for
which it has loaned money.

Recipient governments must invest the funds

within a set period and make all purchases and let all contracts (except for self-help projects) through public bidding.

Relationship of

the project to a comprehensive national housing policy must be specified and self-help must be at a maximum.
be self-sustaining.

The project must eventually

Money loaned must be used for private home owner-

ship and new construction, not for rental units or restoration.

Hous-
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ing is to have 'minimal internal amenities' and provision of nonhousing urban infrastructure is prohibited.

In short, governments and

agencies borrowing to finance housing construction may pay only a very
low interest cost but a very high one in loss of freedom to design and
institute local housing policy.
Methods provided for owners and renters in public housing facilities to finance their individual shares will not be discussed further
here but will be examined below.

Chapter VII, then, will present the

current character of housing policy, i.e., the set of day-to-day activities resulting from these policy deliberations.

Practices to be

considered include regulations governing clientele selection, and specific accomplishments--the actual provision of dwelling units.

Ex-

plicit comparisons among INVU, IVU and FUNDASAL will be offered.
GENERAL MUNICIPAL REVENUE POLICY
Unlike housing policy, municipal revenue raising is very much a
~

local government function in both San Jose and San Salvador.

To be

sure, there are in both countries greater (Costa Rica) or lesser (El
Salvador) levels of subventions from national to city governments, but
the municipalities must raise money on their own.

Transfer payments

will be considered briefly in the following chapter; here the concentration is upon the processes by which the local governments attempt
to increase their own revenues.

Initially we examine the general

methods for the augmenting of the local

govern~ents'

own funds, next

we examine an unsuccessful attempt to raise taxes in San Salvador and
/

finally we trace the arduous route through which San Jose was able to
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impose a new charge.

In all of these we will concentrate upon activi-

ties within the boundaries of the political system.
City councils in San Salvador and San Jose, like their counterparts worldwide, devote a good bit of their energy to raising enough
money to finance a wide variety of municipal services and activities.
And like their counterparts elsewhere, their attempts to raise money
often meet with stiff resistance.
In both cities, the municipality's own income comes from three
6

sources:

patentes or impuestos municipales, tasas and contribuciones.

Unfortunately there are no perfect correlations with any of our better
known generic terms for municipal revenue sources in North America.
Patentes include general municipal taxes and various sorts of licenses.
They are charges for the privilege of doing something within the municipal boundaries (e.g., residing, engaging in commerce, carrying a
firearm) that does not require any municipal effort or service.

Tasas

are basically charges for continuing services provided by the municipality as, for example, garbage collection and street cleaning.

Con-

tribuciones are charges made for new, usually one-time-only municipal
activities such as installing a culvert, paving a street or constructing a sidewalk.

Services for which contribuciones are charged are

the sorts of improvement which, if provided by municipal governments
in Oregon, would likely be Bancroft-bonded.
To further the confusion in terminology, tasas and impuestos are
both used freely as generic terms for any government impost or levy.
In San Salvador the term arbitrio is often used in place of patente;
the two are interchangeable.

216

Considering our framework for policy analysis, then, we may assume that the municipal political systems have gathered the whole
range of po1icymaking phases, so far as possible, within their own
boundaries.

In other words, there may be demands, isolated or aggre-

gated, made upon them from outside for expensive services but the demands for increased revenues to support these services come from within.
Individual councillors, then, may be regarded as the initiating
actors in attempts to increase revenue.

It should be noted, however,

that in some cases, especially in San Salvador, the bureaucracy will
make the original demands or recommendations.
In the usual practice, an individual councillor will suggest to
council that the rates for a particular charge or tax be raised, or
that a specific new source of revenue be adopted.

The council dis-

cusses the idea and if it is deemed worthy of further consideration it
will be assigned to the appropriate committee, the Standing Committee
on Budget and Finance in San Jos~ and the Interim Finance Committee in
San Salvador.
The committee may consider each suggestion on its own, or it may
engage in some internal aggregation and assembly a package for council
discussion.

After due deliberation, the council may decide to pass

the increase, to reject it, or to return it to the committee for modification.

If the increase is passed, the adoption phase for that par-

ticular policy is complete.
Legitimation, in both senses, is the next stage.

In both Costa

Rica and E1 Salvador, as stated above, any changes to municipal tax or
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user charge rates as well as any new charges require approval from the
Central Government.

A definite procedure, then, exists for legitimat-

ing (in the legal sense)

the revenue policy.

Different levels of

Central Government approval are required for tasas and contribuciones,
whether new or modified, than for patentes.

Since the former are sim-

pler, they are discussed first.
When the Municipality of San Salvador passes any new tasa or
contribucibn or makes any rate change therein, the Vo.Bo. of the Ministry of the Interior is required, before the new levy comes into effect.

The Municipality first transmits its proposed policy to the

Governor of the Department, who in turns transmits it to the Ministry
of the Interior.

The Governor may comment on the proposal but cannot

himself approve or disallow it.
Upon receiving the request, the Ministry assigns it to its Department of Municipal Control.

The Department considers the proposal,

and may call for such comment from interested parties as it feels appropriate.

When it has reached a decision as to the desirability of

the policy, the Department reports back to the Minister with its recommendation.

(Sometimes the policy proposal just disappears; the De-

partment of Municipal Control is widely regarded as a graveyard for
dead municipal rate increases.)
The Minister of the Interior is not bound by the recommendation
of the Department; he is perfectly free to approve or disapprove the
policy.

If he approves, he so informs the Department Governor who in

turn informs the Municipality.

At this point the Municipality must

publish the policy proposal, in both the Official Journal and a news-
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paper of general circulation, thrice at intervals of not less than one
working day.

Then, and only then, can the Municipality begin to im-

plement its new revenue policy.
The policy process in San Jos~ is parallel but somewhat simpler.
Again, the policy suggestion passes from individual councillor (or
from the bureaucracy) to the complete Council, thence to the Standing
Committee on Budget and Finance and thence back to the full Council
for its approval.
In Costa Rica too, Central Government approval of changes in
tasas and contribuciones is required.

The municipal accord is trans-

mitted to the Comptroller General of the Republic.

Within this office,

the policy is analyzed by the Department of Economic Studies which
makes a recommendation to the Comptroller.

If the Comptroller ap-

proves, he publishes the document in the Official Journal.

Eight days

after publication, the Municipality may commence application of its
new policy.
In both countries, the process for instituting new policy in the
realm of municipal impuestos (arbitrios, patentes) is even more complex than that for tasas and contribuciones.

Aggregation, formulation

and adoption procedures remain the same but another formal actor enters the legitimation phase.

Changes in the structure of the im-

puestos require approval not only of the executive power of the central governments but also of their legislatures.
In El Salvador, the impuesto policy, like the tasa/contribucion
policy, is transmitted through the Department Governor to the Ministry
of the Interior.

After study by the ministry's Department of Munici-
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pal Control, it is returned to the Minister who sends it to the presiding officer of the Legislative Assembly for introduction to that
body.
After brief initial consideration, the Assembly assigns the bill
to its Committee on Interior and Public Works which considers it and
returns it to the full Assembly for discussion there.

If approved by

the Assembly, the policy filters down as before to the municipality
for application.
In Costa Rica, municipal irnpuesto policy is transmitted in the
same manner as tasa policy up to the point where the Comptroller General makes his recommendation thereon.

From here it goes to the Min-

ister of Government who in turn sends it to the President of the Assembly for introduction.

The Assembly assigns it to the Committee on

Social Affairs (Asuntos Varios) for study and recommendations.

If the

full Assembly passes the bill on its return from Committee, it is sent
to the President of the Republic for approval, and he causes it to be
published in the Official Journal.

Again, after the eight-day waiting

period, the municipality may begin implementing the policy.
The policy that the municipality can now execute may not be
precisely the same as the one it adopted.

Both national legislatures

have the right to modify as well as reject the municipal policy proposal.

If the modifications are not to the municipality's liking, it

either has to live with them or not proceed with the policy implementation stage.
Concurrently with the formal, legal legitimation process for the
municipal revenue policy, the informal legitimation takes place.

Sel-
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dom are policies to raise tax or user charge rates, or to institute
new ones, universally popular.

In Costa Rica and EI Salvador it is

generally during this phase that the affected interests attempt to
have the policies disallowed or at least the more objectionable features changed.

It is, therefore, the primary point of access for in-

formal policymakers.

Both types of informal policyrnakers, as identi-

fied in Chapter III, can be found here.
Municipal officials are not content to await deliberations on
the fate of their policy proposals.
way as other interest groups.

They lobby for them in the same

Generally, municipal officials are the

only actors seeking favorable consideration for new or higher taxes.
As lobbyists, municipal officials are proximate policymakers acting
outside their prescribed roles and are therefore regarded as informal
rather than formal policy participants.
In opposition to the increased levies are whichever groups will
be paying the bill.

In many cases this is their first chance to in-

fluence the legislation.

Many of these individuals and groups rou-

tinely deal with the central governments and make effective use of
7

their contacts.

Specific examples are provided below as we examine

attempts at major tax reform in San Salvador.
It was expected that the legitimation process would be much
smoother and more pro forma in Costa Rica than in El Salvador.

After

all, the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly and the San Jos~ Municipal
Council had the same sort of partisan make-up.

Presumably, then, the

bitter political and ideological strife that exists between San Salvador and EI Salvador would be absent.

Legitimation thus would be
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much more likely for tax increases in San Jose than in San Salvador.
In neither case, however, did the municipalities meet with much
success in having their revenue policies approved.

Other municipali-

ties in both countries had new taxes and rate structure changes ap8
proved rather routinely but not the capitals.
San Jose had not had
a new tax approved since 1935 and San Salvador's tariff schedule had
9
remained unaltered since it was first adopted in 1947.
The researcher, then, who is attempting to select one particular tax policy
to trace in great detail is faced with a major problem--the lack of
any policy that could be examined from perception through application.
It was decided therefore to discuss briefly a policy that failed in
the legitimation phase in San Salvador and to examine more closely the
most successful example available in San Jose.
SAN SALVADOR - TAX REFORM AND HOW IT FAILED
Since it came to power in San Salvador in 1964, the Christian
Democratic Party has attempted to overhaul the city's archaic and
10
chaotic tax structure.
A variety of motives underly these efforts;
it is inappropriate to discuss them here.

What is examined in this

section is the policy process associated with these attempts, and its
ultimate breakdown.
The basic objectives of the tax reform were twofold:

one, to in-

crease the amount of municipal revenue; and two, to shift the incidence of much of the tax burden from smaller to larger enterprises.
This latter action would not only serve the political end of pleasing
PDC's small merchant supporters but also the administrative end of in-
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creasing tax collection efficiency.
To provide a sample of the nihilistic state of the existing tax
structure and the order of reform attempted by the municipality two
short examples follow.

The only categorization, the only order, is

purely alphabetical; there is no attempt to group similar sorts of activities.

The first ten entries in the Tarifa read thus (amounts are

monthly charges in $C.A.):
TABLE XX
EXCERPT FROM SAN SALVADOR TARIFF STRUCTURE
Concept

Total

Fire Insurance Agencies
Air Transportation Agencies
Foreign Life Insurance Agencies
Steamship Agencies
Agencies of Foreign Commercial Houses
Oil Company Agencies
Gasoline Company Agencies
Soap Company Agencies
First Class Automobile Sales Agencies
(capitalized at over $20,000)
Second Class Automobile Agencies
(capitalized at over $20,000)

$78.00
$100.00
$52.00
$78.00
$16.00
$40.00
$100.00
$4.00

SOURCE:

$15.60
$7.80

Tarifa de Arbitrios de 1a Municipa1idad de San Salvador.

It can readily be seen that categories such as 'agency' or 'factory'
contain large numbers of listings in no useful pattern.

Shrewd busi-

nessmen can and do simply pick and pay for their least heavily taxed
commercial activity.
San Salvador's proposed tax policy provided far more order.

In

one section, for example, it gathered together financial institutions--private banks, branches of foreign banks, savings and loan as-
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sociations, stock brokers, insurance companies, finance companies and
pawnbrokers.

Under the 1947 Tarifa some of these paid no municipal

tax; others paid amounts ranging from $13.00 to $78.00 per month, regardless of size.

To complicate matters still further, they were

listed under seven different headings on as many pages.

Under the re-

formed policy, 20 categories were created according to the
capitalization.

amolli~t

of

The smallest business would pay $8.00 per month under

the new schedule; the largest $390.00 plus one peso for every $200,000
of capitalization over $40 million.

Financially and administratively,

then, the new policy made eminently good sense from the Municipality's
point of view.
The City Council realized that any tax reform policy it adopted
would not go unquestioned by those who would bear the brunt of the
tax.

Consequently it began attempts at informal legitimation even be-

fore the formal process.

In October, 1964, the municipality met with

the Camara de Comercio e Industria de El Salvador (CACI) and presented, in general terms, its proposed policy.

CACI indicated that

it recognized the need for a new municipal tax policy and would not
oppose one that did not unjustly oppress its members and friends.
The Municipality' continued with its policy formulation, and
adopted and transmitted to the Legislature its request in March 1965.
The Municipality had not discussed the policy details with CACI and
the latter group was quite unhappy with them.

Its immediate response

was the formation of a junta with the Asociacion Salvadurena de Industriales (ASI) and other affected groups to oppose the new policy.
The junta's attempts to abort the policy in the legitimation
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phase involved both the formal and the informal legitimation.

On the

informal side CACI and allies began a widespread media attack on the
policy.

Among other disastrous

results of the policy's implementa-

tion, it was alleged, would be the ruining of the larger businesses
most impacted by the new taxes and massive price hikes to poor shoppers, the ultimate consumers of the tax increase.

Moreover, the junta

suggested, the Municipality's fiscal problems were primarily a result
of its own administrative ineptness (or political chicanery) in not
collecting the revenues to which it was currently entitled.

The new

policy included greatly increased levies on bars, go-go joints, dancehalls and billiard parlors.

The junta insisted this was an improper

attempt to use a fiscal instrument, a tax policy, for a non-fiscal
purpose, i.e., the imposition of a particular moral standard on the
11

community.
Formal attempts to block legitimation occurred in two arenas.
The business sector used its two seats on CONAPLAN as a springboard
for trying to convince the Executive Power that the new municipal tax
policy, if allowed, would endanger the national policy of commerical
and industrial development.

Not only, it was suggested, would this

harm the nation economically but would also tend to damage PGN politically.
In the legislative arena, GAG! and the junta sought and were
granted permission to present arguments to the Committee on Interior
and Public Works in opposition to the policy.

CAGI then requested

from the municipality seven types of information it said were necessary to adequately respond to the new tax structure.

These were:
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1. a detailed breakdown of revenues received by category of
tax;

2. detailed data on expenditures by category of service, distinguishing between expenditures for service and for administration;
3. detailed data on the causes of the municipal deficits;
4. specific estimates of new revenues by categories of tax;
5. a detailed plan for investment of the projected new revenues;
6. detailed data on uncollected taxes;
7. projected plans for administrative reform of the municipal
government. 12
Need~ess

to say, the nature of the municipal revenue system effective-

ly precluded the assembling of this information.

Nonetheless, the

Mayor of San Salvador asked the junta to meet with him, saying he
would then provide the needed data.

The junta refused, announcing

that it would get the information when it was provided to the Legislative Committee.

The Municipality did not, could not, provide the in-

formation and the National Assembly adjourned without acting on San
Salvador's proposed tax policy.
Ten years later there still had been no major changes in San
Salvador'S tax structure.

In 1971 the Municipality modified its pol-

icy proposal but once again it did not meet with the approval of the
National Assembly; once again the policy died in the legitimation
stage.
PDC's financial program for 1974-1977 concentrated on better administrative procedures, special lines of credit from the Central Bank,
transformation of some unspecified municipal services into profitable
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enterprises and obtaining of permission to charge National Government
agencies for services rendered.

Interestingly enough, overall tax re-

13

form was not mentioned.
San Salvador's new revenue policy, then, was never implemented.
The process ended in the legitimation phase.

In this case, informal

and formal legitimation appear to go hand-in-hand; failure to obtain
the one almost guarantees failure to obtain the other.
It may be useful here to conduct a post mortem on the dead tax
reform policy.

Not only might we determine the causes of this parti-

cular policy fatality, we might also be able to generalize and perhaps
suggest some preventative activity for future municipal policy proposals.
Once again dominating the policy failure is the statutory requirement for National Government approval of municipal tax changes.
If formal legitimation of this type were not required, there would be
no chance for disallowal.
This requirement is particularly lethal to municipal policy in
the situation where political and ideological emnity exists between
the PDC Government of San Salvador and the PCN-dominated Central Government.

Exacerbating the situation in this particular case was the

opposition to the Mayor of San Salvador personally.

The tax reform

was the brainchild of Napoleon Duarte, a charismatic figure known nationwide and generally regarded as having a very good chance of becom14
He could not
ing EI Salvador's first PDC President in recent years.
be allowed this triumph.
Not only is the Municipality at odds politically with the Na-
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tional Government, it is weak vis-a-vis the business community.

The

private sector has two seats on CONAPLAN representing basically the
largest firms; the municipalities have no seats.

Moreover, CACl and

its allies have more technical and financial expertise than has San
Salvador.

Any contest between the two, therefore, is extremely un-

equal and very likely to be won by the business interests.
Not all the Municipality's problems, however, arise from the
political and institutional stacking of the deck against it.
the problems are of its own making.

Some of

In failing to keep CACl informed

as the details of the policy were being drawn up, it may have unnecessarily antagonized them.

In addition, the charges of administrative

ineptitude in tax collection leveled against the Municipality are undeniably true.

The city is definitely in a no-win situation:

it can-

not reorganize its fiscal procedures until it gets some additional
revenue, some breathing room and Central Government approval; this approval will not be forthcoming until San Salvador gets its fiscal house
in order.
It must be noted that San Salvador is not totally without allies, at least potential ones, at the national government level.

The

Municipality's political capital is definitely limited though, and it
must be spent prudently.

The City was not willing to wage all-out war

against either Central Government or the business community; other
matters were coming up on which it would be looking for their sup15
port.
For a variety of reasons, then, the policymaking process in this
particular case was aborted in the legitimation phase.

Partisan poli-
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tics, intense lobbying and some errors on the part
ity all contributed to its failure.

of the municipal-

There is no doubt, however, that

this policy will be resurrected in one form or another.
dorIs need for additional revenue is

San Salva-

not ended, nor are attempts at

formulating and implementing policy to provide this revenue.
THE PARKING METER COMES TO SAN JOSE
The parking meter was invented by Carl Magee in Oklahoma City in
16
1932.
Since then it has been adopted globally both as an instrument
of traffic control and as a source of revenue, particularly municipal
revenue.

Most cities of any size, U.S. or foreign, have their down17
town streets lined with parking meters. San Jos{ is no exception.
In this section we examine the process by which parking meter policy
in San Jose came into existence.
/

In the early 1950s San Jose was growing rapidly.

The rapid

growth was accompanied by an expanded flow of truck and automobile
traffic and the attendant increase in congestion.

One effect of this

was inconvenience to the customers atterr~ting to park near a downtown
,
book and printing shop, Libreria Universal. The proprietor, Hubert
Federspiel, approached the Municipal Executive about the problem and
18
suggested the installation of parking meters.
Shortly before Christmas, 1954, Federspiel wrote the Bogota
agent of Magee-Hale-Park-O-Meter Company asking about the availability
19
The agent responded on January 5, 1955 saying
of parking meters.
that the meters could be shipped immediately from Panama to San Jose
and suggesting that the Municipality begin marking the streets and in-
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stalling the bases for the meters.

Federspiel forwarded the letter

to the Municipal Executive; the demand had formally entered the political system.
The Executive forwarded the request and the agent's letter for
the consideration of the City Engineer.

Two months later the Engi-

neer replied and reported that after consulting the Director of Transit
(a Central Government official), it was decided that the installation
of private parking meters could not be allowed.

However, he contin21
ued, the idea of parking meters should be studied.
Less than two weeks later a solicitation for bids to supply the
Municipality with 400 automatic parking meters appeared in the Offi22
cial Journal.
The bids were to be for the meters and installation
and were to indicate the price C.I.F. Limon or Puntarenas.

The meters

were not to be purchased outright by San Jose but were to be operated
on a profit-sharing arrangement between the Municipality and the supplier for five years, after which time the Municipality would assume
ownership.

Users of metered parking spaces would be charged 50 c~n-

timos per hour or ten c~ntimos for 12 minutes.
Bids were opened on April 21, 1955, and were considered.

At its

meeting of July 22, the Municipal Council, acting on the advice of the
23
Auditor, rejected all bids.
The Municipal Executive was authorized
to draw up a more specific solicitation and reopen the bidding.

There

was no discussion.
It is useful to consider the phases of the paradigmatic policy
process to this point, the actors involved, and the roles played.

Ini-

tial perception of an environmental condition and its definition as a
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need or problem were done outside the political system by an individual.

The matter of the parking meter was considered strong enough to

stand by itself; it was not aggregated with similar issues.

Hubert

Federspiel then made a demand of the political system and the process
24

entered the government phase.

Formulation of the initial policy was

done by the bureaucracy and the policy passed to the Council for adoption.

It failed at the adoption phase and was returned through a

feedback loop for reformulation.
A more detailed specification package was assembled by the Executive and the official call for bids was made in October, 1955.

The

most fundamental change from the earlier solicitation was that the
more recent one sought bids for the outright sale of the parking meters to the Municipality.

Bids were opened on October 31 and the Mu-

nicipa1 Council considered them at its February 29, 1956, session.

It

was decided to award the contract to Jaime Gliell and Company representing the Duncan Meter Corporation of Chicago.

A clause was written

into the authorizing ordinance to the effect that:
It is intended that this award will become effective immediately the Legislative Assembly authorizes the imposition of
the tax that takes place with the installation of the parking
meters and as soon as the Comptroller General of the Republic
approves the supplemental budget. 26
The policy, however, was never presented to the Legislature for enactment as law nor to the Comptroller for approval of the budget changes.
No further official

co~~ent

was made on the matter for almost two

years.
Parking meter policy reappeared with another solicitation for
27
bids in the Offical Journal during July, 1957.
Other than requiring
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the meters to be automatic rather than manually operated, the specifications were the same as in the previous solicitation.

Bids were

opened that same month and went to the Council's Joint Committee (Finance and Public Works) on Parking Meters.
The Committee reported back to the Council at a special meeting
in November.

At that meeting the Municipal Executive referred, some-

what obliquely, to the fate of the previous parking meter ordinance:
Yeu. TCTI1CIi'loe:.c tilCi.l. ;;;Cij.1e :: c:;:' 3 years ago we introduced the
matter of parking meters . . . and through one circumstance
or another we have had to vacate the solicitations . . . the
last time they made us a very good offer that did not require
any down payment by the Municipality but this [the current
offer] is an investment that pays for itself and is a better
deal for the Municipality . . . and then as now what we have
to look for is the benefit of the Municipality .
28
Nothing more was said of the earlier policy attempt.
The Council proceeded to discuss the bids before it.

The lowest

bid was from the Maico Company but the Committee recommended against
accepting it.
switched.

Panama had used these meters for a while but had

Therefore, it was implied (but never stated), they must be

unsuited for use in Central America.

Moreover, it was argued, they

were German made and solving any problems with meters from so far away
would be both inconvenient and expensive.
Unlike the earlier meetings on this subject, debate at this one
was intense and wide ranging.

One cowlcillor argued, for example,

that if Costa Rica was trying to sell its coffee in G6Tillany, surely
29

a Costa Rican municipality could buy a German parking meter.

An-

other councillor pointed out that the Comptroller was not likely to
30

approve the purchase of any meters but the cheapest.

The Municipal
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Executive responded that because the lowest bid required a larger down
payment and charged the Municipality interest on the unpaid balance,
it really was not as low as it seemed and he could persuade the Comptroller to accede to the Municipality's wishes.
Finally the Council decided, as before, to award the contract to
Jaime Guell for Duncan parking meters.

Then came discussion of the

mechanics of the purchase, specifically, obtaining necessary Central
Government approval, and arranging the financing.

Financing arrange-

ments with the company were simple and readily agreed upon:
cent down, the rest in 12 equal monthly installments.
nancial matters were not so simple:

ten per-

Two other fi-

the Municipality had to petition

the Central Bank for permission to buy U.S. dollars for the transaction and the Minister of Finance for exemption from customs duties.
Once again the question of Central Government approval arose.
This time, however, it was suggested that only the Executive Power and
not the Legislative Assembly need legitimate the policy.

The City's

Legal Officer suggested that asking the Assembly for enabling legislation was an imposition on that overworked body.

Further, it was un-

likely the Assembly could consider the request within the 120 days
specified for closing the contract.

Moreover, he was of the opinion

that the parking meter fee was a tasa, not an impuesto; the legislative Vo.Bo., then, was unnecessary.
He was supported in this position by the Municipal Executive who
pointed out that there were existing laws controlling traffic and
parking.

In addition, charges were levied, in the guise of fines,

against those who currently overparked in controlled zones.

There-
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fore, he concluded, no further legislation was needed, only the approval of the Comptroller.
These municipal officials had not reached their conclusions in a
vacuum.

Conversations had been held between them and functionaries of

the Comptroller and of the Ministry of Transportation, as well as with
Deputies of various parties.

The Council was convinced, and passed

the ordinance making the award to Guell with the stipulation that approval of the Comptroller was needed to legally bind the contract.
Such approval was not forthcoming; some two months later the
Comptroller voided the contract.

The directive from his office read:

CONSIDERING: The Comptroller estimates that the functioning
of parking meters in the City of San Jose, with the purposes
of regulating the parking of vehicles in the public ways
through the medium of paying the Municipality for the right,
constitutes a tax [impuesto], and since it is not logical to
authorize the purchase of the apparatus prior to approval on
the part of the Legislative Assembly.
THEREFORE: The resolution passed by the Municipality of San
Jose is declared null. 31
Once again the purchase of parking meters was stymied.
At the next City Council meeting, the Municipal Executive ques32
tioned the action of the Comptroller.
Why, he wondered, had the
Comptroller said nothing when any of the three solicitations for bids
appeared in the Official Journal?

Moreover, the Executive asked, was

there any connection with a letter to the Comptroller from a disappointed bidder claiming that his firm had actually submitted the lowest bid, that factors not taken into account made it the best, that no
interest would be charged the Municipality and that their meters were
33
of very good quality?
Was not the Comptroller, the Executive continued, actually saying "The parking meter of Mr. Maroto is effec-
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tively the cheapest.

Consequently the award is being revoked and pre-

sented to Mr. Maroto"?

If so, this was not a valid exercise of the

Comptroller's power.
Various members of the Council expressed agreement with the Executive.

Regardless of right and wrong, however, the Comptroller had

the power to block the purchase.

The Council formed a committee to

present its viewpoint as forcefully as possible to the Comptroller.
The committee was to meet with the Comptroller and ask him to rescind
his resolution.
The committee met with the Comptroller and put forward its case.
The Comptroller was not impressed.

After almost a year of arguing

that the parking meter charge was a tasa and not an impuesto, the Municipality capitulated.

The Finance Committee and the Municipal Ex-

ecutive reformulated the policy, which was adopted by the Council
34

without discussion or debate,

and forwarded it to the Executive

Power for transmittal to the Assembly.
Two important changes appeared in this new version of the policy
proposal:

one, it was presented as primarily a traffic control and

public security measure, with municipal revenue as a secondary consideration; and two, it stated that half the proceeds from fines levied
against non-paying parkers would go to the Director General of Transit,
an arm of the Central Government.
After four months of study by the Comptroller and other interested officials of the Executive Power, the project was submitted to
35

the Legislative Assembly on July 9, 1959.

The full Assembly assigned

it to the Interim Committee on Taxes and Municipal Enterprises.

The
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Committee considored the proposal and decided to seek some outside exp6rtis6.

On

Octotc~

28 the Committee secretary wrote the Director

General of Transit seeking his advice, suggestions and criteria for
36
putting the policy into operation.
Nothing happened.

Nine months later the Municipal Executive

wrote to the Chief Clerk of the Legislative Assembly:
It has been over a year now since the Minister of Government
sent the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly the project.
As, in reality, I am ignorant of reason as to why said project
has not been submitted for the consideration of the honorable
Assembly, I would very much appreciate your informing me in
this respect. 37
For once, a timely reply was forthcoming.

Less than a week later the

Chief Clerk answered:
Allow me to inform you that the project to which you refer
does not have a recommendation [from the Committee]. Moreover, as the said project was presented in the past Legislature, and in this [one] no Deputy has asked that it be
brought to the floor, permit me to suggest that it would be
t~ YO~8 convenience to ask some Deputy to make such a motlon.
No such Deputy was found.
In April, 1961 the Municipality found itself in financial difficu1ties of undetermined magnitude.

Two Councillors suggested a hard

look at the state of the municipal fisc. This task was assigned to
39
the Committee on Finance and Budget.
The Committee reported back at
the next meeting with the disturbing news that projected revenues for
the year would fall short of projected expenditures by ¢1,757,281.48.
The Committee suggested that the shortage was due to an insufficient1y progressive tax structure.
introduce changes.

No one, however, was willing to

The Council decided to tighten its belt, cut down
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on the use of municipally owned vehicles by councillors, sell a number
of small municipally owned lots and seek new sources of revenue.
Two months later Councillor Car16s Larfn Angulo brought up park40

ing meters at a council meeting.

He presented an already written

ordinance and it was adopted unanimously, with no discussion.
This version of the policy proposal contained a number of new
provisions.

In the preamble, for example, it stated that the Munici-

pality was seeking to cooperate with the Director General of Transit
in managing traffic and parking and to do this by the use of the most
modern technical and scientific methods, had decided to install parking meters.

In a radical shift of direction the preamble went on to

say that day-care centers were needed in San Jose and that the Children's Asylum and Orphan's Hospital were worthy institutions and would
receive money from the proceeds of the parking meters.

Other money

would go for road upkeep, benefiting motorists who fed the parking
meters, and for sanitation works.
This something-for-everyone accord was transmitted to the Executive Power for submission to the Legislature.

On July 3 the Minister

of Government forwarded it to the Assembly, where it was officially
received on July 5.

The Assembly wasted no time in deciding it was

going to shelve the proposal and rather curtly informed the Minister
of this:
. we have resolved to remove from the consideration of
this Assembly the projected law presented by the Municipality
of San Jose and intended to authorize the installation of
parking meters. 41
At this point, then, the parking meter policy, if not dead, was at
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least moribund.
Outside the Legislature, however, a variety of activities relating to the parking meter policy was occurring.

In San Jose, two

Councillors asked the Municipality to give the Little Sisters of
the Poor of St. Peter Claver a continuing grant of ¢500 per month
to help them with their day-care center.

The Council passed the
42

request to the Committee on Finance and Budget.

The Committee re-

ported back to Council and the Council passed a motion saying in effect:
It is a great idea, the Sisters do wonderful work, but the
Municipality just cannot afford it. If, however, the Legislature would act on Larin Angulo's parking meter proposal, a
considerable sum of money could be destined for construction
and maintenance of day care centers . . • In any event, the
Committee is happily studying the matt2r for 1962 in case the
Assembly does not approve our project. 3

Once again the Central Government was informed of the Municipality's
request.

Once again nothing happened.

During the spring and summer of 1962 INVU conducted a superficial survey of traffic flows for San Jose and for other cities, with
an eye to using the results in choosing locations for housing projects.
The Municipality used this information to buttress its case and once
more requested legislative approval for its parking meter policy.

No

changes were made in the project, only a request, accompanied by the
INVU material, for a reconsideration of its proposal.

The Executive

Power transmitted the request to the Legislature; it was not heard of
again.
In the meantime traffic congestion and parking problems continued to increase and plague downtown San Jose.

The City Road Depart-
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ment undertook to study just how severe the difficulty was and to
quantify its magnitude.

This work continued for two years and in Feb-

ruary, 1965, the 'Plan for the Regulation of Parking in the Central
Area of San Jos~' was proposed by the Technical Branch of the Road Department.

Among its findings were the amount of vehicle traffic

(100,000 vehicle trips per day), average length of parking time for
various groups, needed dimensions for convenient parking space and
total number of regulated parking spaces.

Among its recommendations

were wider streets, more signal lights, no parking along bus routes
and a more extensive zone of limited time parking--controlled by parking meters.
The Municipal Executive took advantage of the information and
recommendations in the plan to support his plea for reconsideration of
the parking meter project by the Legislature.

In July he wrote to the

President of the Assembly:
The projected parking meter law is buried in the Legislative
Assembly. This bothers me and a number of the councillors,
especially Carlos Larln for it would enable us to regulate
the use of our congested ways and at the same time provide
some funds for street repair and maintenance . . . . We have
2,147 parking spaces in the central area and want meters on
them . . . It is certain, Mr. President, that if you reintroduce for discussion the projected Parking Meter Law for the
municipalities of Costa Rica, you would receive the gratitude
of all the Councils in the country.44
One modification of singular importance is suggested in this letter.
No longer is the request to the Legislature for the approval of a policy for San Jose but for all the municipalities of the country.
The President of the Assembly was convinced.

The next day he

45

reintroduced the project into the Assembly.

In his preamble to the
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bill he pointed out that the project, originally sent to the Assembly
on October 17, 1962, had undergone two major changes:

one, it was now

presented as primarily a congestion relief rather than a revenue measure; and two, it was to cover all the municipalities of the country,
not only San Jose.
For the first time, the Legislature considered the policy proposal seriously.

The Committee on Social Affairs studied the bill and

with only one minor change reported it back to the full Assembly with
a favorable recommendation on September 27.
was made on the floor.

One other minor change

(A second amendment, trying to lower the

hourly charges, was defeated.)

The Assembly passed the bill on Octo-

ber 6 and sent it to the Executive Branch where it received the ap46
proval of the President of the Republic on November 2, 1965.
The
formal legitimation phase was complete.
Once again the Municipality prepared to solicit bids; this time
with the assurance the Central Government would not declare the bidding null.

On January 5, 1966, the call went out for bids to supply
47

2,000 parking meters.

Bids were to be opened on February 8.

The Municipality had made a number of changes and refinements in
its requirements since the last abortive effort to purchase meters.
Potential bidders requested more than the allotted time to prepare
their new offers.

Consequently, the Municipality received no acccpt-

able bids by the closing date.
At this point the Municipality began to consider the structure
of its bid solicitation more closely.

Particularly, it began to con-

sider what technical specifications it actually wanted in a parking
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meter.

For example, some previous solicitations had required auto-

matic meters and some had required manual meters, with no particular
rationale in either case.

With the political concerns about the park-

ing meters taken care of, San Jose decided to allow itself the luxury
of taking the time to determine precisely what mechanical features
the apparatus ought to have.

This would not only ensure the Munici-

pality obtaining the meter best suited to its needs but would also enable it to prepare a detailed enough specification list that potential
suppliers could prepare reasonably costed bids.
The President of the Council assigned to the Committee on Transit and Urbanism the task of studying the various meters available and
determining exactly what specifications to include in the next bid notice.

One of the Committee's first activities was an examination of

the parking meter operations in other cities.

The three cities most

closely investigated were Panama and Guatemala, where climatic conditions were similar to those in San

Jos~,

and Portland, Oregon, which

had a long history of successful parking meter operation.
For a city that had been in such a hurry, time and time again,
to rush its parking meter policy through both Council and Central Government, San Jose seemed singularly unconcerned with actually putting
the meters into operation.

The study phase lasted over four years;
48

not until October, 1970, did the call for bids go out.
Bids were opened on January 20, 1971, and were sent to the Joint
Committee on Transit, Urbanism, Finance and Budget.

The Committee

made its recommendation to Council two weeks later.

The Council by a

vote of 13 to one awarded the contract to Enrique Herrero y Compania
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for 500 Duncan parking meters at a cost of $41,065.

This time, fi-

nally, the contract was fulfilled.
On July 7, 1971, the Municipality published the regulations governing parking meter use.

They would be in operation from 6 A.M. to

6 P.M. Monday through Saturday, would cost parkers one colon per hour
(twice the rate originally suggested), and only diplomatic personnel
would be permitted to park free.
The final, legal, official enabling activity took place in October when President Jose Figueres promulgated an executive decree
50
authorizing the regulations.
Although unusually heavy summer rains had forced some delays in
the parking meter installation, 380 were in place by November.

As

part of the celebration marking the beginning of National Guard Week,
the first parking meters went into operation at 6 A.M., November 8,
1971.

It was 16 years, nine months and one day since Hubert Feder-

spiel's letter to the Municipal Executive had injected the demand for
a parking meter policy into the political system.
As was the case in San Salvador, the major difficulty in creating this policy lay not in the formulation/adoption phase where the
Municipality was the chief actor but in the legitimation phase, controlled by the Central Government.

It is worthwhile to examine those

modifications that took place in the original policy proposal and led
to the policy's ultimate approval by the Central Government.
One factor had to be the increasing specificity of the proposal
and its support from hard data.

The original policy called for 400

meters; no specifications of any kind were either required or sug-
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gested, nor was there any indication as to what uses the income derived
therefrom might be put.

The proposal as approved contained detailed

specifications on both matters.

The original policy contained no traf-

fic count, no estimate of number of parking spaces, no indication as
to what sorts of people parked in the city center, for how long or for
what purposes.

Information was provided on all these aspects for the

approved policy.
Another change in the policy which influenced its ultimate legitimation was its shift in emphasis.

As originally proposed by the

Municipality it was strictly a revenue raising policy.

As finally ap-

proved it was a policy for controlling parking and relieving traffic
congestion, a policy that only coincidentally generated some funds for
San Jose--or at least so it was perceived.
Probably the most important factor leading to the parking meter
policy's success in the Legislature was the broadening of its scope.
As a lone policy suggestion it had little appeal to the Central Government, either the Assembly or the Executive.

As part of a larger

policy for improving traffic circulation it was much more attractive.
Above all, the Central Government was reluctant to legitimate any policy that would benefit only the Municipality of San Jose; it proved
far more receptive to a policy that could be applied in all the cities
of Costa Rica.
Two unsuccessful elements of the Municipality's legitimation
strategy might also be mentioned here.

San

Jos~

attempted to both

shame and bribe the Central Government into approving its policy;
neither approach worked.

The Municipality tried to make the Central
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Government feel guilty about the lack of funds for the so deserving
child-care programs.

The effort failed, as did the attempt to bribe

by designating some of the parking meter proceeds for the Director
General of Transit.
Ultimately, then, the Central Government was willing to

app~ove

a detailed policy, backed by hard data, that would enable the municipalities of the country to control traffic flows in their downtown
areas.

It was not willing to approve a vague policy designed to fill

the municipal coffers of San Jose.
With the parking meters in place and the regulations in force,
the bulk of the policy process was complete.

Only marginal adjust-

ments remained, either to iron out unforeseen bugs or to respond to
public feedback.

Initial public feedback was widespread.

For the first few days after the parking meter policy went into
effect it was a major newsmaker in San Jose.

On November 9, La Prensa

Libre reported that 450 tickets had been issued the first day for
51
failure to plug the meters.
The article suggested that it was
partly the Municipality's fault; it had failed to instruct the populace on the mechanics of how to operate a parking meter.

The same day

La Nacion reported that there were fewer automobiles on the streets
and that therefore one of the objectives of the parking meter policy
52

was being met.

The same article mentioned that to ensure payment of

fines, the authorities would remove license plates of those cars illegally parked, with the plates to be returned only when the fine was
paid.
The next day La Nacion headlined its article "Easily Evaded are
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the Parking Meters" and indicated a certain insufficiency of enforce53
La Prensa Libre wrote of a
ment on the part of the Municipality.
social problem caused by the meters; the fact that car parkers were
54

robbed of their living.

The particular object of this journalistic

concern was one Francisco Mora Campos who had been supporting a wife
and three children on the ¢150 per week he had been earning as a car
parker.
The following day was a slow one for parking meter news.

The

Municipality did publish a note on how and where to pay fines but
there were no news stories or editorial comments.
November, however, things picked up.

On the twelfth of

An unidentified 'Lover of Pro-

gress' wrote to the editor of La Nacion praising the meters and the
Municipality for installing them, while the editor himself opined:
"We believe that the initiative of the Municipal Corporation merits
55

applause."

More interestingly, La Prensa Libre announced a protest
56,57
march against the parking meters by collectors and messengers.
It should be noted here that this protest was one of the very
few manifestations of public disapproval of the parking meters.

(Cy-

clists, objecting to paying the same amount as automobiles for metered
parking spaces, had earlier protested.)

If those who parked in the

central area were strongly opposed to thus paying for it, they were
not saying so publicly.

With no major actual or perceived local op-

position to the policy, the Municipality felt little need to publicize,
explain or justify it.

Informal legitimation, therefore, took place

almost automatically.
The Municipal Corporation was delighted with the performance of
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its parking meters.

A month after they first went into operation, it

gave Enrique Herrero y Compan1a an order for another SOD meters.

In

their first four weeks, parking meters had grossed ¢92,OOO exclusive
58

of fines.
A second lot of parking meters was purchased and installed.
There was no debate at the Council meeting, no objections from the
Central Government and no public protest.

The adoption, legitimation

and implementation phases of parking meter policy appeared to have become routinized.
59

In May, 1973 the Council discussed parking meters once again.
Two factors dominated the discussion:

the nature of the general ar-

gument on the need for more meters, and Councillor Chavez Molina's
impassioned pleas

against them.

One reason put forward for the pur-

chase and installation of new meters was consistency in parking regulation.

Meters were currently functioning in the center of downtown

and on the fringes; in the space between were gaps, overcrowded areas
of free parking.

These areas should, logically, be metered.

important reason was the financial one.

A more

The City needed the money and

had lots of places to put meters where none were then installed.

It

should be emphasized that with the exception of Chavez Molina there
was no question as to whether there should be any more meters, only
as to how many and where they should go.
in~ediate

One argument advanced for

purchase of 1,000 was the rising cost of iron and steel

which would surely be reflected in higher future prices for the machines.
Chavez Molina's arguments against the purchase of parking meters
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were surprisingly intense and wide ranging.

In the first place, he

suggested, Costa Rica's foreign exchange was very hard earned by the
sales of millions of pounds of milk products and coffee.

It should

not be squandered on "North American gadgets so San Jose can enjoy the
60

lUxury of playing big city."

Further, iron and steel prices might

be going up but these materials were not used in the parking meters.
Moreover, the United States, in a deliberate attempt to destroy the
economies of Bolivia and Chile, was cornering the world markets in
tin and copper.

When they released their stockpiles of these materi-

a1s, used in parking meter construction, the cost was bound to go
down.

Finally, at least in part because of the perfidy mentioned

above, the U.S. dollar was going to decline in value against the
colon.

Not until this happened should the Municipality consider pur-

chasing any parking meters.
ing.

Chavez Molina's arguments availed noth-

The Council, over his lone dissenting vote, decided to buy an-

other 1,000 meters.
The parking meter has come to San Jose and become institutionalized.
vice.

It is there, moreover, primarily as a revenue raising deWhen municipal officials were asked how well the parking meter

policy was working they inevitably replied:

"Very well.

making lots of money for the Municipal Corporation."

They are

Not once did an

official volunteer any comments about traffic control.
As a revenue generator the parking meter has been successful,
as shown in Table XXI.

Table XXII shows the 1974 budget estimated in-

come and expenditures for the parking meters.
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TABLE XXI
PROCEEDS OF PARKING METER OPERATIONS, 1971-1973
Year

Amount collected from parking meter operations,
exclusive of fines

1971
1972
1973

¢135,355.75 (8 November - 31 December)
¢93l,136.85
¢1,080,96l.45

SOURCE:

Municipality of San Jose, Office of the Treasurer.
TABLE XXII
ESTIMATED PARKING METER REVENUE - 1974

Income
Parking fees
Fines
Total
Expenditures
Current
1,000 New Meters
Total

¢2,203,530.00
375,840.00
1/:2,579,370.00
¢976,871.80
135,383.50
¢1,112,255.30

Net Income
SOURCE:

¢1,467,114.70

Municipality of San Jose, 1974 Budget

To put the parking meter revenues in perspective, 7.6 percent
of the current income of the Municipality of San Jose comes from this
61
source.
The Parking Meter Division employs some 95 persons; only
the Streetcleaning and Garbage Collection Divisions have more employees.
The development of parking meter policy may not seem a terribly
exciting subject of examination, but it is important for a number of
reasons.

It is important to San Jose because it was the first new

tax it was able to levy in over 35 years.

The parking meter generates
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the second largest amount of revenue of the City's own sources.

And

it does provide a means, although this is definitely a secondary consideration, of influencing traffic circulation in the downtown area.
It is also important to the analyst.

In the first place, it is

the only municipal policy of the past 40 years that can be traced
through from its genesis to its implementation.

Second, it shows the

sort of time frame in which policymaking takes place.

Finally, it

demonstrates the overarching role of the legitimation phase in policymaking in a Central American urban center.
The next chapter will present the results of the total policymaking effort, national and municipal, in the realms of urban public
finance and public housing; that is, the current set of practices and
regulations in San Jose and San Salvador will be examined and compared.
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CHAPTER VI NOTES
1. Koth, Housing in Latin America, p. 100.
2. Gustavo A. Antonini, Public Policy and Urbanization in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica (Gainesville: University of Florida
Center for Latin American Studies, 1972), p. 67. This is in general agreement with the data in Las Sociedades Actuales which
found in El Salvador 67 percent of housing generally to be deficient but 77 percent of rural housing to be so; comparable figures for Costa Rica were 38 percent generally and 50 percent in
rural areas.
3. Koth, Housing in Latin America, p. 100.

Emphasis is from Koth.

4. See the section on FUNDASAL in Chapter VII.
5. BID estimates that in most Latin American nations at least ten
percent of the GDP would have to be devoted to public housing on
an ongoing basis to eliminate current deficits and maintain minimUIn standards.
6. San Salvador levies are further subdivided into permanent, eventual and local but these classifications need not concern us here.
7. It is sometimes difficult to tell the players without a scorecard.
One national legislator, a former San Jose city councillor, tells
of seeing other ex-councillors lobbying in the Assembly against
municipal tax increases for San Jose. These same individuals had
voted for similar tax increases when on the municipal council, and
had proclaimed loudly the need for additional revenue.
8. One informant, for example, owned two supermarkets. One was located in San Jos~, the other in the suburban community of Escazu.
During the period (about seven years) he had owned them, Escazu
had been granted two tax increases that affected him; San Jos~ had
been turned down by the Legislature three times. At the time of
our last conversation in early 1974, his Escazu supermarket, which
was one-third the size of the San Jos~ supermarket with one-quarter
the volume of business, paid six times as much in municipal taxes
and fees.
9. And when adopted, it was based on and nearly identical to an earlier schedule dating back to 1933.
10. Much of the material in this section is based on Ebel, "The
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Decision-Making Process" and on interviews with Dr. Fidel Ch~vez
Mena, Dr. Victor Manuel Cuellar Ortiz, Manager of Asociacion Salvadore~a de Industriales and Don Daniel Escobar, San Salvador Municipal Secretary.
11. PDC is publicly committed to improvement of community morals. It
is also publicly committed tu shifting t~~ incidence away from
small businessmen. Most bar owners, etc., are small businessmen.
My own impression is that this ;'Ias an attempt to maximize tax revenue from this source, realizing that demand for commercial vice
is very price inelastic. PDC could thus appear not to be taxing
small businessmen while San Salvador could enjoy increased tax
revenues.
12. Ebel, "The Decision-Making Process," p. 212.
13. As late as April, 1974, I was informed by an official of ASI that
the San Salvador business community favored municipal tax reform.
It had opposed the 1964 measure not because it opposed higher
taxes per se but because it did not feel that sufficient rational
modification of the entire structure was involved.
14. There are many in El Salvador who maintain, loudly and openly,
that Duarte did in fact outpoll Arturo Armando Molina of the PCN
in the 1972 presidential election. A full-page advertisement in
La Prensa Grafica of 14 February 1974 refers to Duarte as: "The
President elected by the People." In any event, he was implicated
in the attempted golpe de estado of March, 1972, and is currently
in exile in Venezuela.
15. And it is sometimes forthcoming. A Duarte-originated project for
expanding and modernizing the municipal markets received widespread support. The bill providing national government guarantees for a BID loan to San Salvador for this purpose was not only
approved by the Legislative Assembly but was cosponsored by ten
legislators (of whom one was MNR and six were PCN) from seven departments.
16. I am indebted to William J. Allen and Fred D. Wood for this information.
17. Parking meters abound in downtown San Salvador but are universally
ignored, and with good reason. They are unmodified U.S. models
with instructions in English and designed to function with U.S.
nickels and dimes.
18. It will be remembered that at this time the office of Municipal
Executive was filled by the Governor of San Jose Province, appointed by the Central Government.
19.

All events prior to 1955 have been constructed from the memories
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of those involved.

There is no written record.

20. James E. Tribble to Hubert Federspiel, 5 January 1955.
21. Luis A. Truque G., Chief Municipal Engineer, to Julio Caballero A.,
Municipal Executive, 8 March 1955.
22. Costa Rica, Imprenta Nacional, La Gaceta, 21 March 1955, p. 776.
23. San Jos~, Municipal Council, Minutes of Regular Session Number 74,
22 July 1955.
24. It is customary in policy analysis to term any request made of the
political system a demand, no matter how conciliatorily it may be
phrased.
25. La Gaceta, 12 October 1955, p. 2959.
26. Article 3 of award terms, Minutes of Regular Session Number 101,
29 February 1956.
27. La Gaceta, 5 July 1957, p. 1538.
28. Minutes of Extraordinary Session Number 28, 15 November 1957.
29. Councillor Vargas Castro, as reported in Minutes of Extraordinary
Session Number 28.
30. Councillor Cortes Bolanos, as reported in Minutes of Extraordinary
Session Number 28.

,

31. Costa Rica, Contraloria General de la Republica, Oficio Numero
868, 26 February 1958.
32. Minutes of Regular Session Number 175, 4 March 1958.
33. This was not the firm who submitted the lowest bid for the German
parking meters, but another, Eduardo Maroto e Hijos.
34. Ordinance Number 4, Regular Session Number 51, 3 March 1959.
35. La Gaceta, 15 July 1959, p. 1527.
36. Jose Rafael Cordero Croceri to Luis Quesada, 28 October 1959.
37. Carlos Lara to Oscar Chacon Jinesta, 22 July 1960.
38. Chacon to Lara, 26 July 1960.
39. Minutes of Regular Session Number 262, 21 April 1961.
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40. Ordinance Number 3, Regular Session 262, 20 June 1961.
41. Jose Rafael Vega Rojas, Ad Hoc Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, to Joaquin Vargas Gene, Minister of Government, Police, Justice and Grace, 6 July 1961.
42. Minutes of Regular Session Number 295, 22 August 1961.
43. Minutes of Regular Session Number 301, 12 September 1961. This is
not a direct translation but does contain the essence of the Council's statement.
44. M.A. Padillo J. to Rafael Paris Steffens, 14 July 1965.
45. Decree Number 2366, La Gaceta, 29 July 1965.
46. Decree Number 3580, La Gaceta, 17 November 1965.
47. La Gaceta, 12 January 1966, p. 114.
48. Municipality of San Jose, Licitaci~n Publica No. 22-70, 26 October
1970.
49. Minutes of Regular Session Number 87, 12 February 1971.
50. Decree Number 2047-G, La Gaceta, 16 November 1971.
51. San Jose (Costa Rica) La Prensa Libre, 9 November 1971, p. 14.

52. San Jos"e (Costa Rica) La Nacion, 9 November 1971, p. 6.
53. La Nacion, 10 November 1971, p. 6.
54. La Prensa Libre, 10 November, p. 13.
55. La Naci6n, 12 November 1971, p. 14.
56. La Prensa Libre, 12 November 1971, p. 4.
57. Some activities in Costa Rica commercial life move at a very leisurely pace. To cash a check or make a deposit in a bank routinely takes from one-half hour to a full hour. As executive time
is too valuable to be spent in this fashion, a veritable army of
low-paid messengers and collectors are hired to perform these and
similar tasks. Generally these employees ride motor scooters
which they park anywhere there is space. It is easy to see why
they would find the new parking regulations onerous.
58. Minutes of Regular Session Number 213, 10 December 1971.
59. Minutes of Regular Session Number 426, 24 May 1973.
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60. Ibid.
61. A comparison with the City of Portland is informative:

Parking meter revenues as % of
city's current revenue
Number of employees
Cost of collection as % of
revenue from parking
Number of parking meters (approximately)

San Jose'"

Portland

7.6

2.2

95

26

43.1
2,000

7,000

17.7

CHAPTER VII
RESULTS
In this chapter the end results of public housing and municipal
revenue policymaking are considered.

In housing, INVU and IVU will be

compared as to their current philosophy and practice in terms of client selection, financing

arrangements~

~nd

actual performance in providing housing.

in more concrete terms, of
To furnish an added dimen-

sion, IVU and FUNDASAL will also be compared.

The results of public

finance policymaking are presented in terms of current budgets and
patterns of municipal revenues and expenditures.

San Jose and San

Salvador will not only be compared one with the other, but will be
examined against the backdrop of de Moraes' developmental paradigm.
PUBLIC HOUSING
Instituto Nacional De Vivienda Y Urbanismo
The ongoing policy output in the field of public housing in San
~

Jose, and in all of Costa Rica, is to be found basically in the dayto-day activities of INVU.

To be sure, INVU is not the only agency

involved in public housing provision in Costa Rica, nor is public
housing

I~~U's

only task.

Nonetheless, it is the lead agency in the

field and housing is its primary concern.

INVU lists as its first ob-

jective:
To provide families who lack adequate lodging the means necessary to acquire housing with their own resources. In this
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direction, INVU is
lies of low income.

10

give preference to urban and rural fami-

In many of its housing practices, INVU resembles a private developer.
Its first activity, at least in its major projects, is the acquisition
of land.
Usually this land is a coffee finca.

Choice of finca is deter-

mined not only by availability--INVU has, but to date has not used,
legal authority to expropriate and purchase land--but also by location
in relation to existing or proposed employment opportunities.
deal of cooperation exists with other autonomous agencies.

A good

Often, for

example, ICE will not provide electricity nor SNAA sewers to certain
industrial sites unless INVU plans or can provide nearby housing.
The land is then divided into large tracts, capable of holding
from 500 to 2000 housing units.

These tracts are developed one by one

as funding becomes available and other agencies are prepared to provide urban services.

INVU lays out and plans the development, speci-

fying number, type and situation of houses.

When conditions permit,

when funding and infrastructure are available, INVU calls for bids.
Construction contracts are awarded to the lowest bidders.
Most of the contracts are for completed single-family dwellings;
presently about 75 percent of the units built are of this type.

Ten

to 15 percent of the units are classified as minimum housing--essentially shells with roof, floor, outside walls and an interior source
of water and sewer hookup.

The different types are not mixed in any

one project.
Until 1973, INVU provided urbanized lots in some projects.
These were simply graded plots with water available.

The idea was
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that the inhabitants-to-be of these projects would then aid one another in construction of their houses.

In practice, however, the peo-

pIe involved tended to sell the construction materials, whether provided by INVU or belonging to their neighbors, and pocket the money ..
The spirit of mutual aid and community assistance so evident in the
construction of squatter settlements seems to vanish when institutionali zed.

INVU no longer provides urbanized lots.

Perhaps the most usual measure of output in the field of housing
policy is actual number of cases of housing assistance to family
groups.

Table XXIII shows what INVU accomplished in the six years

immediately preceding this study.
TABLE XXIII
HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY INVU, 1967 TO 1972
Year

Living Units
Constructed a

Other Assistance b

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

1,268
724
149
666
1,267
1,751

241
393
484
1,223
1,016
1,291

1,527
1,117
633
1,889
2,283
3,042

Total

5,843

4,648

10,491

Total

(Note: a includes minimum housing; b includes urbanized lots and the
various financing arrangements, except credit extended to buy INVUconstructed housing.)
SOURCE:

INVU, Memoria 1972.

Although INVU is a national agency, its housing contruction practices
make it appear basically an urban housing agency.

Of the 5,843 living

units constructed, 5,481 or 94 percent were built in urban areas.
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Other assistance was less concentrated; some 57 percent of the activity in this category took place in urban areas.
Financing is another day-to-day activity reflecting housing
policy.

On the one hand, INVU must obtain overall funding for its

projects and their operation; on the other hand it must consider financing arrangements for its clients.
INVU receives funding from a variety of sources.

When it was

established in 1954 it took over some $11,000,000 from its predecessor, the housing office of the Social Security Administration.

By

law it received $600,000 at the same time from the Central Government
2

and a guaranteed annual appropriation of $1,200,000.

In addition,

the National Insurance Institute and the Social Security Administration are permitted but not required to invest an unspecified part of
their reserves in INVU.

Moreover, INVU has a continuing income as

those to whom it has loaned money or sold houses on credit repay their
obligations.

Finally, INVU can borrow both internally and externally.

This is a very uncertain source of funds but the amounts, when available, can be considerable.

The primary source of external funding is

the Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (BID).
INVU has a variety of programs for funding its various client
groups.

Two of these, for rural households, will be mentioned only

briefly.

Four others, applicable in urban areas, are considered in

more detail.
The two specifically rural credit arrangements are known as
supervised rural credit and the rural communities program.

Super-

vised rural credit is available to the small farmer who wishes to
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build or improve a home on his or her own land.
vised in that the money is

acco~npanied

The credit is super-

by technical assistance or ad-

vice, and the borrower is presumably to pay some attention to this
advice as a condition of obtaining the loan.

Amounts ranging from

$150 to $2,000 are available to each borrower with an annual interest
rate of eight percent and a repayment schedule of between five and
ten years, depending on the amount borrowed and household income.
In the rural communities program, families are given building
lots in the vicinity of existing rural population centers.

These lots

are generally pieces of either abandoned fincas or unused portions of
3

large plantations owned by multinational corporations.

In addition

to the lots, families are given enough credit to purchase bl
materials for a home.

';ng

Amount of credit and repayment terms aJ

lored to the size of house needed and family income.
that the family will do the actual construction.

~ 1-

It is aSSV::L"

This program appears

to be working more successfully than the parallel mutual aid or selfhelp programs in urban areas.
INVU operates two financing programs that are applicable in urban or rural areas.
urban areas.

To date, both have been used more extensively in

The first of these is the savings and credit program.

Under this program INVU establishes a regular savings plan for an individual.

When the individual has saved a certain amount, he or she

is eligible to be granted enough credit to purchase a house in an
INVU project.

The actual amounts of money involved, again, are tai-

lored to the individual family's needs and resources.
INVU also operates a savings and loan program for individuals
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needing money for a particular housing situation that does not involve
a dwelling unit in an INVU project.

INVU lists four uses to which the

funds may be put:
1. Purchase of a dwelling unit and its lot, or construction
of same on the borrower's own lot.
2. Purchase, expansion or repair of a dwelling unit.
3. Cancellation of a lien on the borrower's house.
4. Purchase of land [on which the house sits] by the owner of
a dwelling when this [dwelling] has been built on someone
else's property.4
Under the savings and loan program, a borrower determines how much he
or she needs and how long it will take him to save, usually, 25 percent of this amount.

When he has saved

remainder at nine percent interest.
6 - 9, is shown below in Table XXIV.
10 - 12.

his quota, INVU lends him the

A typical schedule, known as Plan
Plans range from 2 - 4 to

The first number indicates the number of years over which

the individual saves his share, in regular monthly amounts.

The sec-

ond figure indicates how many years he has to repay the loan received
from INVU.

Under Plan 6 - 9 then, the individual saves in six years

25 percent of the amount subscribed and borrows the remaining 75 percent, to be repaid in nine years.
The remaining two forms of funding are the particularly urban
ones of cooperatives and semi-urban credit.

As used here, cooperative

refers to the practice of an employer formally cooperating with INVU
to expedite housing credit for his employees.

Among the more usual

forms of cooperation are an employer's agreeing to guarantee loans
made his employees by INVU and the employer's agreeing to lend the employee the amount the employee would normally have to save.

Under
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Plan 6 - 9 for example, an employer would lend the employee (or, more
precisely, pay INVU on the employee's behalf) an amount equal to 25
percent of the total subscription.

The employee could thus immediately

use the money for housing purposes and not have to save for six years
first.

The employee would, of course, have to make loan repayments

for 15 years rather than for nine.
TABLE XXIV
TYPICAL PAYMENT SCHEDULE, INVU SAVINGS AND LOAN PROGRAM
Amount
subscribed
¢

5,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000

SOURCE:

Amount
to save

Amount
of loan

Monthly
saving
payment

Monthly
loan
payment

¢ 1,250

¢ 3,750

¢ 21.60

¢

2,500
5,000
7,500
10,000
12,500
15,000
17,500
20,000
22,500
25,000

7,500
15,000
22,500
30,000
37,500
45,000
52,500
60,000
67,500
75,000

43.10
86.20
129.20
172.30
215.40
258.40
301. 40
344.50
387.50
430.60

50.80
101. 60
203.20
304.80
406.30
507.90
609.60
711.20
812.80
914.40
1,016.00

INVU, Sistema de Ahorro y Prestamo.

Finally, the semi-urban program extends credit and technical assistance to families with possession of individual parcels of land on
the urban fringes of populated areas.

If the families do not have

clear possession, credit may be extended to buy the land, as well as
pay for construction materials.

It is expected that the families to

whom credit is extended will provide most of the labor for the construction of their individual homes.
Although it is nowhere made explicit, the creation of semi-urban
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credit is a tacit recognition of squatter's rights.
is INVU's newest program; it began in 1973.)

(Semi-urban credit

Rather than engage in

massive programs to relocate squatters or simply use the force of the
law to drive them fr,m affected property, INVU has decided to make the
best of it and regularize squatting.

On the one hand, this involves

making money available to buy the land from its legal owner; or at
least to obtain a long-term lease.

On the other hand, it involves

giving the squatter a chance to replace his tugurio shack with a
sounder and more sanitary dwelling.

Throughout Central America squat-

ter settlements are no longer regarded as a blight to be forthwith
eliminated but as part of the national housing stock to be upgraded,
legitimized and used.
Two additional observations may be made on INVU's funding practices; the delinquency rates of their clients and some indication of
the size of INVU's operation.

At the end of 1972, some three quarters

of INVU's debtor-clients were making their payments on schedule.
About seven percent were seriously overdue, six months or more behind
5

schedule.

There is no evidence that INVU has any mechanism other

than moral suasion to pressure their deadbeat clientele into paying.
Nor is there any evidence that INVU would be inclined to do so.
INVU is in a difficult situation in this regard.

From one side

its main external source of funding, BID, presses it for prompt collection as a condition for any possible future loans.

From the other

side, internal Costa Rican political pressures effectively preclude
any firm action against delinquents.

All of these considerations may

be reflected in the figures showing the rate of nonpayment to be
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6

slowly increasing in recent years.
Because so much of INVU's funding varies so widely from year to
year, detailed figures on the operation do not provide enough useful
information to justify their compilation.

However, Figure 13 may give

some idea of the size of INVU from a financial viewpoint.
Capital investment in housing
Loans made by INVU
Reserve fund
1972 income from own sources
Debts owed by INVU
Figure 13.

$57,000,000
24,000,000
17,000,000
9,500,000
11,200,000

Selected financial data for INVU, 31 December 1972.

It should be noted that about 60 percent of INVU's debt is owed to
agencies outside Costa Rica, primarily to BID.
The third general aspect of INVU activity to be considered here
is client selection, both in terms of class and in terms of individuals.

The major construction activities are designed to benefit pri-

marily the middle and lower middle classes.

The urbanized lot and

minimum housing programs were aimed at the very poor, but urbanized
lots are no longer provided.

Minimum housing accounted, in 1972, for

just under 12 percent of INVU's 'housing solutions' (less than nine
percent by value).

The rural communities program, the only one the

poorest of the rural dwellers can take advantage of, benefited in the
same year a total of eight families.

Semi-urban credit, of possible

benefit to the lowest income classes was just being introduced.

At

the time the field work for this study was completed, then, the poorest class had, at best, access to only one-eighth of INVU's activity;
the other seven-eighths could be used only by the middle or lower
7
middle class.
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Some of INVU's programs are open to anyone who can meet stated
criteria; others require a very strict selection from among many applicants.

The savings and loan program, for example, welcomes and

will contract with anyone willing and able to meet its requirements.
Most programs, however, must be selective.

There are far more

applicants than opportunities for available housing units or funds.
In cases where INVU is working in cooperation with another agency,
that agency may select the clients.

This would be the case where, for

example, the National Petroleum Company (RECOPE) and INVU together
provided 2,900 housing units for RECOPE's employees near its refinery
in Limon.
For those cases where specific applicants must be chosen, and
where INVU must make the choice, as in the occupants for the INVUconstructed housing projects, a variety of criteria is taken into account.
cant:

First, INVU considers the three big questions about each applihow needy each is, how long each has been on the waiting list

and, of paramount importance, how able each is to make the payments on
time.

INVU scores each applicant on each characteristic, combines the

scores, and ranks the results.
To further distinguish among

applicants~

IN\nJ conducts, both

overtly and covertly, a socioeconomic study of each applicant family.
In the course of this INVU seeks information on conjugal harmony or
discord, excessive drinking or gambling, and general neighborhood reputation.

With these data, the rankings are refined once again and an

ordered list of the most eligible applicants is drawn up.

From this

list applicants are chosen in order whenever an opening or opportunity
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appears.

New applicants are fitted into the list according to their

ranking.

All in all, it is a reasonably sophisticated if overly rig-

orous system fOT choosing individual families to be served.
The final point to be made about INVU in this section is a reiteration of the first.

Although INVU is not the only agency involved

in providing, or at least funding, public housing, it is the lead
agency.

In the period 1968 through 1972, it provided 48 percent of
8

Costa Rica's public housing.

In addition to furnishing more housing

than any other agency, INVU also is the broadest based.

The other

agencies involved in public housing either supply housing only for
9

their own employees or limit their activities to low-cost loans.
One aspect of INVU's activities not considered here is an estimate of how successful it is in reducing Costa Rica's housing deficit.
This will be provided below in the section comparing INVU's programs
and performance with those of IVU and FUNDASAL.
Instituto de Vivienda Urbana
IVU, as the name indicates, is primarily a housing agency.

Un-

like INVU, it does not have responsibility for national urban planning
or similar functions.

As its name further indicates, IVU is particu-

larly an urban housing agency.

Rural housing, also within INVU's pur-

view in Costa Rica, is provided in El Salvador not by IVU but by a
separate agency, the Instituto de Colonizacion Rural (ICR).
Like its counterpart in Costa Rica, IVU's first concern is obtaining land.

Unlike San Jos~, San Salvador has no handy fincas that

can be purchased or expropriated adjacent to major urbanized areas.
IVU, therefore, has not been able to be as selective as INVU in choice
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of building sites; it has had to acquire a greater number of smaller
scattered locales.
IVU provides housing through three basic sets of practices:
auto-construction, direct contracting, and administration.

Auto-

construction is similar to the urbanized lot program tried and abandoned in Costa Rica.

In auto-construction, IVU provides the lots and

building materials and the tenants-to-be provide the labor.

IVU moni-

tors closely the activities in auto-construction and schedules people-so much time for general labor, so much for work on what will be their
own dwelling, so much time for rest.
of buildings left half completed.

Even so, there have been cases

Worker energy has a tendency to

vanish once a roof, floor and outside walls have been finished.

IVU

has used auto-construction for both single-family and multiple-family
dwelling units.
Direct contracting needs little elaboration.

IVU draws up plans

and specifications for a particular project and invites bids on it.
All things being equal, the lowest bidder is awarded the contract and
builds the project.

IVU has from time to time, however, attached par-

ticular conditions to the bids.

One of these requires a guarantee

from the chosen contractor to employ and train a certain number of
those who will live in the completed project.

Since almost none of

the IVU housing is destined for the poor and unskilled, this practice
is neither as widespread nor as useful as it might be.
Another innovation introduced by IVU was the experimental housing program.

In this program ten companies were given general speci-

fications for particular types of housing--e.g., 50 square meters of
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floor space, two bedrooms, bathroom, kitchen, living room--and were
told to build a unit or two of each type as cheaply as possible, using
whatever building material they wished.

IVU suggested, however, that

general preference be given to materials of domestic manufacture and
specific preference to materials worked on in its own laboratory.

If

any company was able to design and build a housing unit at much less
cost than its competitors, and below current housing prices, it would
receive a sizable contract from INVU.

Unfortunately, final data on

the experimental housing program are not yet available so it is not
known if any great cost breakthroughs were made.
In construction by administration, IVU itself does the work.

It

is restricted to construction in tugurio areas and the actual labor is
performed by the inhabitants of these areas.

Construction by adminis-

tration differs from auto-construction in three important respects.
First, the workers in construction by administration are hired by lVU
and paid wages.

Generally, they will move into the housing thus

built, but this is not a given.

Second, the end result of this activ-

ity is seen as either urbanized lots or minimum housing; autoconstruction aims at a more finished product.

Third, construction by

administration is used on occasion for non-housing construction such
as communal latrines to serve tugurios.
Again, the single most useful measure of policy output in the
field of public housing is actual number of housing solutions, including urbanized lots, provided.
from 1967 through 1972.

Table XXV shows IVU's accomplishments

Accurate data were not available for number

of urbanized lots provided.

However, it was estimated that about one
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and one-half times as many lots as houses were supplied.

If this fig-

ure is accurate, some 8,000 lots were prepared and housing solutions
10
in all totalled between 13,000 and 14,000 units.
TABLE XXV
HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY IVU, 1967 THROUGH 1972
Year

Number of Housing Units

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

880
1,415
1,380
1,050
200
484

Total

5,409

SOURCE:

IVU, Memoria de Actividades 1973.

IVU provides basically three types of housing.
housing, has already been described.
family and multiple-family units.

One, minimum

The others are completed single-

Single-family housing contains on

a single floor, two bedrooms (rarely three), a kitchen, a bathroom and
a living room.

Multiple-family units are the same except they are a

bit larger and contain three bedrooms.

At first glance it might seem

unusual for apartments to be larger than single-family houses but
greater population densities on scarce land can be obtained with this
mix than with larger, one-story, single-family houses.
tions govern the maximum cost for each type of housing.
shows how these limits increased over a ten-year period.

Strict regulaTable XXVI
Actual av-

erage unit cost of single-family housing completed in 1972 was $2,545
11

and of multiple-family housing was $2,908.
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TABLE XXVI
MJ~XIMUM

ALLOWABLE PER UNIT COSTS FOR IVU HOUSING, IN $C.A.

Minimum housing
Single-family housing
Multiple-family housing
SOURCE:

1964

1969

1974

480
1,480
2,080

800
2,400
2,600

1,800
3,400
3,800

Information supplied by IVU Architect Oscar Arrivillaga.

IVU receives its funding from the same general sources as INVU:
its own resources including rent and mortgage payments; subsidies from
the Central Government; internal borrowing through bonds and loans
from financial institutions; and foreign loans, particularly from
USAID and BID.

IVU has never been as well capitalized as INVU.

In-

stead of taking over public housing from an agency with $11,000,000
as INVU did, IVU replaced Mejoramiento Social, a destitute agency
that had managed to construct only 1,000 housing units in its eight
years of existence.

Moreover, IVU has no guaranteed subsidy from the

Central Government.

The agency asked that it receive automatically

three percent of the annual National Government budget; this suggestion was flatly rejected.

In fact, IVU is one of the first to suffer

cutbacks whenever the Government faces a financial exigency.
IVU maintains three sorts of financial arrangements for its
12
clients.
Urbanized lots are sold on the installment plan. Actual
monthly payments are tailored to individual income but in no case is
the repayment period to be longer than ten years.

The usual interest

charges is six percent.
Single-family housing is financed on a contract or rent-to-own
basis.

Unlike payments for urbanized lots, payments for housing are
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not tailored to family income.

Terms are reckoned on a 20-year pay-

ment schedule, at six percent interest.

Monthly payments for housing

in a specific project are calculated and made known in advance.

Fam-

ilies unable to meet these payments are expected to refrain from applying for housing they cannot afford.
IVU's third financial program for its clients is a straight
rental operation.

Again, monthly payments are fixed, and not based

on family income.

Rents are pegged so

~hat

a particular rental pro-

ject, and borrowing and other administrative costs attached to it, are
paid off in 20 years.

Rents collected after the apartments have been

paid go into IVU's reserve fund.

IVU reserves the right to raise

rents at any time to keep up with inflation.

Tenants not willing or

able to pay the increase are expected to seek less expensive housing.
A total picture of IVU's financial position would be difficult
to compile.

In addition, it varies considerably from year to year

given the vagaries of both Central Government support and external
funding.

Nonetheless Figure 14 gives an indication of the size of

IYU's operation from a financial viewpoint.
Investment in housing being sold by contract
Investment in rental housing
Debts owed by IVU
Income from own sources, July 1972 - June 1973
Reserves and unexpended capital
Figure 14.

$24,000,000
6,400,000
12,400,000
3,000,000
26,800,000

Selected financial data for IVU, 30 June 1973.

About 84 percent of IVU's debt is owed to external lenders, again,
principally USAID and BID.
Although IVU does not operate any savings or loan programs as
INVU does, there are two government programs to assist individuals in
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financing their homes.

These deserve brief mention here.

One is the

Financiera Naciona1 de Vivienda (FNV); the other is the Fondo Social
para 1a Vivienda (FSV).
FNV was created in 1963.

It is described as a "public corpora-

tion of undefined function, with autonomy in the administration of its
13
patrimony, intended to serve as a Central Credit Bank for housing."
Essentially, FNV has four functions:

serving as a credit reservoir

for the savings and loan associations that have come into being since
its establishment; insuring individual savings accounts up to ¢12,000;
insuring the associations' home mortgages; and creating a secondary
market for these mortgages.
The original capital for FNV came from a Central Government subsidy of $800,000 and a USAID loan of $3,100,000.

Prior to the estab-

1ishment of FNV, savings and loan associations were unknown in E1 Salvador.

Three have since been formed.

These associations pay their

depositors six percent on savings while the commercial banks pay four
percent.

The two percent spread is a matter of custom and not, as in
14
the United States, mandated by law.
Mortgage loans backed by FNV may be made for new homes, up to
90 percent of the value of the horne, but no loan can be for more than
¢25,000.

Maximum term for the loans, which bear interest at nine per-

cent, is 20 years.

Oscar Salegio, Chief 0:- IVU's Engineering Depart-

ment, estimates about one-quarter of all new housing built by the pri15
vate sector is financed by FNV-backed mortgages.
The other housing finance agency in E1 Salvador is FSV which has
adopted as its motto:

"Building for the worker."

It is a new program,
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dating only from 1973.

Designed to build housing for individuals who

are regularly employed but still unable to meet payments in IVU projects, FSV is funded by contractors, workers, and employers.

Workers,

who save their money with FSV, will be able to borrow from it to finance minimum housing.

Contractors, who lend money to FSV, expect to

profit both through being awarded construction contracts and through
interest paid them.

Employers, who also lend money to FSV, expect to

get in return not only interest but a healthy and adequately housed,
if almost captive, workforce.
FSV has net been in operation long enough to assess its performance.

In a full-page advertisement in La Prensa Grafica it described
16
itself as "constitutional mandate converted into reality."
The ad-

vertisement continued:
The valiant contribution of the State, of the patron and of
the worker will make it possible to realize massive construction of housing. In granting credit, preference will be given
to workers with the lowest incomes, as established in accordance with appropriate regulations. For this the SOCIAL FUND
FOR HOUSING has been created. New urban solutions, innumerable sources of labor and major economic growth. Sufficient
reasons to get on with progress. 17
FSV represents a radical departure from earlier policies of no direct
government credit assistance to individuals.

It remains to be seen

how successful it is.
A final consideration in the examination of IVU's financial practice is the timeliness of its clients' repayments.

INVU published de-

tailed figures on how many of its clients were up to date in their
payments, how many were behind, and how far behind.
such data.

IVU provides no

It does, however, give some indication as to actions taken

against delinquent debtors.

In the courts of El Salvador in 1972-
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1973, IVU initiated the following proceedings for "reasons of delinquency and other causes":

300 demands for dismissal of tenants; 177

warnings of eviction; and 103 petitions for eviction.

Twenty-four

properties were repossessed as a result of complaints filed in earlier
18
years.
It would be assumed that in the less open Salvadorean system,
IVU would be free to administer the financial side of its program
without the political pressures with which INVU must contend.
is not necessarily true.

This

In 1968, under the external influence of

BID, IVU tightened up its collection procedures and announced that all
clients who failed to pay what they owned in 15 days would be evicted.
A great hue and cry arose.

PDC siezed the opportunity to denounce the

government for heartless treatment of the very social group it had
promised to serve.

IVU was not prepared for this response:

"Shocked

by the unexpected outbursts, the agency [IVU] directors withdrew their
19
demands for immediate mortgage payments."
Neither country, neither
agency, then, has a monopoly on fiscally remiss but politically potent
clients.
It is worth emphasizing once again the nature of IVU's clientele.

IVU does not even pretend to provide housing for the lowest in-

come segment of society, those with a family income of less than ¢250
per month.

Salegio estimates that 30 percent of the urban families in

El Salvador cannot afford minimum housing of 40 square meters, to be
20
paid for in 20 years at six percent interest.
IVU's housing, then,
is available to those making at least ¢250 per month but not making
21

enough to compete successfully in the private housing market.
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Like INVU, IVU makes a socioeconomic study of each applicant.
Unlike INVU, there is no ranking of the applicants on the basis of
purely family characteristics.

IVU's aim in selecting clients is to

choose those who are the best overall fit for the particular housing
to be filled.

If there are

TIl

any applicants who do not fit a project

for some non-economic reason (e.g., family size), future IVU projects
may be designed with this applicant group in mind.

Once a particular

project is designed, however, clients are selected to fit; the project
is not modified to suit the needs or demands of potential clients.
One activity IVU engages in that INVU does not is the contruction of housing for particular occupational groups.

IVU will often

announce that a particular project is being built, for example, to
22
house nurses, teachers and clerks.
There can be a variety of motives for this.

One may be that these groups are regarded as making

special contributions to the country's development.

Another may be

that the amount and stability of their incomes places them in an
economic category IVU finds desirable or convenient to serve.

Yet a

third reason may be that many of these people are government employees
and subsidized housing can be offered them in lieu of better wages.
Whatever the underlying principle, this practice removes large portions of IVU-supplied housing from the reach of the general populace.
Fundacion Salvadore:5a De Desarollo Y Vivienda Minima
In establishing minimum income criteria, then, IVU has effectively eliminated a large portion of the housing-short population from
participation in its program.

The only

qu~si~public

agency designed
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to serve the lowest income classes is FUNDASAL.
FUNDASAL, a private non-profit corporation, was established in
1972 to attack the entire problem of marginality.

What constitutes

marginality is vividly described:
It signifies a lack of food and housing, school and work,
health and recreation. The marginal [person] is one without
bread and without a roof, illiterate and unemployed, beaten
down and sick. Marginality signifies existence on the margin
of the most precious values of our society. The lack of an
adequate house degrades the family with a promiscuity and a
greed that is almost animal. Hunger and idleness destroy the
bodies and the wills: the child--almost a man--begs through
the public streets; the girl of thirteen--now a woman--sells
her body in the bars and bordellos; the youth--now an adult-compensates for his impotence with a senseless machismo; the
man--now aged--drowns his frustration in a bottle of guaro.
In the creed of marginality, good is anything that helps survival: prostitution is an office; robbery, a career; alcohol,
a refuge. God, country, family and honor mean nothing to one
who has no father, no land, no home, no life of his own. 23
FUNDASAL regards the provision of housing as the single most critical
activity in its attack on marginality.
All FUNDASAL housing is provided through a form of modified
auto-construction.

Professional builders and tradesmen hired by

FUNDASAL work through the week on the housing projects.

On Sundays

the future tenants, under supervision, provide the necessary unskilled
labor.

All housing is in the form of rent-to-own or contract sale

lll1its.

As usual, it is difficult to assess the performance of an organization this new.

The usual measure, housing units provided, does

give some indication although no comparisons over time are possible.
At the end of 1973, FUNDASAL was in the process of constructing 2,270
24
units.
The first 525 of these, in San Jose del Pino, were completed
25
and occupied by the tenants in April, 1974.
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FUNDASAL seeks i.ts funding wherever it is to be found.

It re-

ceives some subsidy from the Central Government, $80,000 in 1973, but
the Government has made no long-term commitments.
1973 was $988,800.

Total income in

In addition to the subsidy there were miscellane-

ous donations of $68,800 and loans of $840,000.

The largest single

grant to date was $640,000 in 1974 from the Interamerican Founda26
tion.
Municipalities often donate the land for the housing projects.

Domestically, FUNDASAL has borrowed money from the Central Re-

serve Bank and the private Mortgage Bank of El Salvador.

Externally,

it has received major grants and loans from the Panamerican Development Foundation, USAID, Campaign Against Hunger and New Homeland plus
smaller amo'Li.llts of assistance from a wide variety of sources.

Private

individuals and coporations both within and without El Salvador con27
tribute money and materials.
FUNDASAL's financial arrangements with its clients are quite
simple.

The price of each housing unit to the tenant is somewhere

between ¢l,500 and ¢2,500 depending on the size of the unit and the
terms under which FUNDASAL was able to obtain funoing for the construction.

The wealthier tenants payoff their debt at 15 colones

per month, the poorer tenants at ten colones per month.
Client selection criteria for FUNDASAL housing are also quite
simple.

The basic requirement is that family income not exceed ¢250

per month.

By its own estimate, this income limit is high enough to

create for FUNDASAL a pool of potential clients that includes more
than 60 percent of housing-short urban Salvadoreans.
range; need is taken into account.

Within this

Tenants are expected to have lived
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at least five years in the area; FUNDASAL does not wish to do anything
that might encourage migration to the capital.
are preferred as tenants.

Established families

To be regarded as established, family mem-

bers should have lived together for two years; a longer time period
is better.

Finally, FUNDASAL wants tenants who are disposed to work

Sundays in auto-construction.

Its feeling is that families willing to

make this commitment are not only particularly deserving but also are
less likely to let their house deteriorate.

FUNDASAL does indicate,

however, that none of their criteria is written in stone; rather they
are to be regarded as flexible guidelines.
Two other facets of FUNDASAL's operation are discussed here:
one, its institutional relationship with other agencies, and two, the
non-housing aspects of its program to fight marginality.
Like other builders of housing, FUNDASAL requires a package of
permits, approvals and urban services.

Seeking these brings it into

contact, and sometimes into conflict, with a number of other agencies.
The nature and low budget of its operation effectively banish FUNDASAL
housing to the more remote outskirts of the urban areas.
the obtaining of many urban services more difficult.

This makes

Difficulties

are compounded in dealing with government agencies that are both regulatory and service providing.
One such agency is ANDA.

FUNDASAL housing, like other housing,

requires the Vo.Bo. of ANDA before it can be legally built.

However,

obtaining the Vo.Bo. of ANDA qua regulatory agency in no way guarantees the provision of sewers and water from ANDA qua service agency.
Much the same difficulty exists with DUA.

DUA must approve con-
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struction plans but such approval does not mean that DUA will provide
the site with adequate road access.

Preconstruct ion approval must be

obtained not only from these agencies of the Central Government but
also from the municipality.

Generally municipalities, especially San

Salvador, give their Vo.Bo. almost automatically; CAESS, the electric
company, will provide service anywhere, anytime, to anyone willing to
pay for it.
In some cases ANDA and/or DUA will refuse FUNDASAL permission to
build.

FUNDASAL's reaction is usually the same as that of other Sal-

vadoreans, it goes ahead and builds anyhow, illegally.

It should be

noted that there are on the outskirts of San Salvador a great many
illegal dwellings that are not marginal.

These are sound, healthy,

often large and expensive houses that are illegal solely because they
lack the Vo.Bo. of ANDA or DUA.

Many of these illegal dwellings have

no road access and can be reached only on foot by long flights of
stairs.

ANDA has been known to relent and provide services to

FUNDASAL housing, after refusing it permission to build.

ANDA does

not seem to let its regulatory and service functions interfere with
one another.
One of FUNDASAL's strongest institutional links is with Jose
Simeon Canas University of Central America.
Univer~ity

To a large extent, the

acts as FUNDASAL's research arm and provides it with a

great deal of technical assistance.

At the same time, FUNDASAL's

projects serve as laboratory and training ground for the University's
engineering, planning, and community development students.
FUNDASAL has adopted the position that provision of housing
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alone is not a sufficient attack on marginality.

To complement the

housing program, it undertakes educational, economic, and community
development activities.
Educational activities are pragmatic and aimed at adults.

The

prime targets are FUNDASAL's current or projected tenants but there
are no restrictions.

A typical program was undertaken in conjunction

with the movement of families into San Jose del Pino.
274.)

(See above, p.

Courses were given in the day-to-day concerns of mother-child

relationships, human reproduction, venereal disease, social development, sanitation and parasite control.

The courses were intended pri-

marily for the new tenants in FUNDASAL housing but others from the
tugurios were welcome to, and did, attend.
Economic activities are designed to maximize the productive capacity of the marginal population.

In one case FUNDASAL established

a small ornamental iron workers' cooperative and located a market for
the lamps, watch faces and mirror frames it produced.

In another sit-

uation it organized a building materials cooperative to produce concrete pipes, sewer lines and similar fixtures.

FUNDASAL also set up

two cooperatives to make and market Persian-types rugs and carpets.
Finally, in an effort to mobilize what little savings are possible in
the tugurio and to liberate its tenants from usury, FUNDASAL has established small credit unions, using some of its patrimony as seed
capital.
Although it budgets less than five percent of its expenditures
for community development, FUNDASAL regards organization as a vital
sector in its war on marginality.

FUNDASAL considers itself a non-
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political entity that politicizes its clients.

It is estimated that

among the marginal population of San Salvador, ten percent are on the
right wing, ten percent on the left wing and the remaining 80 percent
29

are totally apolitical.

FUNDASAL attempts to break this shell of

political apathy by organizing its tenants.

It has had some success.

Tenant organizations have become pressure groups and successfully lobbied for roads and bus service.
This organizing activity has also had a partisan political effect that FUNDASAL officially maintains is unintended.

Before organ-

ization in particular tugurio areas, few of the people voted and of
these few votes, 90 percent were cast for PCN.

After organization,

the number of voters increased fivefold and PCN received only ten per30

cent of the votes.
Two factors complicate community organization in the tugurios of
of San Salvador:
(ORDEN).

Mano Blanco and Organizacion Democratica Nacional

While neither group can be linked directly to the Central

Government, both do share the same Hobbesian view of mankind and governance as PCN.
tugurio dwellers.

Mano Blanco is dedicated to maintaining order among
Protest marches demanding jobs or improved bus ser-

vice upset its sense of harmony; Mano Blanco does its best to discourage these practices at the same time FUNDASAL is encouraging them.
ORDEN is a right-wing para-military organization whose purpose
is the repression of any manifestations of liberalism.

A weekly news-

magazine referred to it as "the dreaded 50,000 member Orden [sic] mi31
Ii tia."
ORDEN has recently been implicated in the murders of two
Jesuits and others with similar leftist leanings.

Both of these
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groups have opposed FUNDASAL's community organizing efforts in the
tugurios.

Where their initial opposition has been unsuccessful and

FUNDASAL has organized the inhabitants, support for both Mano Blanco
and ORDEN has dwindled seriously.
FUNDASAL, then, attacks the whole area of marginality through
community development, economic programs and provision of low-cost
housing.

It is considered here primarily because of the quasi-public

nature of this last activity.

In the section below, INVU, IVU and

FUNDASAL are compared on a variety of criteria.
Summary
In Chapter VIII some general conclusions about and comparisons
of Salvadorean and Costa Rican housing in the larger sense are made.
Here the day-to-day activities and programs are summarized.

This sec-

tion will also give some indication as to how successful the public
housing programs are in reducing the public housing deficit in the two
countries.
Some comparisons among the three agencies and their housing
practices have been made above; Figure 15 gives a summary of the salient characteristics.
One measure used in evaluating the success of public housing
agencies is how much of the housing problem they solve.

To determine

this, it is necessary to know not only the supply side of the picture
but also the demand, the size of the housing shortfall.

A wide vari-

ety of estimates of the housing deficit is available for both Costa
Rica and EI Salvador.

Most of these estimates are quite precise;

some of them may even be accurate.

Because these estimates do vary so
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Characteristics

INVU

lVU

FUNDASAL

Average number of housing
solutions provided annually, 1967-1972 (excluding urbanized lots)

1,561

902

N.A.

Provision of completed
standard housing

Yes

Yes

No

Provision of minimum
housing

Yes

Yes

Yes

Auto-construction, selfhelp, mutual aid

No

Yes

Yes

Rental housing

No

Yes

No

Physical work performed
by the agency itself

No

Yes

Yes

Guaranteed subsidy from
the Central Government

Yes

No

No

Bonds sold to other
government agencies

Yes

Yes

N.A.

Savings and loan program

Yes

No

Yes

Rigorous debt collection
procedures

No

Yes

No

Low to
Middle

Lower
Middle to
Middle

Lowest

Housing for particular
occupational groups

No

Yes

No

Assistance to rural
families

Yes

No

No

Community organization
program

No

No

Yes

Level of cooperation/
coordination with
municipalities

Low

Variable

High

Socioeconomic class served

Figure 15.

Characteristics of public housing agencies.
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widely, it is not realistic to accept anyone of them as truly repre32
sentative.
Even government figures are suspect. White, for exampIe, states that the Salvadorean authorities give the housing problem
33
"spuriously exact statistical treatment."
In an attempt to reduce the inherent biases and inaccuracies in
this area and provide the maximum validity to our comparisons, we
adopt here the estimates and projections made by outside agencies who
have assembled data for both countries.

To further confuse the issue

and complicate measurements and comparisons, two different kinds of
data are estimated:

total deficit, and housing to be constructed an-

nually by the public sector to meet a certain goal.

These mayor may

not be presented in conjunction, and goals mayor may not be set rationally, with a specific, realizable aim.
One set of estimates is provided by Jorge Riba to the Organiza34
tion of Central American States.
His figures as to number of houses
necessary to maintain the status quo are combined with actual performance figures for INVU and IVU in Table XXVII.
Riba's estimates of needed housing include that necessary to
handle population increases and to maintain the current housing
stock; he does not include any housing destined to reduce existing
deficits.
Considering the future, Riba projects that in 1975 Costa Rica
will have to build 18,700 units and El Salvador, 17,400 units. Com35
parable figures for 1980 are 21,600 and 19,600 respectively.
Another source estimates 1975 housing needs at 19,400 units for Costa
36
Rica and 36,000 units for El Salvador.
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TABLE XXVII
COMPARISON OF HOUSING NEED AND PUBLIC SUPPLY
COSTA RICA AND EL SALVADOR
1965 AND 1970
Year

Housing Units
Needed

Housing Units
Publicly Supplied a

Percent of Need Met
by Public Agencies

COSTA RICA
1965
1970

14,400
16,300

736
1,889

5%
12%

EL SALVADOR
1965
1970
(Note:

14,100
15,600

1,864
1,050

13%
7%

a, only housing provided by IVU and INVU is included.)

SOURCES: Jorge Riba, La Vivienda en Centro~llerica; IVU, Memoria de
Actividades 1973; INVU, Memoria 1972.
In contrast to Riba's estimates of INVU and IVU performance during the 1960s, Wynia suggests they were able to keep pace:
With little help from the private sector, the housing agencies managed to stay only slightly ahead of the urban population growth. Consequently, at the end of the decade the urban housing deficit remained approximately the same as it had
been in 1960. 37
There is no disagreement, however, that little of the accumulated
38
housing deficit has been eliminated in either country.
Neither
agency any longer defines its targets in terms of eliminating the
39
deficit.
IVU sets up construction targets of so much housing
each year for (usually) a five-year period; INVU sets no long-range
targets at all.

Only when it has completed preliminary engineering

for a specific project will it make any public statement.
In concluding this comparison of housing practices of IVU and
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INVU, a few points merit further emphasis.
the approach to self-help housing.

One is the difference in

INVU assumed that provision of

materials and technical assistance would be sufficient with future
tenants providing the will and the labor.
false.

This assumption proved

IVU adopted a more structured approach, with definite sched-

uling and on-site supervision.
not perfectly.

This approach worked better, although

In fact, most of some unexpected cost overruns suf-

fered by IVU were a result of high administrative costs in its selfhelp program.
One characteristic shared, involuntarily, by INVU and IVU has
been severe financial difficulty, the worst of any Central American
housing program.

Neither agency found its BID and USAID assistance

sufficient to establish self-sustaining programs.

Both agencies

found themselves effectively abandoned by their central governments
in times of budgetary shortages.

For several years, in fact, the

Costa Rican government refused to pay INVU the annual subsidy of
40
$1,200,000 due it by law.
In EI Salvador, then, the fiscal crisis was due primarily to
unexpected administrative costs and secondarily to inadequate Central
Government support, both exacerbated by BID insistence on completion
of self-help housing before any further loans would be considered.
In Costa Rica the crisis was due primarily to lack of promised Central Government funding and secondarily to unexpectedly expensive
self-help housing costs.

These were exacerbated by USAID and BID in-

sistence that before they would disburse further loan money, existing
projects had to be completed and the C'entral Government had to meet
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its obligations.
In spite of everything, IVU and INVU have been the two most successfu1 housing agencies in Central America at actually providing
dwelling units.

They have been the most ambitious, undertaken the

largest projects, and encountered the greatest difficulties.

Their

specific construction practices, financing arrangements and clientele
selection have been compared above; Chapter VIII will examine briefly
the larger aspects of housing policy and po1icymaking in Costa Rica
and E1 Salvador.
MUNICIPAL REVENUE
In this section the current revenue and expenditure patterns of
the two municipalities are considered.

They are compared not only

with one another but also with de Moraes' ideal of good municipal revenue practices.

In addition, some of the findings of Arvids Kalnins,

United Nations municipal revenue specialist, on administrative short41
comings in San Jose are presented.
San Salvador
The chaotic, almost anarchic, state of San Salvador's municipal
revenue system has been detailed above in Chapter VI.

Nowhere is this

42

more evident than in the budget.

Municipal revenues are obtained

from the following general sources:
1. Taxes on capital investment

2. Taxes on economic activities carried on in public
places
3. Taxes on public entertainment and raffles
4. Taxes on construction
5. Charges for municipal services
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6. Fees for licenses and permits
7. Fines
8. Charges for market stalls.
43

As noted above, no such logical categories are used in the Tarifa.
Nor are they in the budget.

Over 95 percent of current income is

lumped under the single catch-all category of 'Regular Income.'
reason for this imprecision is simple:
know

hDl'l

The

municipal authorities do not

much they can expect from any particular tax or charge, nor
44

from any group thereof.
In fact, the preparation of the budget is almost exclusively
concerned with the expenditure side.

First, the Municipality figures

out what it is going to do and how much it will cost to do this.

Ex-

cept for large specific projects, this is the same as the previous
year, modified slightly to account for wage increases and higher cost
of materials.

Next, the total of any expected subsidies, donations

and special fees is calculated.
from the former.

This latter amount is subtracted

The amount then needed to balance the budget, it is

assumed, will somehow come from the Municipality's olio of taxes and
charges.

The dangers of this approach to budgeting are recognized by

the Municipality.

In the preamble to the budget, a statement warns

citizens of possible service cutbacks and employees of possible layoffs if, for any month, it looks like expenditures are too high or
revenues are underrealized.
It is reasonable to assume that most of San Salvador's regular
income comes from the taxes on capital investment and construction.
These activities are carried on by larger corporations who presumably
engage in accurate bookkeeping even if the Municipality does not.
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These corporations, moreover, tend not to be political allies of the
PDC.

The Municipality therefore can collect from these taxpayers more

easily and cheaply than it can track down hosts of sidewalk vendors,
particularly when these vendors do tend to be political supporters of
PDC.

This particular tax collection practice, it will be remembered,

underlay much of CACI's suspicious and hostile attitude towards San
45
Salvador.
In summary, then, the revenue side of San Salvador's budget is
shown in Table XXVIII.
TABLE XXVIII
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN SALVADOR, CASH ON HAND
AND PROJECTED REVENUE
1973 ($C.A.)
Income from own sources
Regular
Special Funds
Fines
Subsidies
Cash on Hand

$2,864,076
43,622
3,168
2,164
162,164

Total

$3,075,194

SOURCE:

Municipalidad de San Salvador, Presupuesto Municipal 1973.

It should be noted that these figures do not include income from the
46
municipal markets. These are governed by their own law
and by the
47
loan agreement with BID.
Interestingly enough, the City Markets
Law permits the markets manager much greater financial latitude than
that possessed by the Municipality generally.

For example, the man-

ager can spend up to $8,000 without the Vo.Bo. of the Central Government; San Salvador can spend only $2,000.

The Municipality is re-
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quired to spend some of its general fund money on market administration.

In 1973 it had $81,500 earmarked for this purpose.
If the revenue side of San Salvador's budget is vague and unim-

formative; the expenditure side is much more thoroughly and completely
presented.

Table XXIX presents the expenditures for 1973 both by

category of expenditure and by nature of service provided.
TABLE XXIX
PROPOSED SAN SALVADOR MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES, 1973 ($C.A.)
By Expenditure Category
Percent

Category

Amount

Wages and Salaries
Services
Supplies
Equipment
Construction
Transfer Payments

$1,938,504
411,260
217,223
129,000
80,000
299,208

63.0
13.4
7.1
4.2
2.6
9.7

Total

$3,075,194

100.0

By Service Category
Financial Administration
Sanitation
Public Works
General Administration
Police
Community Action
Slaughterhouse
Other

$1,118,482
548,575
531,132
265,480
165,966
98,344
92,270
254,945

36.4
17.8
17.3
8.6
5.4
3.2
3.0
8.3

Total

$3,075,194

100.0

SOURCE:

Municipalidad de San Salvador, Presupuesto Municipal 1973.

Expenditures in the category Financial Administration would be considered overstated in United States municipal accounting practice.

For

example, all bookkeeping and data processing costs for the whole mu-
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nicipal operation are included here, not cos ted out and charged to the
respective departments.
Probably the most striking aspect of the San Salvador municipal
budget is its small size.

A budget of just over $3,000,000 is not
48

To be sure, many

very much for a city of over 500,000 population.

functions generally regarded as municipal are performed (or not performed) in San Salvador by other agencies.

Streets are constructed by

DUA and water and sewers provided by ANDA, to mention just two of
these.

Nonetheless, the usual condition of the Municipality of San

Salvador is one of penury.
San Jose
Municipal revenue sources in Costa Rica are quite diverse, and
the quality of the collection practices is uneven.

The chaos that

reigns in San Salvador is absent but the Costa Rican system is still
exceedingly complex.

In addition to charges for municipal services,

municipal revenue sources may be divided into those available to all
municipalities and those restricted to only certain municipalities.
The basic levies made by all municipalities include taxes on
real estate, public spectacles, and construction; license charges for
carrying on various commercial and industrial activities; three different liquor taxes; municipal stamps; and fees for the slaughtering
of swine and cattle.

The livestock-slaughtering fee for an animal is

to be split evenly between the municipality where it was finished and
the one where it was slaughtered.

Of these taxes, all but the license

charges are covered by generic national laws setting conditions and
rates that are constant throughout the country.

A special law is
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needed for each municipal license charge on industrial or commercial
activities.
A variety of taxes is levied by only some municipalities, in
some cases by only one.

These include taxes on land left vacant or

unproductive, sugar, tobacco, salt, mangrove wood, lobsters, turtle
harvesting, wood, petroleum, cement and graves.

Most of these taxes

are governed by general national laws but each grave or wood tax requires a specific act of the National Assembly.
One further complication that existed through 1969 was the web
of relationships between municipalities and the Central Government.
The two levels had shared in a variety of real property, coffee, liquor and ad valorem taxes.

New legislation effective January 1, 1970,

modified this so the municipalities shared among themselves the total
49
proceeds of the property tax.
San Jose's share is fixed at 29.4
percent of the amount collected.

The Central Bank collects this tax

and takes 8.6 percent for administrative costs.

The remaining 62 per-

cent is divided among all other municipalities in the country accord50

ing to population.

The importance of this revenue source, and the

relative position of others, is shown in Table XXX.
The role played by parking meter revenue in San Jose has been
discussed above in Chapter VI.

It should be mentioned that in one way

or another the Municipality derives almost $200,000--about five percent of its income--from various fees and charges on the manufacture,
import and sale of liquor.
The absolutely critical contribution of the real property tax
51
to San Jose municipal coffers, then, is evident from the table.
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Almost 50 percent of its total income (73 percent of its tax revenue)
is derived from this source.

Moreover, the collection costs are nil.

The Central Bank does the collecting and pays San Jose the Municipa1ity's share off the top, even before subtracting its administration
fee.
TABLE XXX
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE, PROJECTED REVENUE, 1974 ($C.A.)
Source

Amount

Percent

Property tax a
License fees
Other taxes
Total tax revenue

$2,185,298
439,245
284,528
$2,909,071

49.9
10.0
6.5
66.4

Rental of market space
User charges
Subsidies b
Fines
Other non tax revenue c
Total non tax revenue

205,087
909,665
163,900
128,429
64,906
$1,471,986

4.7
20.8
3.7
2.9
1.5
33.6

Total revenue

$4,381,057

100.0

(Note: a, almost 98 percent of this amount is from the real property
tax, the remainder is from a real estate transfer tax and the tax on
vacant land; b, almost 99 percent of this amount is from IFAM; c, a
franchise fee of five percent of gross revenue is levied on the electric company.)
SOURCE:

,..

Municipa1idad de San Jose, Presupuesto Ordinaria del 1974.

One other point merits inclusion here.

Despite the ruling of

the Comptroller General and the drawn out fight for its approval as
an impuesto, parking meter revenue is classified in the budget as a
user charge, not as a tax.
Table XXXI presents the expenditure side of the budget by nature of expenditure and by program.

As was the case for San Salvador,
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Wages and Salaries account for most of the Municipality's expenses.
More specific comparisons between the two cities will be made below in
a subsequent part of this chapter.

Before ending our consideration of

San Jose and its budgetary and financial practices, it is worth examining the administrative shortcomings identified by Kalnins, along
52
with some of his suggestions for improvement.
TABLE XXXI
PROPOSED SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES, 1974 ($C.A.)
By Expenditure Category
Category

Amount

Wages and Salaries
Services
Supplies
Equipment
Acquisition of Real Estate
Transfer Payments
Debt Service

$2,433,323
497,907
747,548
51,943
16,906
560,561
72,869

55.5
11.4
17.1
1.2
0.4
12.8
1.7

Total

$4,381,057

100.0

Percent

By Program Category
Policy Development and
Planning
General Administration a
Municipal Health
Education and Culture
Economic and Social Services
Public Works
Capital Investment
Total

$ 378,231
1,090,290
855,195
223,890
414,000
578,190
841,261

8.6
24.9
19.5
5.1
9.4
13.2
19.2

$4,381,057

100.0

(Note:

a, financial services account for $779,957 of this amount.)

SOURCE:

Municipa1idad de San Jose, Presupuesto Ordinario del 1974.

The most basic deficiency Kalnins found to be the "complete ab-
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sence of recent and valid technical studies about the administrative,
juridical, financial and fiscal situation of the municipalities of
53

Costa Rica."
Many of the conditions he criticized have been improved.

His

criticisms were, in some cases, instrumental in bringing about needed
change.

He complained, for example, that there existed no Municipal

Code, that there was a hodgepodge of tax sources shared between municipalities and the Central Government, and that there was no central
clearing house or course for technical or financial aid or advice to
the municipalities.

All of these have changed for the better.

Some conditions, however, have not changed.

Kalnins found, as
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did Castro Carvajal,

that municipalities paid insufficient attention

to budgeting and were constantly plaguing the Comptroller General with
requests for modifications, as often as 15 times a year for some municipalities.

Municipalities continue to overspend their budgets,

user charges remain unrealistically low and the Comptroller General
persists in impeding fiscal planning with his rigid insistence on in55

variable line-item budgets from the municipalities.
Kalnins offered a rather radical solution to the administrative
and financial problems of the subnational units of government in Costa
Rica.

These units should be abolished and the country divided into 14
56
departments.
Each department was to be purely an administrative arm

of the Central Government.
comes to the fore.
Costa

In this suggestion his French background

Provinces and cantons have not been abolished in

They continue to exist, to have severe administrative
57

difficulties and to grapple with financial problems.

San Jose is
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not exempt from the municipal maladies.
Summary
In this section San Jos~ and San Salvador are briefly compared
on four points:

actual size of municipal government, revenue sources

and collection, expenditure patterns, and quality of tax system according to de Moraes.
Size of budget is often used as a measure of scope of municipal
activity.

San Jose's budget is larger than San Salvador's, about 40

percent larger.

This is so despite the fact that San Jose serves ap58
proximately 20 percent fewer people.
Municipal government in San
Jose, then, is considerably more expensive on a per capita basis-about 11 dollars as compared with six dollars per capita in San Salvador.

As befits the more populous city, San Salvador has the larger
59
municipal workforce--l,805 employees to San Jose's 1,376.
In both
municipalities there are roughly 3.5 municipal employees for every
1,000 inhabitants.

Municipal employees are better paid in San Jose

where they earn an average (mean) of $1,768 per year than in San Sal60
vador where $1,074 is the mean annual income.
Tables XXVIII and XXX above indicate the sources of revenue for
the two municipalities.

Several factors are immediately evident.

Both cities have very low revenues, total and per capita, by North
American standards, and San
Jose.

S~lvador

is considerably lower than San

Most of this difference is accounted for by the property tax

which generates half of San Jose's revenue and nothing in San Salvador.

Another factor, already mentioned, is the availability of park-
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ing meter revenue in San Jose.
ity of fines.

Closely tied to this is the productiv-

Fines, almost half of which are parking fines, provide

almost three percent of San Jose's revenue but only one-tenth of one
percent in San Salvador.
The difference in the level of central government support is obvious.

Less than one-tenth of one percent of San Salvador's income

comes from subsidies while San Jose receives almost four percent from
this source.

Moreover, the turnover of the property tax to the munic-

ipalities by the Costa Rican government can almost be regarded as a
61

massive subsidy.
Finally, it should be emphasized that San Jose's more careful
estimate of revenue from the various sources allows the preparation of
a more realistic budget.

Revenues due from a particular source may be

more accurately assessed and remedial action taken more quickly should
they drop unexplainedly below estimates.

This is not to suggest that

San Jose's monitoring and revenue collection practices are effective
and efficient.

Far from it--San Jose like other Costa Rican munici62

palities is inexcusably lax in the collection of user charges.

But

as woeful as the quality of revenue collection is, it is still better
than in San Salvador.
Meaningful comparison of the expenditure patterns of the two municipalities is rendered difficult by the different package of services each offers its citizens.

The most obvious differences are that

San Jose constructs and maintains roads while San Salvador does not,
and that San Salvador maintains a municipal police force whereas San
Jose has none.
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Nonetheless, a few useful comparisons may be made.

Both cities

spend about the same portion of their income on General Administration
and in safeguarding the health of their citizens.

Both are required

to transfer about ten percent of their funds to other agencies such as
school boards.
The largest single difference between the two is that while San
Jose puts almost one-fifth of its income into Capital Investment, less
than three percent of San Salvador's income is directed to new construction.

Interestingly enough, San Salvador, which does not build

or maintain roads, spends more of its revenues on Public Works than
San Jose, which does build and maintain roads.

Finally, Culture and

Economic and Social Services use up about 15 percent of San Jose's income while the closest comparable category in San Salvador, Community
Action, gets only three percent.

This is explained in large part by

the more centralized and activist role of FOCCO when compared to
DINADECO.

Municipal expenditure patterns, then, like so many other

facets of municipal activity in the two countries, are heavily influenced by the nature of national-municipal relations.
These relations are reflected, among other considerations, is
the relative standings of San Jos'e and San Salvador vis-a-vis de
63

Moraes' developmental paradigm.

De Moraes, it will be remembered,

classifies municipal tax systems as current, transitional and future.
Characteristics of the current system include utilization of patrimonial natural resources, taxes and charges on things and persons,
and imposition ad speciem.

Consequences of this system are a static

economy, deficient public services and a strong tendency to centrali-
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zation.
The next developmental stage he labeled transitional.

This step

is characterized by prevalence of taxes and user charges, income according to the concepts of increased rates and earmarking, some cases
of double imposition, charges as a function of capacity to contribute,
and imposition ad valorem.

De Moraes suggested the consequences of

moving to this stage would be augmentation of financial capacity, improvement in service delivery and a tendency to decentralization.

His

future stage is well beyond the reach of either San Jose or San Salvador and will not be considered further here.
One point de Moraes might profitably have included in his developmental scheme was administrative progress in tax collection from the
current hit-or-miss approach toward some future system characterized
by efficiency, equity and impossibility of evasion.

It may well be

that improved administration procedures could do more than any modification of the tax structure itself to aid the municipalities fiscally.

We see below some steps toward improving the nature of rev-

enue policies; no such steps in improving administration can be detected.

However brilliantly designed a revenue system may be, un-

collected tax monies cannot pay for any services.
In a very real sense, then, all the attempted municipal revenue
policymaking we have examined has been an effort to move from current
to transitional systems.

San Jos~'s parking meter law, for example,
64

did impose a tax or user charge
financial capacity.

and did augment the Municipality's

It also improved service delivery in two ways:

directly, through provision of more orderly parking arrangements, and
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indirectly, through provision of more money to the City Treasury to
pay for other services.
San Salvador's attempted tax reform was a broad front effort to
move from ad speciem to ad valorem levies and very specifically, to
make charges a function of capacity to contribute.

As de Moraes sug-

gested, some cases of double imposition would have resulted.
Nonetheless, both municipalities today have tax systems that
are classified as current.

In both cases, there remains a strong

tendency toward centralization.

We would have to disagree with

de Moraes, however, in his contention that this tendency is a consequence of the current tax system; rather, we submit, it is a contributing factor thereto.

This tendency, moreover, is not as strong in

San Jose as in San Salvador.

According to any of de Moraes' criteria,

San Jose is farther along the road to a transitional, hence better,
tax system than is San Salvador.
The greatest financial boon to San Jose in recent years has undoubtedly been the transfer of the real property tax.
ever, an act of the Central Government.

This was, how-

There is no evidence that

the Mllilicipality initiated any action to effect this transfer.
A major difference in style can be noted in practices, particularly intergovernmental fiscal relations, in Costa Rica and El Salvador.

In El Salvador the Central Government aims to keep the capi-

tal both politically and financially weak.

There are two proper

places for money to be concentrated, it feels--in its own hands or
in the private sector.

Costa Rica makes no such attempt to keep its

municipalities either politically impotent or destitute.

The Central
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Government has shown itself willing to provide the municipalities with
65

money.

Ultimately, however, it maintains control of this money.

Taxing capacity has not passed to the municipalities.
government does not keep San Jose broke.
to the contrary, financially dependent.

The Costa Rican

It does keep it, rhetoric
In the final analysis we must

question just how much, if any, difference these two styles actually
make to San Jose and San Salvador in their attempts to develop rational, adequate, equitable local government revenue systems.
This chapter, then, has examined the current practices and programs in the fields of municipal revenue and public housing provision
in San Salvador and San Jose.

Chapter VIII will consider the broader

nature of policymaking in these fields and relate this back to both
the political, economic, and social background factors and to our original hypotheses and models for analysis.
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CHAPTER VII NOTES
1. Costa Rica Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanism (INVU), El
INVU: Organizacibn, Objectivos, El Problema de Vivienda, Rea1~
zaciones Fisicas, El P1aneamiento Urbano, San Jos~, 1973, p. 3.
7

2. Costa Rica, Law Establishing the National Institute of Housing
and Urbanism, Article 6c.
3. Many banana growers on the Caribbean slopes abandoned their land
when Sigitoka and Panama disease blighted their crops. Unused
portions of large landholdings owned by multinational corporations are often taken over by squatters. The Colonization Institute (ITCO) has legalized this use and sometimes makes parcels
of land available to INVU for housing lots. Squatters have use
of the land and after successfully working it for a number of
years may get title to it. Many squatters, however, sell land to
which they have no title to North Americans, who are subsequently
dispossessed.
4. INVU, El INVU, p. 5.
5. INVU, Memoria 1972, San Jose, 1973, p. 31. Wynia, however, reports that 70 percent of INVU's clients were at least three months
behind on their mortgage payments in 1967 (Politics and Planners,
p.160).
6. INVU, Memoria 1972, p. 32.
7. Ibid., p. 28.
8. INVU, El INVU, p. 8.
9. In addition to INVU, other housing finance agencies are Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago (loans for rural housing construction
only), Banco Anglo Costarricense, Banco de Costa Rica, Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica, Instituto Nacional de Seguros, Banco Popular y de Desarollo Comuna1, and Caja Costarricense de Seguro
Social. Caja's policy changes unpredictably. Some years it makes
low-cost, subsidized loans fairly widely available, other years
it finances only housing for its own employees.
10. Unofficial estimate by various staff members of IVU.
11. El Salvador, Instituto de Vivienda Urbana (IVU), Memoria de
Actividades 1972-1973, San Salvador, 1973, unpaged.
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12. Oscar Rene Salegio, Analisis de la Situaci~n y del Plan Habitaciona1, San Salvador, IVU, 1968, pp. 47-80 passim.
13. Ibid., p. 70.
14. Sean M. Elliot, Financing Latin American Housing: Domestic Savings Mobilization and U.S. Assistance Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 144.
15. Salegio, ATIa1isis, p. 71.
16. A thorough perusal of the Salvadorean Constitution failed to identify the applicable articles.
17. San Salvador (El Salvador) La Prensa Gr~fica, 22 April 1974, p. 33.
18. IVU, Memoria 1972-1973.
19. Wynia, Politics and Planners, p. 162.
20. Salegio, Analisis, p. 79.
21. In the mid-1960s the Legislative Assembly recommended that IVU
build very low-cost rental units for tugurio dwellers. IVU ignored this recommendation as being totally unrealistic and fiscally irresponsible.
22. In one press release, for example, IVU announced construction of
60 single-family dwellings for teachers, nurses and employees in
the 27th of September Colony in Zacatecoluca at a total cost of
¢292,5l5. Each dwelling would contain 128 square meters of floor
space, more than twice the size of minimum housing units (La
Prensa Grafica, 28 January 1974, p. 44).
-23. Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo y Vivienda Minima (FUNDASAL),
El Carre ton de los Suenos, San Salvador, Moderna Noble &Asociados, 1973, p. 21.
~

~

24. Ibid., p. 25.
25. La Prensa Grafica, 19 April 1974, p. 7.
26. La Prensa Grafica, 26 February 1974, p. 3.
27. For exrunple, La Prensa Grafica, 4 April 1974, p. 23, carried an
article on the donation of ¢15,000 worth of electrical wiring
materials by Phelps Dodge of Central America.
28. It is an interesting anomaly that IVU, an agency of a secular
government, generally insists that its tenants be formally married, while FUNDASAL with a Roman Catholic priest as executive
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director, asks only that there be some evidence of stability in
the relationship.
29. Interview with Antonio Ibanez, 19 April 1974.
30. While exact figures are not available on the distribution of the
90 percent of the votes not cast for PCN they did not all go to

PDC. MNR received a larger share of the votes than its share in
the country as a whole. Much of the information in this section
was gathered in March, April and May, 1974 from informants who did
not care to be identified.
31. Time, 24 July 1978, p. 72.
32. For example, projections of the urban housing deficit in El Salvador for 1980 range from 140,000 to 697,500 units.
33. White, El Salvador, p. 247.
34. Jorge Ricardo Riba, La Vivienda en Centroamerica, San Salvador,

Secretaria General del Organizaci6n de Estados Centroamericanos,
1969, p. 35.
35. Riba's estimates of total deficit are very close to those in

UNICEF, Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales. Riba, however,
bases his projections on a growth rate of 3.8 percent for Costa
Rica and 3.3 percent for El Salvador when the most recent figures
show El Salvador at 3.9 percent and Costa Rica at around two percent. To be consistent his estimates for El Salvador would have
to be increased and those for Costa Rica decreased.
36. Koth, Housing in Latin America, p. 38.
37. Wynia, Politics and Planners, p. 178.
38. One set of optimistic figures, however, does suggest that the ac-

cumulated deficit is being successfully attacked in the San Jose
area. Antonini, Public Policy, p. 67, offers the following:
Total Housing Deficit
San Jose Province

San Jose Urban Area

1963
1970

25,938
19,200

9,729
5,958

Change
% change

-6,738
-26%

-3,751
-39%

39. There is a persistent rumor in San Salvador that the Central Gov-

ernment suppressed a report on the progress of public housing
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because it documented the embarrassing failure of IVU to even approach its goals.
40. Wynia, Politics and Planners, p. 180.
41. United Nations Office of Technical Cooperation, Evaluacion del
Desarol10 del Programa Sobre 1a ReorganizacionAdrninistrativa y
Financiera de R~gimen Municipal de Costa Rica, prepared by Arvids
Kalnins, San Jos~, 1972.
42. Municipality of San Salvador, Presupuesto Municipal 1973, San Salvador, 1973. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to budget
in this section are to this document.
43. See above, p. 222.
44. As detailed and rational as the Municipality's proposed tax reform was, it did not estimate total revenues from particular
sources either.
45. At the time PDC had adopted as a slogan: "So he who has more,
pays more and he who has less, pays less." CACI suggested that
the slogan should read: "Who pays his taxes on time has the
capacity to be taxed twice as heavily."
46. E1 Salvador, City of San Salvador Markets Law (1969).
47. San Salvador, with E1 Salvador acting through CONAPLAN as guarantor, borrowed $6,300,000 in 1969 to construct seven new municipal markets. The City Markets Law was passed primarily to make
this possible.
48. The City of Portland, by contrast, had in 1977-1978 a general
fund budget of $104,700,000 for a city of 400,000 population.
49. Costa Rica, Law Number 4340, 30 May 1969.
50. Costa Rica, Ministerio de Gobernaci~n, Nuestro Gobierno y El
Regimen Municipal, San Jose, Imprenta Naciona1, 1972, p. 24.
51. It can readily be seen why Vargas in "Adrninistracion del Sistema
Municipal" ascribes much of the strengthening of Costa Rican municipalities to Law 4340. See p. 34 above and Chapter II, notes
57-59.
52. Kalnins, Reorganizacion Adrninistrativa y Financiera del Regimen
Municipal en Costa Rica, San Jos~, Oficina de P1anificaci~n, 1968.
53. Ibid., p. 2.
54. Castro Carvajal, "Evaluacibn del Sistema Presupuestaria."
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55. Kalnins also criticized the 14-year 'gestation period' of the Urban Planning Law. See the discussion above, Chapter VI, of the-time required for the Parking Meter Law.
56. Kalnins, Reorganizacion Administrativa, p. 64.
57. The Comptroller General regularly condems individual municipalities for profligacy and other financial sins. On one day in 1973
for example, he declared 83 municipalities "financial disasters"
for cumulative overspending of some ¢300,000,000 (La Nacion, 21
November 1973, p. 4A).
58. It will be remembered that population figures are not gathered
for the municipalities but for the urban areas of the respective
provinces. For comparative purposes here San Salvador is assumed
to have a population of 500,000 and San Jose of 400,000. See
above, Chapter V, for actual head count figures for the urban
areas.
59. Both figures are obtained by adding departmental figures listed in
the respective budgets. The San Jose budget goes so far as to
list the name and salary of employees paid on a monthly or annual
basis.
60. These figures compare very favorably with general per capita income in the two countries. In 1970, per capita income was $469
in Costa Rica and $298 in El Salvador. See above, p. 174.
61. If the Salvadorean government followed the lead of Costa Rican

and gave the capital 29.4 percent of the property tax, San Salvador's share (1972) would amount to $1,074,570. Compare this to
the actual municipal revenue in 1973 of $3,075,194.
62. The Central Government's record in property tax collection is not
much better.
63. See above, pp. 90 and 91.
64. Again, it is still unresolved whether the parking fee is a tax or
a user charge.
65. IFAM, for example, may take off from the top of any municipality's
share of the property tax, any amount owed to IFAM by the municipality.

CHAPTER VI II

CONCLUSION
Our analysis has shown that for our first general premise the
null hypothesis held (p. 11).

That is, we found no significant dif-

ference in policymaking and policy outcomes between San Jos~ and San
Salvador in the fields of revenue raising and public provision of
housing.

We do not conclude from this, however, that the political,

social and economic background factors considered are irrelevant, only
that they need be more carefully examined.

Our focus in this section,

then, is on those background factors that are similar in the two cities.

We will attempt to determine the extent to which these similar

factors explain the similarities in policy.
The broadest and most important of the policy similarities are
the paucity of revenue decisionmaking and the absence of public housing decisionmaking in both San Salvador and San

Jos~.

As

this condi-

tion is more readily explained for housing, this will be done first.
Stated simply, in both cases the central government has reserved
to itself the provision of public housing.

It might be recalled here

that the Salvadorean Municipal Act did not mention housing provision
but Article 41-5 of the Costa Rican Municipal Code requires municipalities to "establish • . . housing programs of social interest" in
the urban areas.

Despite this statutory difference, the two coun-

tries' public housing practice closely parallel one another.

Major
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reasons for national rather than municipal (or cooperative nationalmunicipal) provision are iterated briefly below.
In the first place, housing in El Salvador and Costa Rica is not
primarily an urban problem.

Estimates of the exact size of the hous-

ing problem vary according to whose data and projections are used so
definitive figures are almost impossible to obtain.

Nonetheless,

there is considerable evidence that housing shortfall and substandard
housing, both in absolute numbers and as percentages, are greater in
the rural areas of Costa Rica and El Salvador than in the urban areas.
The national and rural dimensions of the need for the public provision
of housing therefore make it a concern of the central and not of the
municipal governments.

As shown in Chapter VII, however, most of the

housing provided by the national governments agencies, INVU and IVU,
is provided in urban areas.

The greatest concentration, moreover, is

in the metropolitan regions of the capital cities.
In most places and for most issues problem areas and political
boundaries do not coincide.

This is particularly true of urban hous-

ing problems in Costa Rica and El Salvador.

Unlike the United States

where urban housing decay and shortfall are associated generally with
the central city, the segments of the urban population most in need
of housing assistance in Central American are found on the fringes of
the city.

Thus the problem, and the housing-short population, spills

over from one jurisdiction into another.
least metropolitan in scope.

The problem is, then, at

Lacking both effective intermediate

government units and intermunicipal cooperation, the central governments are required almost by default to do whatever is to be done
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about the provision of publicly assisted housing in urban as well as
in rural areas.
Cost and financing considerations also lead to centralization.
The municipalities simply do not have the fiscal capacity (partly for
reasons offered in the section on revenue raising) to provide the
amounts of publicly assisted housing required within their own boundaries.

But for that matter neither do the national governments.

is necessary, therefore, to seek external financing.

It

External donors

may, in some cases, be willing to deal directly with the cities.
Lenders, however, provide the overwhelming bulk of external financing,
and external lenders, whether private financial institutions, other
nations, or international agencies, insist upon the partic.ipation of
the central governments.

Since national governments, then, are re-

quired to guarantee loans and back the municipalities with full faith
and credit, they simply go the one step further and do it themselves.
For the central governments to assume the ultimate financial responsibility for public housing without taking direct control, makes very
little sense to them.
Yet other reasons for direct central government provision of
housing lie in the fact that housing is not provided in a policy vacuum.

Housing policies are related to other national policies, and

often have aims and goals beyond the mere provision of shelter.

Na-

tional governments obviously need pay more attention to externalities,
positive and negative, than municipal cOlporations.

Housing policy is

logically connected to industrial location and may be used to discourage migration to larger cities and to encourage settlement
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elsewhere.

Construction of public housing may spur local building

materials industries and result in the creation or upgrading of marketable skills among the workers.
political purposes.

Moreover, housing may be used for

Among these are providing low-cost housing to

civil servants and building projects in areas where the populace seems
most ready and able to engage in disruptive and destabilizing political activity.

Surely it is in the best interests of the national gov-

ernments to control public housing and hence maximize their influence
over these various occurrences.
Nor have the municipalities given the central governments much
reason for faith in local abilities to set and administer housing policy.

In neither San Jose nor San Salvador is there any evidence of

past efforts to alleviate the housing problem.

Part of this inactiv-

ity is of course due to lack of funds but part of it must be attributed to lack of will or interest or both.

The head of the engineer-

ing department of IVU, speaking of public sector participation in the
provision of housing in urban El Salvador, states:
The Central Government has taken charge of all the public
housing programs and projects in the country and the participation at the level of the local Governments or Municipalities has been to date practically nil. l
In looking at revenue raising we will see that this suspicion of municipal administrative competence is not totally unjustified.
Yet another impetus to central government takeover of urban
housing provision is structural.

Both Costa Rica and EI Salvador

have used autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies of the national government to provide what are usually regarded as urban services.

Both

countries have such agencies in the field of electricity, water and
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sewage, public health aud urban planning, to mention a few.

Thus

there is a tradition, and a style, of national government involvement
in local services and the extrapolation to urban housing provision is
an easy and obvious one.
These, then, are some of the explanations for the central governments' assumption of urban public housing policy.

But what have

the central governments done in this field, what has been their policy
response?

In both cases the basic activity, as might be expected, has

been the establishment of a national authority.

In neither case does

this authority, INVU in Costa Rica and IVU in El Salvador, include a
representative fTom the municipal sector.
The various construction policies of these agencies have been
detailed above; they need not be elaborated further here.

One very

important policy decision as to clientele, however, deserves emphasis.
In both cases the conscious and overt decision has been made to provide housing primarily for the middle to lower-middle class, those
who can almost but not quite compete in the private housing market.
A variety of reasons is offered for this.
cial.

One is the purely finan-

Because this clientele can and presumably does pay their rent

and repay their loans, the drain on the treasury is less and in the
long run, more housing can be provided for the same amount of government money.

Another reason is that many of the people so helped are

relatively skilled personnel, e.g., nurses, teachers, technicians,
and the governments find it desirable to keep them as satisfied as
possible.
Yet another explanation may be found in the governments'
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conviction that providing housing alone to the very lowest classes
does as much harm as good.

The result of this would be a still unem-

ployed, poor, hungry, sick and generally hopeless population living in
a different place.

Experiences such as those with the superbloques in

Caracas indicate that this attitude may not be as callous as it first
seems.
In all of the above we have examined commonalities in urban public housing policy between El Salvador and Costa Rica.
a few differences, however.

There do exist

The partisan political animus between San

Salvador and the central government does not exist in Costa Rica.
This difference may be felt more than specified or explained in housing policies and practices.

In addition there exists in El Salvador a

private, non-profit agency known as the Salvadorean Foundation for Development and Minimum Housing (FUNDASAL).

This agency tackles the en-

tire problem area of 'marginality,' part of which is the provision of
housing.

FUNDASAL builds housing for sectors of the population unable

to meet the minimum income requirements of IVU.

It estimates that

more than 90 percent of the Salvadorean population can afford, on a
long-term basis, the housing it provides.

There is a good deal of

cooperation between FUNDASAL and the Municipality of San Salvador;
the Municipality, for example, donated the land upon which FUNDASAL
built one of its housing projects.

It should be noted that the cen-

tral government has also aided, with cash payments, FUNDASAL projects.
No parallel organization exists in Costa Rica.

The closest is

yet another autonomous agency of the national government, the Mixed
Institute for Social Aid (IMAS).

Like FUNDASAL it is headed up by a
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Catholic priest and receives some donations from the private sector.
lMAS does engage in limited slum clearance and housing rehabilitation.
Unlike FUNDASAL, lMAS is primarily a social work agency and has a predominantly nlral, not urban, orientation.

When approached by a poor

migrant to the city for help, lMAS' first inclination is to help him
back to the countryside; FUNDASAL's is to integrate him into the urban
community.

Also unlike FUNDASAL, lMAS has no ties to or cooperative

agreements with the municipality.

lMAS provices a minimal amount of

urban housing as a last resort; FUNDASAL sees the provision of housing
to the urban poor as a prime responsibility.
One further difference between Costa Rica and EI Salvador lies
in the institutional arrangement of their housing agencies.

INVU is

not a part of any Ministry but an "autonomous organism of the State,
endowed with its own funding, legal personality and administrative and
technical independence."

In El Salvador, on the other hand, IVU is

but one of five agencies under the Technical and Coordination Directorate of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanization.

INVU, then, is

free to pursue its aims with minimal control or interference from any
other agency.

IVU lacks this freedom but is more likely to find its

efforts integrated in and subsidiary to a broader overall national
plan for urban development.
Finally, the Municipality of San

Jos~

has begun a study of the

possibility of providing cheap housing for the lowest paid municipal
employees.

No such moves have been undertaken by San Salvador.

In furthering our study of housing policies, it might prove instructive to compare Costa Rica and El Salvador on each of the
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thirteen objectives suggested by Abrams (above, p. 101).
The first suggested objective is priority in housing for lowerincome families.
some extent.

Both governments' housing policies adhere to this to

For reasons stated above, briefly in this conclusion and

more fulling in the body of the paper, neither government concentrates
on housing for the lowest income families.

Costa Rica, however, aims

at a clientele whose poorest members have lower incomes than the poorest members of the target group in EI Salvador.
Opportunities for homeowners hip by low-income families at low
costs are provided for in both countries' policies.

Again, Costa Rica

tries to minimize the costs more than does EI Salvador.

Both coun-

tries concentrate more on housing ownership than on rental opportunities.
Choices of environment provided by government housing projects
are somewhat constrained in each of the two countries.

Both offer

choices in the 'stage-of-construction' realm--furnished houses, shells
2
and urbanized lots are available.
Not all types are available in all
projects however.

The important difference here is that some rental

housing is provided in EI Salvador, none in Costa Rica.
Both countries' housing policies include reasonable financing
policies.

EI Salvador provides financing for both single-family

dwellings and low-income condominiums.

Costa Rica makes financing

available for the purchase of government-assisted housing, paying off
high interest rate mortgages, purchase of building lots, and buying
land in cases where a homeowner has built his home or someone else's
property.
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Savings are encouraged within government housing policy in both
cases.

In El Salvador the government chooses to work through the pri-

vate sector with FNV aiding in the establishment of savings and loan
associations.
savings

The Costa Rican government has opted for building the

incentive~

and the facilitative

mechanism~

right into the

housing agency.
Subsidies are more difficult to compare
neither case can they be regarded as adequate.

cross-nationally~

but in

The central government

in El Salvador was asked to provide IVU with a guaranteed annual subsidy.

It refused.

The Costa Rican government, on the other

required by law to provide INVU with an annual subsidy.

is

hand~

its

However~

failure to honor this legal mandate has been mentioned above.

An in-

teresting point of comparison here is that the Salvadorean government
has provided a subsidy for the private FUNDASAL while the Costa Rican
government has made no such grant to a non-government agency.
A more effective building industry does not seem to have developed in either country.

Costa Rica has accepted whatever state of

technology exists in the private firms with which it contracts.
Salvador, on the other

hand~

El

has actively sought and encouraged exper-

imental proposals from its contractors and has originated and tested
some products in IVU's own material technology section.
has~

El Salvador

therefore, made more of an effort in this direction than has

Costa Rica but no effective results have been seen to date.
quently~

Conse-

in neither country has there been any significant reduction

in home construction costs due to government housing policy.
Placement of industry where a minimum of housing needs to be
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built is not a particularly relevant objective in either Costa Rica or
El Salvador.

Costa Rica has encouraged decentralization of industry

to a greater extent than El Salvador, but not by much.

There is lit-

erally nowhere in either country a labor intensive industry could locate with sufficient housing for its work force.

This, therefore, has

not been a prime factor for industrial location or housing policy in
either country.
Rehousing of squatters per se has not been a major priority of
housing policy in either case.

Neither Costa Rica

nOT

El Salvador

has adopted a policy of trying to move an entire colony of squatters
to government-assisted housing on a fixed schedule.

Squatter reset-

tlement has been carried out on a piecemeal basis and in neither country has it been an activity of the housing agency.
Little has been done to prevent squatting in either Costa Rica
or El Salvador.

This is the case despite a very different 'squatting

environment'; squatting is not a critical problem in Costa Rica
whereas it accounts for some two-thirds of the urban growth in El Salvador.

Moreover, squatting is no longer regarded as an unmixed evil.

Current thinking is that squatting is to be guided, not eliminated.
Formal housing cooperatives in the European tradition are unknown in the two Central American countries, and no government policies exist to foster them.

Cooperation in housing construction, how-

ever, is not unknown as overnight erection of large shantytowns demonstrates.

Salvadorean government housing policies encourage mutual

aid by tenants-to-be in the construction of some housing projects.
This practice was also tried by INVU in Costa Rica but was not found
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viable and has been abandoned.

Neither government has adopted rent

control policies.
In summary, then, the two national governments have a very similar set of housing policies.

In neither case do they regard housing

as a strictly urban policy area.

Costa Rican housing policy, set by

INVU, has its particular strengths in its wider financing provisions
and consideration of the needs of a lower-income group than in El Salvador.

This latter nation, however, is stronger in its provision of

low-income rental housing and its efforts to develop cheaper and more
efficient building materials.
With the unreliability of statistics and differences in program
operation, it is difficult to state that one country's set of policies
has been the more effective in the provision of shelter to those unable to compete in the private housing market.

It is even more diffi-

cult to tie a measure of success back to the set of political, social
and economic factors examined.

To the extent possible, however, this

has been done above in the body of the paper.
It is fair to say, nevertheless, that neither El Salvador nor
Costa Rica has made any substantial progress in housing its lowerclass urban population.

It is not fair to concentrate attention

solely on the shortcomings of national housing policy.

In the face of

severe financial and political difficulties, each nation has provided
some housing.

And, it should be repeated, Costa Rica and El Salvador

are far ahead of the other Central American nations in this respect.
Both countries' housing programs suffer from the twin handicaps
of scarce capital and surplus clientele.

Both countries found it
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necessary to seek external financial aid, and international funding
agencies, with some recent and partial exceptions, have subscribed to
the "devil take housing" theory:
According to this theory, housing merits low priority in national and international spending schemes because it is a durable form of investment requiring substantial outlays but paying off little per year. In addition, it generates no foreign
exchange, competes with industry and agriculture for capital,
draws off needed labor and materials, and may even be inflationary.3
Internally, problems with national housing programs have been primarily problems related to the overall national political milieux more
than to IVU or INVU shortcomings.
International funding agencies, it seems, expect little from
housing programs.

In fact, they seem to anticipate failure.

These

gloomy predictions tend to become self-fulfilling.
In the final analysis, as long as Costa Rica and El Salvador depend on external sources of capital, the attitudes and practices of
these outside actors are going to affect the public provision of urban
housing more than will any internal political, social or economic conditions or the nature of the policymaking process in the two countries
and any of their local governments.
In examining the revenue policies of San Jos~ and San Salvador,
similarities rather than differences come to the fore.

In both munic-

ipalities many initial attempts were made to broaden the revenue base;
few were successful.

Our difficulty in finding specific examples to

follow through the process is symptomatic of this.

In both cities,

the major snags came in the legitimation phase; that is, the problem
arose of obtaining needed central government approval.

The successful
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case examined, parking meters in San Jos~, indicates the complexities
in getting the national government's Vo.Bo. for a project of no apparent possible conflict with national policy.

In the unsuccessful case

looked at, overall tax reform in San Salvador, the same sorts of difficulty were found, exacerbated by the active and effective opposition
of the business community.
Where, then, and to what background factors do we look to explain the similarity in, and paucity of, municipal revenue policy?
Foremost among the political factors we must consider national control
of the municipal fisc.

In both cases we saw this manifested in two

overarching legal requirements:

one, that the municipal budget be ap-

proved by a central government agency; and two, that local taxes be
enacted as laws by the Legislative Assembly before coming into effect.
Both San Salvador and San Jose exhibited severe problems in the
administration of their revenue policies, particularly unsure and erratic tax collection, a condition not likely to encourage the national
governments to grant further taxing powers.
National governments in EI Salvador and Costa Rica have been
stable for over 25 years.

This has given them time to concern them-

selves with municipal problems; they have not had to devote large percentages of governmental energy imposing internal order.

As

a result

they may feel less inclined, and less compelled, to assign the municipalities more responsibilities and concomitant revenue sources.
Another relevant similarity is that of style in administrative
decentralization.

Certain services, local in nature, are viewed as

not appropriate for direct central government provision, yet are too
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expensive for the cities to handle.

Instead of providing revenues, or

at least enabling legislation for increased local revenue raising, the
governments create autonomous agencies.

With the provision of these

services thus out of the hands of local government, so allegedly, are
the needs for increased revenue.
In both countries, elections, contested by recognizable parties,
determine control of national and municipal governments.

Policy pre-

ferences of local government leaders, therefore, are not purely personal and idiosyncratic but are ideological as well as pragmatic.
Despite differences in partisan make-up of the municipal council,
both San Jose and San Salvador have sought changes in local revenue
policy.

Both have been rebuffed by their central governments.

Non-governmental groups have played a part in shaping local revenue policy in the two cities.
marily obstructionist.

In both cases this role has been pri-

And in both case these external actors have

met with success by intervening with the national government at the
legitimation stage of the process more than by influencing the local
government during the policy formulation phase.
Not all the similarities in background factors affecting the
similarity in policy output, however, are political; some are economic.

Perhaps the most important of these is the similarity we have

observed in national tax structures.
direct taxes.

Both concentrate heavily on in-

The failure of the central governments to make wide-

spread use of direct taxes may somehow lead to a reluctance to approve
additional local taxes which are for the most part direct.
General structures of the national economies, as measured by
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the structure of the Gross Domestic Product, parallel one another very
closely in Costa Rica and EI Salvador.

The same is true of the mix of

public and private economic activities in the generating of the gross
domestic products.

A direct link between these factors, however, and

the policy outcomes we have observed, does not lirnnediately suggest itself.
A further economic similarity is income distribution.

Since

groups of one income level tend to support increased municipal revenues (and expenditures) and those of another income level tend to oppose such increases, the similarity in income distribution may account
for the closely matched patterns--that is, the patterns of attempted
increases at the local level in both countries and the blocking of
these attempts at the national level.
Two demographic factors look very much alike in San Jose and San
Salvador--the age structure of the population and the numerical preponderance of women.

A link between these factors and the policy

statements of the municipal governments could be posited if it could
be shown that women and/or the dominant age groups held a consensus
opinion on the need for more municipal revenue, and that one or both
of these groups were especially active politically.

But there is no

such evidence, and thus nothing to support speculation as to the
existence of such a linkage.
This, then, is a brief listing of the background factors that
are similar in-the two polities and hence likely to lead to similarities in policy outputs.

But not all political, economic and social

conditions are this similar in the two countries.

Here we will
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consider briefly the ones that vary significantly, the ones we originally hypothesized would account for expected differences in policy.
Several of these characteristics are economic.

It was shown

above in the section on economic background factors that the Costa
Rican economy was growing faster, had a greater percentage of its
workforce in manufacturing, and a considerably lower unemployment
rate.

Per capita productivity was also higher in Costa Rica.

El Sal-

vador, it was noted, endured a much smaller rate of inflation.

None

of these major differences, however, led to the expected variation in
policy output, even in local government revenue raising where they
were expected to have the most influence.
Among the demographic and social dissimilarities we note the
greater
data are

urba~

population growth in El Salvador.

in~omplete

And, although the

and even suspect, this country shows a higher rate

of internal rural to urban migration.

Some differences in community

structure have also been examined.
Political diversities were expected to result in and explain the
largest part of our mlticipated variation in policy output.

One of

these diversities is the greater degree of openness of the Costa Rican
political system; though this openness is difficult to measure and
document, it is nonetheless very real.

Another is the divergence,

legislatively and administratively, between the two municipal government organizations.
The single set of political differences expected to generate the
most variety in policy product is the set of relationships between local and national governments.

Three aspects vary significantly.

In
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Salvador there are virtually no subsidies paid the local government in
San Salvador by the nation; in Costa Rica these subventions are considerable.

The Costa Rican government assigns a major and important,

if undefined, role in national development to local governments.
such posture is assumed by the Salvadorean government.

No

In Costa Rica

the same spectrum of political parties is found in the National Assembly as in the San Jose council.

In El Salvador the capital is pitted

in total partisan political opposition to the national government.
Nonetheless, San Jose has had as little success in obtaining national
approval for tax changes as has San Salvador.

We must conclude that

ultimately it makes no differences in this particular policy area
whether national government practice is to keep the city financially
dependent as in Costa Rica or politically weak as in EI Salvador.
Finally, the existence of a comprehensive plan for the development of metropolitan San Salvador was expected to have an effect on
policy in that municipality.

No such effect is in evidence, among

other reasons because the plan assigned local government no role in
the development process.
In our discussion of the current municipal tax systems of San
Jose and San Salvador we compared them not only with one
also with de Moraes' evolutionary model.

~~other

but

Having examined the policy-

making process, we note attempts on the part of both municipalities
to move closer to his developmental paradigm, attempts that have been
frustrated by the national governments.

San Jose continues to l1ave,

vis-a-vis de Moraes' criteria, a better tax system than San Salvador.
De Moraes' model, however, cannot be accepted uncritically.

It
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appears, for example, to confuse cause and effect in claiming a tendency to centralization as a consequence of the current municipal tax
system rather than a contributing factor thereto.

Nonetheless the

model does provide a useful summary of the present state of the art
and possible alternatives thereto, and remains a convenient backdrop
against which to make comparisons.
The policy products and the contributions of the various background factors thereto have been analyzed for San Jose and San Salvador.

It is appropriate at this point to offer some conclusions on

their policymaking structure.

It is particularly useful to compare

them against the tableau of Wynia's seven characteristics, to determine to what extent his national-level stereotypes in Central America
4

are mirrored at the local level.
Wynia's first characteristic is "paternalistic and often charismatic leadership juxtaposed with a lack of institutional, especially
constitutional, legitimacy."

This type of leadership is definitely

found in San Salvador; it is totally absent in San Jose.

Both munic-

ipal policymaking structures, however, possess institutional legitimacy.
Expanding political participation yet underrepresentation of
the masses is found in both cities.

Both, however, are trying to

broaden the base of mass participation.
these attempts vary significantly.

The motivating force behind

In Costa Rica the national govern-

ment has mandated the opening of the local political structure to community residents.

In San Salvador the municipality itself has tried

to encourage the participation of the hoi polloi, largely to provide
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votes and workers to aid UNO-CD national political aspirations.
The extensive patronage ascribed to administrative structures is
found in both cities, as are the intricate formal rules.

In neither

case, however, does there appear to be as widespread an informal disregard for these rules as is found at the national levels.

One char-

acteristic of the local administration deserving mention here is the
difficulty, in both cases, of attracting qualified personnel to fill
upper-level administrative and technical positions.
Obscured and obstructed communications within the public sector
/

are to be found in San Jose and San Salvador.

This is more true of

national-local government relations than of intra municipal contacts.
Each polity exhibits its own special case of this.

In San Jose the

breakdown seems to occur due more to weak information or functional
area rivalries between local government and autonomous agencies; in
San Salvador it is another manifestation of the political-ideological
conflict between the municipality and the national government.

Com-

munication problems between municipalities and the private sector in
both circumstances have two bases:

a tendency of the sectors to talk

past one another and a preference on the part of the private sector
for political contacts at the national rather than the local level.
Neither heavy reliance on the private sector for managing but
not financing economic growth nor slow economic growth and modernization due to structural and institutional rigidities have any direct
relevance to local policymaking.

Rigidities built into national gov-

ernment, however, do affect the localities.

There seems to be no less

of this in the one situation than in the other despite a rhetoric of
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flexibility on the part of the Costa Rican government.
Again, economic dependence on foreign markets and consequent
vulnerability to external economic and financial conditions do not impinge as directly upon the local as on the national policymaking
structures.

A closely related condition, however, is found in exter-

nal lending agency controls on the structure of public housing provision.

Since the rules promulgated by the external agencies are gen-

eral, there are no differences in their applicability between El Salvador and Costa Rica.
Wynia has suggested further that associated with the particular
Central American decisionmaking structure will be found one of two
kinds of policymaker--the overcautious, underinformed, hesitant incrementalist, and the utopian of infinite goodwill but minimal understanding of complex policy problems.

We did not find municipal policy-

makers in either city at these extremes.

We did find, however, the

policymakers in San .Jose to be more incremental and realistic in approach while those in San Salvador were somewhat more holistic, and
even idealistic.
In Chapter I it was suggested that we might expect to find a
'consensual elite' situation in San Salvador and a 'competitive mass'
5

in San Jose.

A 'consensual elite' structure is characterized by a

narrow distribution of political power among the citizens and a con6

vergence of political ideology among political leaders.

San Salvador

definitely exhibits a concentration of political power but does not
manifest any unity of ideology among political leaders, particularly
when the actual roles of economic notables and the national govern-
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ment in local politics are considered.

More accurately then, its

power structure should be labeled 'competitive elite.'

San Jos~ also

shows a divergence among ideologies of political leaders but in its
more open system, power is more widely dispersed among a larger proportion of the citizenry.

Our supposition as to a 'competitive mass'

in San Jos~, then, holds true but our expectation of a 'consensual
elite' in San Salvador does not.
Finally, it remains to comment briefly on the suitability of our
policymaking model.

It has worked.

Not only the policy approach but

our scheme in particular have proved compatible with comparative inquiry.

Our model is not, however, beyond needing improvement.
One modification that would improve its usefulness is the in-

clusion of a legitimation phase between adoption and application.

Ob-

viously we have not ignored legitimation in the sense of approval of
policy by the national government, but the inclusion of a formal legitimation stage in the model would serve two purposes.

First, it

would make the model more consistent with the reality of the policymaking process in the Central American republics, and likely elsewhere.

Second, it would alert other potential users of the model to

the importance of formal legitimation in the creation of municipal
policy.
Another necessary alteration to our model would provide for
cases where demands originate within the political system.

Tradition-

ally a major argument in policy analysis has been whether needs or demands entered the political system.

In response the individual ana-

lyst has simply shifted the boundaries of the formal political system
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backward or forward along the policy process stream.

This practice,

we have found, pr.)duces an inadequate model for comparative purposes.
A more complete model must allow for the inclusion of demands generated in the private sector and presented as such to the political system and also for demands generated within the political system.

This

is particularly true in those polities where government, local or
national, functions as patron.
TIle third improvement to our model would be to build in a mechanism to take cognizance of the roles played by informal actors.
Traditional models stress the boundaries of the political system, suggesting that after a certain stage in the process outsiders, those not
formally part of the system, take no further part in decisionmaking.
This is even less an accurate reflection of reality in Central America than in the 'developed' countries.

We emphasize again the role

played by private interests in the legitimation phase, a better model
would deal more directly with them.
We do not imply that the model usedin this study, modified as
above would be perfect.

Nonetheless it could provide a useful start-

ing point for those who would do further research in this field.
Hopefully, they can and will use it in search of more complete information and fuller explanations.
If our model, with some modifications, served us well, our basic
hypothesis did not.

We expected to find the differing sociopolitical

cultures, acting both directly and through the policymaking activities, leading to substantive differences in both process and product.
These differences in process and product did not materialize.

~7

A variety of possible explanations for this absence offer themselves.

The background factors chosen may, in fact, not affect signifi-

cantly the policy output -- or, they may affect the policy output
only in the Anglo-American situation and not in the Central Anlerican
cases.

We are not prepared to accept this radical an explantion

without further study.
The background factors may not influence policy and policymaking
in the chosen policy areas of public housing and municipal revenue but
may have an effect in other policy areas not examined.

Unfortunately

there are no known studies of this kind on other policy areas which could
either support or refute this contention.
It may be that one particular phase of the policymaking process,
the administration/application phase, is of such overarching importance
that similarities therein overwhelm more subtle differences due to
the differing background factors.
be two elements:

Of particular importance here might

the administrative structure itself, and the shortage

of qualified and motivated individuals serving in critical municipal
administration positions.

We suggest that this is very likely and

offer this particular hypothesis as a base for further examination.
Finally, there is a nagging suspicion that city size actually
plays a more important role than assigned it in this study.

There may

be some threshold size, e.g.,a population of 1,000,000, below which
our hypotheses do not hold but above which they can be verified.
lines of further research, therefore, suggest themselves.

Two

First, a

study along the lines of the current one could be carried out, but
with city size adopted as an independent variable.

Thus, for example,
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San Salvador might be compared with Caracas or Bogota.

Second, a sim-

ilar study could be conducted using two large cities with differing
social, economic, and political milieux.

Bogota or Caracas, for exam-

pIe, might be compared with Santiago or Buenos Aires.
As stated earlier, one important end of comparative research is
the discovery of empirical generalizations that can be verified and
eventually become part of an overall explanatory structure.
is one small step in that direction.

This study

Its results were not as ex-

pected, and some suggestions have been offered as to why this may be
so.

Possible modifications and directions for future research have

been recommended.
In conclusion, we do not regard studies such as this, in which
the initial hypotheses could not be proved, to be fruitless.

We main-

tain that political, economic, and social background factors do affect
the nature of both the policymaking process and the outputs therefrom.
It is confidently expected that further investigations of this type,
with the tools and approaches perhaps refined

a~ ~ugg~st~d

above, will

be able to verify these hypotheses and provide valid generalizations
as to the relations among environmental conditions, political structures and processes, and policy products both in Latin America in
particular and third world urban settings in general.
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CHAPTER VIII NOTES
1. Salegio, An'lisis, p. 57.

2. Or, more accurately, did offer this choice.
vides urbanized lots.

INVU no longer pro-

3. Wynia, Planners and Politics, p. 155.
4. See above, p. 20.
5. See above, p. 10.
6. Agger, Rulers and the Ruled, pp. 73-78 passim.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
SOURCES IN ENGLISH
Abrams, Charles. Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Ubanizing World.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964.
Agger, Robert E.; Goldrich, Daniel; and Swanson, Bert E. The Rulers
and the Ruled: Political Power and Impotence in American
Communities. New York: John Wiley &Sons, 1964.
Agor, Weston H., ed. Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and
Influence. Analyses for Nine Countries. New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1971.
Alba, Victor. Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the
People in Latin America. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968.
Anderson, Charles W. "Politics and Development Policy in Central
America, "Midwest Journal of PoliticalScience, 5 (1961), 332-350.
Anderson, Thomas P. Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971.
Antonini,Gustavo A., ed. Public Policy and Urbanization in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. Gainesville: University of Florida
Center for Latin American Studies, 1972.
Baker, Christopher E. ; Fernandez Pinto, Ronald; and Stone, Samuel
Zemurray. Municipal Government in Costa Rica: Its Characteristics
and Functions. San Jose: Associated Colleges of the Midwest Field
Program and University of Costa Rica School of Political Science,
1971.
Bauer,Raymond A., and Gergen, Kenneth J., eds.
Formation. New York: Free Press, 1968.

The Study of Policy

Bell, John Patrick. Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution. Latin
American Monograph 24. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1971.
Beyer, Glenn H.

Housing and Society.

Biesanz, John, and Biesanz, Mavis.
bia University Press, 1944.

New York:

MacMillan, 1965.

Costa Rican Life.

Blum, Walter J., and Kalven, Harry, Jr.

New York:

Colum-

The Uneasy Case for Progressive

331
Taxation.

Phoenix Books.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1963.

B1utstein, Howard I.; Betters, Elinor C.; Cobb, John, Jr.; Leonard,
Jonathan A.; and Townsend, Charles M. Area Handbook for E1 Salvador. Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1971.
Bodenheimer, Susanne. "The Social Democratic Ideology in Latin America: The Case of Costa Rica's Partido Liberaci<Sn Naciona1,"
Caribbean Studies, 10 (1971), 49-96.
Booth, John A. "A Replication: Modes of Political Participation in
Costa Rica," Western Political Quarterly, 29 (1976), 627-633.
Bowman, Mary Jean. "A Graphical Analysis of Personal Income Distribution in the United States," American Economic Review, 35 (1945),
607-628.
Breton, Albert. "A Theory of the Deman:! for Public Goods," Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, 32, (1966), 455-467.
Browning, David. E1 Salvador:
Clarendon Press, 1971.

Landscape and Society.

London.

Oxford:

Burnett, Ben G., and Johnson, Kenneth F. Political Forces in Latin
America: Dimensions of the Quest for Stability. 2nd ed. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1970.
Busey, James L. "Foundations of Political Contrast: Costa Rica and
Nicaragua," Western Political Quarterly, 11 (1958), 627-659.
York:

Latin American Political Institutions and Processes.
Random House, 1964.

Notes on Costa Rican Democracy.
Colorado Press, 1962.

Boulder:

New

University of

Castillo, Carlos M. Growth and Integration in Central America.
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

New

Chilcote, Ronald H., and Edelstein, Joel C. Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond. New York: Schenkman Publishing,
Inc. division of John Wiley &Sons, 1974.
Clark, James. "Environment, Process and Policy: A Reconsideration,"
American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 1172-1182.
Cornelius, Wayne A. "Urbanization and Political Demand Making: Political Participation f~ong the Migrant Poor in Latin American
Cities," American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 1125-1146,
Cuzan, Alfred G.

"Urban Resource Allocation and Policy Performance:

332
Center-Local Linkages in El Salvador and Costa Rica." Paper prepared for delivery to the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American
Society for Public Administration. Chicago, April 1-4, 1975.
Dawson, Richard E., and Robinson, James A. "Inter-Party Competition
Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States,"
Journal of Politics, 25 (1963), 265-289.
Denton, Charles F. Patterns of Costa Rican Politics.
and Bacon, 1971.
Dewey, John. The Public and Its Problems. Chicago:
n.d. Copyright Mrs. John Dewey, 1954.

Boston:

Allyn

Swallow Press,

Dickson, Thomas I. "The Contribution of the Inter-American Development
Bank to the Latin American Statistics Muddle," Inter - American
Economic Affairs, 28 (1974), 79-85.
Dror, Yehezke1. Public Policy Making Re-Examined.
Chandler Press, 1968.

San Francisco:

Dye, Thomas R. Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in
the American States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.
"Income Inequality and American State Politics," American
Political Science Review, 63 (1969(, 157-162.
Understanding Public Policy.
Prentice-Hall, 1972.

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:

Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis.
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
A Systems Analysis of Political Life.
1965.

&Sons,

Englewood Cliffs,

New York:

John Wiley

Ebe1, Roland H. "Governing the City State: Notes on the Politics of
the Small Latin American Countries," Journal of Inter-American
Studies and World Affairs, 14 (1972), 325-346 .
. "The Decision-Making Process in San Salvador," in Rabinovitz,
----=:"Francine, F., and Trueblood, Felicity M., eds. Latin American
Urban Research Volume One. Beverly Hills, California: Sage
Publications, 1971, 189-213.
Edwards, Harold T. "Power Structure and Its Communication Behavior in
San Jose, Costa Rica," Journal of Inter-American Studies, 9 (1967),
236-247.
Elliott, Sean M. Financing Latin American Housing: Domestic Savings
Mobilization and U.S. Assistance Policy. New York: Frederick
I'

•

333
A. Praeger, 1968.
Eulau, Heinz. Policy Making in American Cities: Comparisons in a
Quasi-Longitudinal, Quasi-Experimental Design. General Learning
Corporation Monograph 3002VOO, 1971.

---=--, and Eyestone, Robert. "Policy Maps of City Councils and
Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," American Political
Science Review, 62 (1968), 124-143.
Field, Arthur J., cd. City and Country in the Third World: Issues
in the Modernization of Latin America. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Schenkman Publishing, 1970.
Frankenhoff, C.A. "Low Cost Housing in a Latin Econo!!!y," Intf"TAmerican Economic Affairs, 17 (1964), 79-86.
Fried, Joseph P.
ers, 1971.

Housing Crisis U.S.A.

New York: Praeger Publish-

Friedman, John, and Alonso, William, eds. Regional Development and
Planning: A Reader. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964.
Froman, Lewis A., Jr. "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities,"
Journal of Politics, 29 (1967), 94-108.
Gibson, Jeffry Royle. A Deomgraphic Analysis of Urbanization: Evolution of a System of Cities in Honduras, El Salvador and Costa
Rica. Latin American Studies Dissertation Series 20. Ithaca:
Cornell University, 1970.
Gini, Corrado. "Indici di concentrazione e di dipendenza, "Biblioteca dell' Economista) 5a serie, 20 (1922), 39-40.
Goldrich, Daniel. "Peasants' Sons in City Schools: An Inquiry into
the Politics of Urbanization in Panama and Costa Rica," Human
Organization, 23 (1964), 328-333.
Gordon, Wendell C. The Political Economy of Latin America.
Columbia University Press, 1965.
Haar, Charles M. "Latin America'S Troubled Cities,"
41, (1963), 536-549.

New York:

Foreign Affair.:;

Hanna, William John. "Comparati ve Urban Politics," Journal of Comparative Administration, 4 (1972), 265-278.
Haveman, Robert H. The Economics of the Public Sector.
John Wiley &Sons, 1970.

New York:

, and Margolis, Julius, eds. Public Expenditures and Policy
----:-Analysis. Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970.

334
Hofferbert, Richard I., and Sharkansky, Ira, eds. State and Urban
Politics: Readings in Comparative Public Policy. Boston: Little, Brown &Company, 1971.
Hoos, Ida R. Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique.
eley: University of California Press, 1972.

Berk-

Humes, Samuel, and Martin, Eileen. The Structure of Local Government:
A Comparative Survey of 81 Countries. The Hague: International
Union of Local Authorities, 1969.
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies.
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

New

Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems. El Salvador
Election Factbook, March 5, 1967. Washington, D.C.: Operations
and Policy Research, Inc., 1967.
International Union of Local Authorities. Urbanization in Developing
Countries: Report of a Symposium held in December 1967 at Noordwijk, Netherlands. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
Jacob, Herbert, and Lipsky, Michael. "Outputs, Structure and Power:
An Assessment of Change in the Study of State and Local Politics,"
Journal of Politics, 30, (1968), 510-538.
Jones, Charles O. An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy.
mont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1970.

Bel-

"State and Local Policy Analysis: A Review of Progress," in
Political Science and State and Local Government. Washington, D.C.:
American Political Science Association, 1973, 27-54.
Kantor, Harry. Patterns of Politics and Political Systems in Latin
America. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.
Kaufman, Clifford. "Urban Structure and Urban Politics in Latin America," Journal of Comparative Administration, 4 (1972), 343-364.
"A Rejoinderto Joan Nelson," Journal of Comparative Administration, 4 (1972), 373-379.
Kennedy, Paul P. The Middle Beat: A Correspondent's View of Mexico,
Guatemala and El Salvador. New York: Teachers College Press of
Columbia University, 1971.
Koth, Marcia N.; Silva, Julio A.; and Dietz, G.H. Housing in Latin
America. Inter-American Program in Civil Engineering Research
Report R64-04. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964.
Kraemer, Kenneth L. Policy Analysis in Local Government. Washington,
D.C.: International City Management Association, 1973.

335
Lasswell, Harold D. The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis. College Park: University of Maryland Bureau
of Governmental Research, 1956. Copied at Ann Arbor, Michigan
by University Microfilm, 1972.
Leontief, Wassily. "Theoretical Assumptions and Nonobserved Facts,"
American Economic Review, 61, (1971), 1-12.
Lieuwen, Edwin. Arms and Politics in Latin America. Rev. ed. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations,
1961.
Lineberry, Robert L., and Sharkansky, Ira. Urban Politics and Public
Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Lorenz, M.C. "Methods of Measuring the Concentration of Wealth,"
Publications of the American Statistical Association, 9 (1905),
209-219.
Lowi, Theodore. "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and
Political Theory," World Politics, 16 (1964), 27-44.
Lundberg, Donald E.
Gr~fica,1968 .

Costa Rica.

2nd ed.

San Jose, Costa Rica:

Casa

Martz, John D., ed. The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
"Costa Rican Electoral Trends 1953-1966," Western Political
Quarterly, 20 (1967), 888-909.
Mayer, Lawrence M. Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological
Survey. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1972.
Meadows, Paul, and Mizruchi, Ephraim H., eds. Urbanism, Urbanization,
and Change: Comparative Perspectives. Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-WeSley Publishing, 1969.
Mehden, Fred R. von den.
Cliffs, New Jersey:

Comparative Political Violence.
Prentice-Hall, 1972.

Englewood

Merritt, Richard L. Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970.
Mitchell, William E., and Walter, Ingo, eds.
New York: Ronald Press, 1970.

State and Local Finance.

Musgrave, Richard A. The Theory of Public Finance:
Economy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.

A Study in Public

, and Peacock, Alan T., eds. Classics in the Theory of Public
Finance. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Copyright International Economics Association, 1958.

----=-:-

336
Needler, Martin C. Latin American Politics in Perspective.
D. Van Nostrand, 1963.
, ed. Political Systems of Latin America.
Nostrand, 1964.

---:-:--

Princeton:

Princeton: D. Van

, "The Latin American Military: Predatory Reactionaries or
Modernizing Patriots," Journal of Inter-American Studies, 11
(1969), 237-244.

--~-

Nelson, Joan. "The Search for Useful Hypotheses," Journal of Comparative Administration, 4 (1972), 365-371.
Nelson, Michael. The Development of Tropical Lands: Policy Issues in
Latin America. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press for
Resources for the Future, 1973.
Netzer, Dick. Economics and Urban Problems:
tions. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

Diagnoses and Prescrip-

Pan American Union. Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica 1949
(As Amended). Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1965.
Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador 1962.
D.C.: Pan ~~erican Union, 1966.
Paton, Alan. Cry the Beloved Country.
guin Books, 1972.

Washington,

Harmondsworth, England:

Payne, Geoffrey K. Urban Housing in the Third World.
& Kegan Paul, 1976.

London:

PenRoutledge

Petras, James F., and LaPorte, Robert J. Cultivating Revolutions:
United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America. Vintage
Books. New York: Random House, 1973.

The

Prest, Alan Richmond. Public Finance in Underdeveloped Countries. 2nd
ed. New York: Halstead Press division of John Wiley &Sons, 1972.
Rabinowitz, Francine F., and Trueblood, Felicity M., eds. Latin \merican Urban Research Volume One. Beverly Hills, California: Sage
Publications, 1971.
Rakoff, Stuart H., and Schaefer, Guenther F. "Politics, Policy and
Political Science: Theoretical Alternatives. "
Politics aild
Society, 1 (1970), 51-77.
Ranney, Austin, ed. Political Science and Public Policy.
Markham Publishing, 1968.

Chicago:

Ray, Talton F. The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela.
University of California Press, 1969.

BeJ'keley:

337
Raynolds, David R. Rapid Development in Small Economies: The Example
of El Salvador. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
Reuber, Grant L. Private Foreign Investment in Development. Oxford:
Clarendon Press forthe Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 1973.
Riker, William. A Theory of Political Coalitions.
University Press, 1962.

New Haven:

Yale

Rosenthal, Donald B. "Local Power and Comparative Politics: Notes
Toward a Study of Comparative Local Politics." Paper prepared
for delivery at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 5-9, 1972.
Ruddle, Kenneth R., and Gillette, Philip, eds. Latin American Political Statistics. Supplement to Statistical Abstract of Latin
America 1972. Los Angeles: University of California Latin American Center, 1973.
Rycroft, W. Stanley, and Clenuner, Myrtle M. A Study of Urbanization
in Latin America. New York: Office for Research, Commission on
Ecumenical Missions and Relations, the United Presbyterian Church
in the U.S.A., 1963.
Salisbury, Robert H. "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for
Theories and Roles," in Ranney, Austin, ed. Political Science
and Public Policy. Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1968, 151-175.
---=-0-' and Heinz, John. "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications." Paper prepared for presentation at the
1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Assocation,
Washington, D.C., September 2-7, 1968.

Settlement Study Center. Conference Papers: Rehovot Conference on
Urbanization in Developing Countries. Rehovot, Israel: 1971.
Sharkansky, Ira. "Economic Development Regionalism and State Political Systems," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (1968),
41-61.
,ed. Policy Analysis in Political Science.
Publishing, 1970.

--~:-

Chicago:

Markham

Sherwood, Frank P. Institutionalizing the Grass Roots in Brazil: A
Study in Comparative Local Government. San Francisco: Chandler
Press, 1967.
Singer, Neil M.
pany, 1972.

Public Microeconomics.

Boston:

Little, Brown

& Com-

Smith, Thomas B. "The Study of Policymaking in Developing Nations,"
Policy Studies Journal, 1 (1973), 244-249.

338
Stallings, Barbara. Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America.
Professional Papers in Comparative Politics Volume 3. Beverly
Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972.
Strickon, Arnold, and Greenfield, Sidney M., eds. Structure and Process in Latin America: Patronage, Clientage and Power Systems.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972.
Taggart, Robert, III. Low Income Housing:
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970.

A Critique of Federal Aid.

Taylor, Charles Lewis, and Hudson, Michael C. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. 2nd ed. New York and London: Yale
University Press, 1972.
Time, 24 July 1978.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
tive Asp~~~_s. __ .()_~_.!1_r:_~~1:1~zat~o:n. CST/TAO/M/Sl), 1970.

Administra-

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. Economic Survey
of Latin America 1971. CE/CN/12/93S/Rev. 1), 1973.
Uphoff, Norman T., and Ilchman, Warren F., eds. The Political Economy
of Development: Theoretical and Empirical Contributions. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972.
Violich, Francis, and Astica, Juan B. Community Development and the
Urban Planning Process in Latin America. Latin American Studies
Series Volume 17. Los Angeles: University of California Latin
American Center, 1967.
Wade, L.L., and Curry, R.L. Jr. A Logic of Public Policy.
California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1970.
Wagner, Richard E.
1973.

The Public Economy.

Chicago:

Belmont,

Markham Publishing,

Wallich, Henry C., and Adler, John H. Public Finance in a Developing
Country: El Salvador -- A Case Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19S1.
Walsh, Vivian Charles. Introduction to Contemporary Microeconomics.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.
Watkin, Virginia C. Taxes and Tax Harmonization in Central America.
Cambridge: Harvard University Law School, 1967.
White, Alastair.

El Salvador.

New York:

Praeger Publishers, 1973.

Wickwar, W. Hardy. The Political Theory of Local Government.
bia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970.

Colum-

339
Williams, Edward J. Latin American Christian Democratic Parties.
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967.
Williamson, Robert C. "Some Variables of Middle and Lower Class in Two
Central American Cities," Social Forces, 41 (1962), 195-207.
"Some Factors in Urbanism in a Quasi-Rural Setting: San
Salvador and San Jose," Sociology and Social Research, 47 (1963),
187-200.
Wynia, Gary Wayne. "Policy and Bureaucracy in Central America: A
Comparative Study." Ph.D. dissertation, University of WisconsinMadison, 1970.
"Political Participation and Development Policy Making:
Latitudes and Disciplines in Five Central American Systems."
Paper prepared for delivery at the MUCIA Conferences on Requirements and Consequences of Political Participation for Development
Policies, Center for Continuing Education, University of Chicago,
December 5 and 6, 1970.
Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Central America. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972.
SOURCES IN SPANISH
Government Documents --Costa Rica
Banco Central de Costa Rica. Cifras de Cuentas Nacionales de Costa
Rica. (EE/2307iELB:HBL:ebg/19 June 1973/300). San .]os~, 1973.
Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. A~untes Para el Estudio de Uno
de los Aspectos de la Estratificaci n Social en Costa Rica. San
Jos>e, 1969.
Costa Rica Comision Nacional de Divisibn Territorial. Divisibn Territorial Administrativa de la Republica de Costa Rica. Edicibn
provisional. San Jos~: Imprenta Nacional, 1972.
~

Costa Rica Contralorla General de la Republica.
No.7, 1972; No.8, 1972; No.9, 1973. San

~

Boletin Contralor.
Jos~.

Manual Para Establecer, Formular y Presentar el Presupuesto
por Pro!>rames y Acti vidades en las Municipalidades de Costa___ .B.tc~.
San Jose, 1970.
Memoria Anua1 1972.

San Jose, 1973.

Costa Rica Direcci6n General de Estadlsticas y Censos. Indice de Pre- /
cios al por Menor. Monthly Journal 1962 - December 1972. San Jose.

340
Principa1es Hechos Vita1es Ocurridos en Costa Rica
San Jose~ 1972.
____~_. Regortes Trimestra1es.
San Jose.

1961-1971.

Quarterly April 1965-January 1973.

Preliminary Data, 1973 National Census.
printouts.

Unpublished computer

Costa Rica Imprenta Naciona1. La Gaceta -- Diario Oficia1.
Various Issues. San Jose.

Daily

Costa Rica Instituto de Fomento y Asesorla Municipal (IFAM). Ctdigo
Municipal y Ley de Organizacibn y Funcionamiento del Instituto
de Fomento y Asesorfa Municipal. San Jose: Imprenta Naciona1,
1972.
Federacibn Interamericana de Instituciones de Cr{dito y Asesoria Municipal. San Jos?, 1973.
Fi1osofia, Objectivos )' Programas de Trabajo.

~

San Jose,

1971.
anos.

Manual de Ca1cu10 y Cobro de las Tasas por Servicios UrbSan Jos~, 1973.
Manual de Contabi1idad.

/

San Jose, 1972.

Manual y Cata1ogo de Cuentas Para e1 Sistema de Contabi1idad
de 1as~Unicipa1idades de Costa Rica. San Jos€, 1973.
Presupesto por Programes Para e1
Informa.

/

Ana 1974. San Jose, 1973.

Monthly December 1971-March 1974.

Costa Rica Instituto Naciona1 de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU).
Reso1var Su Problema de Vivienda. San Jos~, 1957.

Como

E1 INVU: Organizaci6n, Objectivos, E1 Problema de Vivienda,
Rea1izaciones Fisicas, E1 Planamiento Urbano. San Jos~, 1973.
Ley Organica Instituto Naciona1 de Vivienda y Urbanismo.
(no. 1788 of 24 August, 1954) San Jos€: 1954.
Ley de P1anificaci~n Urbana.
San Jos€, 1969.

(No. 4240 of 15 November 1968)

____~_/ Proyecto de Ley Para Reserva de Terrenos en Hati110.
Jose, 1957.
Sistema de Ahorro y Prestamo.

/

San Jose, 1972.

San

341
Costa Rica Ministerio de Gobernaci~n. Nuestro Gobierno y E1 R€gimen
Municipal. San Jos~: Imprenta Naciona1, 1972.
/'

Costa Rica Ministerio de Hacienda. Ley de Reforma Tribt:taria.
4961 of 10 March 1972). San Jos~, 1972.

(No.

Costa Rica Oficina de P1anificaci~n. Guia de Servicio~: a1 Ciudadano.
San Jose": Escue1a Superior de Administraci'6'n Pub1i.ca America
Central, 1966.
Informe de Labores.

Annual 1968-1972.

/

San Jose.

Previsiones de Desaro110 Econ~ico y Socia: de Costa Rica
y Planes del Sector Publico Para 1969-1972. San Jose, 1969.
Costa Rica Tribunal S~remo de Elecciones. Computo de Votos y Declaratorias de E1eccion Para Presidente y VicepresiJentes, Diputados,
a la Asemblea Legislativa, Regidores y Sindicos Municipa1es.
Elections of 1962, 1966, 1970 and 1974. San Jose.
Instituto Brasileiro de Administra~ao Municipal. Sistema de P1anificaci~n Urbana y Regional. Informe Final. San Jos~:
Instjtuto de
Formento y Asesoria Municipal, 1973.
Kalnins, Arvids. Reorganizaci~n Administrativa y Financeria del R~g
imen Municipal de Costa Rica. San Jose: Officina de Planificacion, 1968.
Tributos Municipales Costarricenses: :\n~lisis Cri tico y
Perspectivas. Serie Documentos Municipales:- San Joie: Instituto de Fomento y Asesorfa Municipal, 1972.
, and Bogantes Hildago, Gerardo. Reorg nizacion de 1a Estruc---:-tu-r-a del Gobierno Local de Costa Rica-.-S;n Jos-e: Oficina de
Planificact6n, 1969.
Murilla, Mauro. "Principios Generales de 1a Competencia Municipal,"
Revista de 1a Contra1orla General de 1a Repbblica 14 (1972),
59-61.
San Jose-, Municipalidad del Canton Central de. Contabilidad de Presupuestos Municipa1idades y Concejos de Distritos. San Jos€:
Imprenta Nacional, 1965.
Licitaci6n Publica No. 22-70.

./

San Jose, 26 October 1970.

Presupuesto Ordinario por Programas y Actividades Ejercicio
Economico del Ano 1974. San Jos€, 1973.
Unpublished minutes of various council meetings, 1955-1973.

342
Government Documents --- El Salvador
Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador.
1969-March 1974. San Salvador.

Comit~ Institucional.

Revista Mensual.

January

Diagnostico y Prognostico Habitacional de la
San Salvador, 1971.

Rep~blica de El Salvador.

Consejo Nacional de Planificaci~n y Coordinacion Economica. Indicadores Economicos y Sociales. Quarterly April 1970-April 1974.
San Aalvador: Casa Presidencial.
El Salvador Direcci~n General de Estadisticas y Censos.
Estad1stico. Annual 1961-1973. San Salvador.
BOletln Estadlstico.
San Salvador.

~~uario

Quarterly April 1969-January 1974.

Censos Nacionales de 1971.

San Salvador, June 1972.

El Salvador en Graficas 1973.

San Salvador, 1973.

Encuesta de Ingresos y Gatos Familiares. (Familias de Ingresos Menores de Seiscientos Colones) Area Metropolitana. San
Salvador, 1972.
Proyecciones de Poblaci~ 1961-1981.

San Salvador, 1964.

El Salvador Instituto de Vivienda Urbana (IVU). Ley de Creacibn del
Instituto de Vivienda Urbana. Decree No. III of 29 December
1950. San Salvador, 1951.
1973.

Memoria de Actividades.
San Salvador.

Annually 1958, 1961-1967, 1972,

El Salvador METROPLAN. Estudios Sobre los Tipos de Viviendas Predominantes en la Ciudad de San Salvador y Sus Alrededores. San
Salvador, 1968.
El Salvador Ministerior del Interior.
issues. San Salvador.

Diario Oficial.

Ley de la Financiera Municipal.
ber, 1966. San Salvador, 1966.

Daily.

Decree No. 68 of 1 Septem-

Ley de Mercados de la Ciudad de San Salvador.
312 of 27 April 1969. San Salvador, 1969.

Decree No_

Ley del Ramo Municipal (Con sus Reformas hasta 1971).
Salvador: Imprenta Nacional, 1971.
Ley del R(gimen Politico.

Various

San

San Salvador: Imprenta Nacional,

343
1970.
El Salvador Ministerio de Obras Publicas. San Salvador:
arollo Municipal. San Salvador, (1973).

Plan de Des-

Salegio, Oscar Rene. Analisis de la Situacion y del Plan Habitacional
de El Salvador. San Salvador: Instituto de Vivienda Urbana,
1968.
San Salvador, Municipalidad de.
vador, 1973.

Presupuesto Municipal 1973.

San Sal-

Other Sources in Spanish
Arias Sanchez, Ocsar. Grupos de Presion en Costa Rica.
Editorial Costa Rica, 1971.
Banco Interamericano de Desarollo.
D.C., 1967.

El BID Y la Vivienda.

San Jos~:
Washington,

Reunion Sobre Financiamento Municipal en Latinoamerica.
Proceedings of meeting held in Washington, D.C. January 23-26,
1966. Three volumes. Washington, D.C., 1966.
Barahona Herrera, Rodrigo. "Organizaci'On, financiamento y administrciDn de Instituciones Nacionales de Crfdito Para los Gobiernos
Locales." Unpublished study for the Department of Public Administration of the Division of Technical Assistance of the United
Nations. San Jose, 1967, mimeographed.
Barbosa Roca, Carlos. Contabilidad Publica y OrganizacionAdministrativa. Costa Rican National Course for Administrators. San Jose:
1971.
/

Brenes Villar, Carlos Roberto. "Aspectos Historicas Juridicos del Regimen Municipal Costarricense." Graduating thesis, Faculty of
Economics and Social Sciences, University of Costa Rica. San
Jose, 1970.
Cabezas Masses, Ramiro. Elementos de Administraci~n y politica Tributaria Para Gobiernos Municipales. Caracas: Fondo Editorial
Com1fu, 1970.
Caplan, Benedicto. Fianzas Municipales. CICAP-OEA Project 214. San
Jos(: Centro Interamericano de Capacitacion en Administracion
Publica, 1971.
Carazo Odio, Rodrigo. "Exposicion a III Congreso Nacional de Municipalidades e Costa Rica," Revista Municipal Interamericana, 8
(1958), 62-64.

344
Cardona Guti~rrez, Ramiro, ed. Migracion y Desarollo Urbano. Proceedings of the Second National Seminar on Urbanization held in BogotlMay 15-18, 1969. Bogota: Divisi6n de Estudios de Poblacion
de la Associacion Columbiana de Facultades de Medicina, 1970.
Castro Carvaj aI, Jos-e Manuel. "Evaluacibn de Sistema Presupuestario
de Costa Rica." Graduating thesis, Faculty of Economics and
Social Sciences, University of Costa Rica. San Jose, 1969.
Castro L., Manuel Angel. "Normas Tributarias del CO'digo ~funicipal y
Sus Relaciones con el Nuevo Cbdigo Tributario," Revista de Ciencias Jurldicas, 20 (1972), 57-62.
Centro Interamericano de Adrninistradores Tributarios. Documentos e
Informes del I Seminario T~cnico Sobre Auditoria Tributaria.
Meeting held 25 January-2February 1969 in San Jos(. San Jos~,
1969.
"..-

Inforrne del Seminario Regional Sobre Politica Tributaria:
San Jose~ Costa Rica, 6-10 August 1973. San Jose: Instituto
Centroamericano de Administraci6n Publica, 1973.
Chavez Mena, Fidel. "Organizacibn Municipal." Doctoral thesis, Faculty
of Jurisprudence and Social Sciences, University of El Salvador.
San Salvador, 1966.
"La Migracion Interna," Ateneo, 260 (1969), 62-77.
Escuela Superior de Administracibn Publica Am{rica Central. Estado
de la Opinion Publica de Costa Rica Sobre el Gobierno Municipal.
Serie Trabajos de los Alumnos No. 15. San Jos~, 1959.
. Inforrne de Serninario Sobre un Estudio Comparativo de Con-----c-ep-tos y Terminos Aplicables al R~Municipal en Centroarnerica. Serie Informes de Seminarios No. 3 San Jose, 1960.
Estudio Comparativo de Sistemas Tributarios de los Paises
Centroamericanos. Serie..- Economia y Fianzas No. 416. (ESAPAC/
EXT/014/200/66) San Jose, 1966.
Fundacibn Salvadorena de Desarollo y Vivienda Minima. El Carret6n de
los Suenos. San Salvador: Moderna Noble &Asociados, 1973.
Garcia Vargas, Gonzalo. "Control Econbmico Fianciero de las Municipales Costarricenses." Graduating thesis, Faculty of Economics
and Social Sciences, University of Costa Rica. San Jos(, 1966.
Garro, Joaquin. Veinte Ahos de Historia Chica. (Notas Para una Historia po11tica Costarricense). San Jose: Imprenta Vargas, 1968.
Gomez B., Miguel. Inforrna de la Encuesta de Fecundidad en el Area
Metropoli tana. San Jost: Universidad de Costa Rica--Instituto

345
Centroamericano de Estaalstica, 1968.
Harth Deneke, Alberto. "1954-1973: 20 ATIos de Planes Para San Salvador," Revista Interamericano de P1anificacion, 7 (1973), 64-76.
Heredero Higueras, Manuel. Las Estructuras de Organizacibn de 1a
Administraci6n Urbanistica. Madrid: Escue1a Naciona1 de 1a
Administraci6n Public, 1968.
Instituto Centroamerican de Administraci~n Publica. Estructura y
Administracion Tributaria de America Central. San Jos~, 1968.
Instituto Centroamericano de Estaalstica. Tab1as de Vida de Costa
Rica 1962-1964. Serie Economia y Estad1stica No. 24. San Jose:
Universidad de Costa Rica, 1967.
Jimenez, Mario Alberto. Desarollo Constitucional de Costa Rica.
ed. San Jos~: Editorial Costa Rica, 1973.
Jimenez Castro, Wilburg. Migraciones Internas en Costa Rica.
ton, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1956.

2nd

Washing-

Lope-Bello, Nelson Geigel. Autonomia Municipal y Urbanismo. Caracas:
Universidad Simon Bolivar Instituto de Estudios Regionales y Urbanos, 1972.
Martinez Calvo de Angel~, Olga. "Problemas Socio-Economicos Que Afectan al Peon de la Municipalidad de San Jose." Graduating thesis,
School of Social Service, University of Costa Rica. San Jost,
1972 .
Meza Araya, Josf Rafael. "La Potestad Reglamentaria Municipal." Graduating thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Costa Rica. San
/
Jose, 1972.
Montero Umana, Lilia Maria. "Evoluci6'n del Sistema Tributaria de Costa
Rica y Artalisis Economico de Algunos Impuestos al Consumo Interno."
Graduating thesis, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Costa Rica, San Jose: 1972.
Moraes Barreto, Joao Luiz de. "En Busca de una Teoria de Reforma Tributaria Municipal en Ame-rica Latina," Revista de Ciencias Jurldicas, 20 (1972), 105-114.
Murillo, Mauro. "ParticipaciO"n de los Mun'icipes en el Gobierno Local,"
Revista de Ciencias Juridicas, 20 (1972), 105-115.
San Jost (Costa Rica) La Naci~n.

Daily.

Various Issues.

Novoa, Fidel A. Asi se Construye una Ciudad.
Author, no date.

San Salvador:

By the

346
Obregon Loria, Rafael. El Poder Legislatvia en Costa Rica.
Imprenta Nacional, 1966.
Oficina Internacional de Trabajo.
en Costa Rica. Geneva, 1972.

,/

San Jose:

Situacion y Perspectivas del Empleo

San Salvador (El Salvador) La Prensa Gr~fica.
San Jos~ (Costa Rica) La Prensa Libre.

Daily.

Daily.

Various Issues.

Various Issues.

Ramirez A., Mariano. La Determinaci5n de la Poblaci~n Economicamente
Actica y Su Distribuci6n por Rama de Actividad: El Caso de Costa
Rica. San Jos€, no date.

...-

Ramirez Zamora, Luis Edgardo. "Investigacion de los Servicios Publicos
Brindados por las Municipalidades y Sus Lineas de Accion." Graduating Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Costa Rica. San Jos~, 1972.
Riba, Jorge Ricardo. La Vivienda en Centroamerica. San Salvador:
Secretaiia General de La Organizaci6n de los Estados Centroamericanos,1969.
Rodriguez Monge, Cecelia, and Ferrer de Beck, Elena Teran. "Aspectos
Historicos y Urbanos de Area Metropolitana de San Jose de Costa
Rica." Graduating thesis, Faculty of Sciences and Letter, University of Costa Rica, San Josf, 1967.
Rojas, Otto. "El C6digo Municipal y la Municipa1idad AutO'noma. Subvenciones y la Autonom1a Municipal," Revista de Ciencias Juridicas, 20 (1972), 9-56.
Romero Perez, Jorge-Enrique. "El Primer C6digo Municipal de Costa
Rica," Revista de Estudios de la Vida Local, 1977 (1973) unpaged.
"El Instituto de Fomento y Asesoria Municipal de Costa Rica,"
Revista de Estudios de la Vida Local, 1979 (1973) unpaged.
/

Salas, Jose Maria. Le Reforma Municipal y el VI Congreso Interamericano de Municipios. San Jos~, 1957.
Sancho Gonzales, Eduardo. "Las Funciones Municipales (ArtIculo 4 del
CO'digo Municipal) y la Realidad Municipal Costarricense," Revista de Ciencias Jurldicas, 20 (1972), 63-103.
/'

Santoro, Gustavo. Algunos Aspectos de la Vida Urbana en San Jose.
Serie Ciencias Juiidicas y Sociales No.6. San Jose: Universidad de Costa Rica, 1962.
Sariola, Sakari. An~lisis Socio-Economico de Barrio "Sagrada Familia"
Area Recien Urbanizada de San Jos~ de Costa Rica. Universidad de
Costa Rica Serie Trabajos de Alumnos No. 10. San Jos~: Escue1a

347

Superior de Administrac~n Publica America Central, 1958.
Solorzano Saenz, Mercedes. "El Hecho Generador de La Obligaci~n Tributaria." Graduating thesis, Faculty of Law, Univerisity of Costa
Rica. San Jos~, 1971.
Sposito Jim~nez, Luis Alberto. Curso Basico de Contabilidad Municipal.
Caracas: Fondo Editorial Com6n, 1970.
Stone, Samuel Zemurray. "Algunos Aspectos de la Distribuci6n del Poder
Pol'l.tico en Costa Rica," Revista de Ciencias Jurfdicas, 20 (1972),
105-130.
United Nations Children's Emergency Fund; Secretaiia Permanente del
Tratado General de Integracion Econbmica Centroamericana; and
Organizaci~n de Estados Centroamericanos.
Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales: An~lisis y Surgencias Para la Planificacion
de Sus Desarollos, Tomando en Cuenta la Formact'6n de Sus Nuevas
Generacioncs. Guatemala: Editorial Jose de Pineda Ibarra, 1972.
Informe Final: Conferencia Sobre la Familia, la Infancia y
la Juventud de Centroamerica y Panama. Guatemala: Editorial
Jose de Pineda Ibarra, 1973.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Financiamiento de los Programas de Vivienda y de Mejoramiento de la Comunidad. (E/CN.5/323-ST/SOA!32) New York, 1957.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Aspectos Demograficos
y Socioeconomicos del Area Metropolitana de San Salvador. Prepared by J. van d~Boomen. (E/CN.12/CCE/333/TAO/tAT/54). San
Salvador, 1 January 1966.
United Nations. Office of Technical Cooperation. Evaluacibn del Desarollo del Programa Sobre la Reorganizacion Administrativa y Financiera del Regimen Municipal de Costa Rica. Prepared by Arvids
Kalnins. San JosE(, 1972.
<
United States Agency for International Development and Fundacion Para
1a Vivienda Cooperativa. Mesa Redonda Sobre el Problema de la
Vivienda en las Urbanizaciones Margina1es. Proceedings of meeting
held in Washington, D.C. November 3-7, 1969. Washington, D.C.> 1970.
Universidad de Costa Rica. Algunos Aspectos Sociograficos de Area
Metropolitana de San Jos€. Proyecto Estratificaci6n No.1. San
Jos~: Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Poblacion, 1970.
Varga Oviedo, Jos~ Angel. "AdministraciO'n del Sistema Municipal en
Costa Rica." Graduating thesis, Faculty of Economics and Social
Sciences, University of Costa Rica. San Jos~, 1972.
Vega Calvo, Johnny.

"R~gimen Juridico de 1a Prestaci()n de Servicios

348

Publicos Locales." Graduating thesis, Faculty of Law, Univer./
sity of Costa Rica. San Jose, 1965.

APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
There exists in Central America a large number of government
agencies~

political parties, international organizations and miscella-

neous groups that are universally known by the acronyms for their Spanish names.

Below are the most cornmon, with English equivalents.

Full

Spanish names have been provided above when first encountered in the
text.
Costa Rica
Political Parties
AD
CD
PASO
PLN
PNI
PRD
PRN

PUAC
PUCR
PUN

Democratic Action Party
Christian Democratic Party
Socialist Action Party
National Liberation Party
National Independence Party
Democratic Renovation Party
National Republican Party
Cartagenan Agricultural Union Party
Civic Revolutionary Union Party
National Unification Party

Other Agencies
CIN
DIGAMS
DINADECO
ICE
IFAM
lMAS

INS
INVU
OFIPLAN

Interinstitutional Commission on Nomenclature
General Office for Medical and Social Assistance
General Office for Community Development
Costa Rican Electrical Institute
Institute for Strengthening and Assisting Municipalities
Consolidated Institute for Social Assistance
National Insurance Institute
National Housing and Urbanization Institute
National Planning Office (attached to the Presidency)
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SNAA
TSE
ANFE
AN DE
FECR
ANEP
JUDECA
ITCO

National Sewer and Water Administration
Supreme Election Tribunal
National Association for Economic Development
National Teachers Association
Federation of Costa Rican University Students
National Association of Public Employees
Coffee Growers Federation
Colonization (Rural Resettlement) Institute

El Salvador
Political Parties
FUDI
MNR

PCN
PCD
PPS
PRUD
UDN
UNO

United Democratic Independent Front Party
National Revolutionary Movement Party
National Conciliation Party
Christian Democratic Party
Salvadorean Popular Party
Revolutionary Democratic Unity Party
Democratic Nationalist Union Party
United Opposition Party

Other Agencies
ANDA
CAESS
CCE
CONAPLAN
DUA
FINAMUN
FOCCO
FNV
FUNDASAL
ICR
IVU
MOPT
TEGEFEM
FUSS
FESTIAVSCES
CGS
UNOC
AGEUS
COSDEC
ANDES
ANEP
CAC!
ANTEL
ASI

National Sewer and Water Administration
San Salvador Electric Streetlighting Company
Central Election Commission
National Council for Planning and Economic Coordination
Directorate of Urbanism and Architecture
Municipal Development Bank
Office for Community Development and Self Help
National Housing Finance Administration
Salvadorean Foundation for Development and Minimum
Housing
Institute for Rural Colonization
Institute for Urban Housing
Ministry of Public Works and Transportation
General Treasury for Municipal Funds
United Trade Union Federation
Federation of Food, Clothing and Related Trade
Unions
General Confederation of Trade Unions
National Union of Christian Workers
General Association of University Students
National Coffee Marketing Association
National Teachers Association
National Association of Private Enterprises
El Salvador Chamber of Commerce and Industry
National Telecommunications Administration
Association of Salvadorean Industrialists
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Other
APRA
BCIE
BID
CESPO
CIAT
CICAP
CIET
ESAPAC
ICAP
ODECA
OEA
OIT
ONU
SIECA

Popular American Revolutionary Alliance (forerunner of all Latin American Christian Democratic parties)
Central American Economic Integration Bank
Interamerican Development Bank
Center for Social and Population Studies
Interamerican Center for Tax Administrators
Interamerican Center for the Strengthening of Public Administration
Interamerican Center for Tax Studies
Central American Advanced School for Public Administration
Central American Institute for Public Administration
Organization of Central American States
Organization of American States
International Labor Organization
United Nations
Permanent Secretary of the General Movement for
Central American Economic Integration

APPENDIX B
GINI COEFFICIENTS
The Gini cOefficient (or ratio) is a measure showing how closely
an actual distribution approaches absolute equality or inequality.
sentially, it is a measure of concentration.

Es-

Most often it is used to

describe income distribution but may also be used, as shown above, for
distribution of land and political power.

Gini coefficients are named

for their developer, Corrado Gini, an early twentieth-century Italian
1
statistician and economist.
The Gini coefficient as it is known today is based on the Lorenz
2
The Lorenz curve is a simple graphic device plotting cumulated
curve.
percents of the commodity under discussion against cumulated percents
of persons sharing in the distribution of that commodity.

Figure 16

below provides an example, using income as the subject.
Absolute equality is indicated by the 45-degree st!aight line.
Curve a indicates a slightly unequal distribution and curve b an even
less equal distribution of income.
pIe, that:

It may readily be seen, for exam-

1) in the perfectly equal situation, the bottom 50 percent

of income recipients receive 50 percent of the total income; 2) in the
situation represented by curve a, the bottom 50 percent of recipients
receive 33 percent of the total income; and 3) in the situation represented by curve b, the bottom 50 percent of recipients receive only 11
percent of the total income.
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Figure 16.

Sample Lorenz curves.

The Lorenz curve, then, provides an easily understood and simply
constructed visual picture of a distribution.

It may be used to com-

pare several polities, regions or groups and to compare the same polity, region or group at different times.
By itself, however, the Lorenz curve suffers from three shortcomings:

1) it requires the drawing of a graph; 2) this graph may be-

come unwieldy if a large number of cases are included; and 3) it
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presents only ordinal, not cardinal comparisons, i.e., one can determine that a commodity is more c.Qncentrated in one situation than in
another, but not how much more.
In an effort to alleviate these shortcomings and allow more precision in expressing comparative distributions, Gini developed his coefficient.

It is, simply, the ratio of the area between the Lorenz

curve and the 45-degree line to the total area of the triangle bounded
by the X axis, the Y axis, and the 45-degree line.
The more unequal and concentrated the distribution, the farther
from the 45-degree line will be the Lorenz curve and the greater will
be the Gini coefficient.

At the extremes, absolute equality of dis-

tribution would result in a Gini ratio of zero and absolute concentration in one individual would result in a Gini coeffecient of one.
In our example (Figure 16), the Gini coefficient for the situation represented by Lorenz curve a is obviously less than that for
Lorenz curve b.

Actual coefficient for a in this example is approxi-

imately 0.23 and for b it is about 0.58.
In essence, then, Gini coefficients are simple arithmetic ratios
indicating degree of concentration or dispersion of a particular commodity.

As dimensionless numbers, Gini coefficients allow for uncom-

plicated, systematic cardinal comparisons among a variety of groups,
polities or regions.

Although only one of a number of such meas-

3

sures,
entists.

it is the one most widely used by economists and social sci-
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1. A thorough account may be found in Corrado Gini, "Indici di concentrazione e di dipendenza," Biblioteca dell' Economista, 5a serie,
20 (1922):39-40.
2. M.C. Lorenz, "Methods of Measuring the Concentration of Wealth,"
Publications of the American Statistical Association 9 (1905) :209219.
3. For a more detailed discussion of several of these, see Mary Jean
Bowman, "A Graphical Analysis of Personal Income Distribution in
the United States," American Economic Review 35 (1945) :607-628.

APPENDIX C
ELECTION PROCEDURE IN THE QUOTIENT OR MODIFIED D'HONDT SYSTEM
Both municipal and national elections in Costa Rica are carried
out under the quotient or modified d'Hondt system of proportional representation.
model.

This system is perhaps best illustrated by a simple

Assume a municipality with an electorate of 100,000 voters,

five parties and ten seats at stake.

The quotient for an election is

a numerical reckoning of the number of votes necessary to fill one
position.

In our example there are 100,000 voters and ten seats so

the quotient equals 100,000/10

= 10,000

votes.

The quotient natu-

rally varies with each election for each office and is based on the
number of votes actually cast.

It cannot, therefore, be determined

until after the election has been held and the votes counted.
Let us assume further that the election results in our model municipality show the following:
Party

Number of votes

A

34,921
34,636
5,526
19,923
4,994

B

C
D

E

The first step is to determine how many seats are awarded by full
quotient.

(In this election we determined a full quotient to be

10,000 votes.)

Examination of the results show Parties A and B to

each have three of these quotients and Party D to have one.

Seats
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are assigned and residual votes calculated.

The situation now appears

thus:
Party

Number of seats
by quotient

Residual
votes

A

3
3

4,921
4,636
5,526
9,923
4,994

B

0

C
D
E

1

0

The next step is to determine semi quotients and assign seats accordingly.

As the name indicates, a semiquotient is equal to half a quo-

tient, in this case 5,000 votes.

Semiquotient seats are assigned

first to any party having a semiquotient and not having a quotient
seat.

If there is more than one party in this situation, the party

with the largest number of residual votes gets the first seat, and so
on down the line.

Next, seats are assigned in the same manner to

parties that do have a seat through quotient but have a number of
residual votes greater than the semiquotient.

In our example semi-

quotient seats would go first to Party C and second to Party D.

Note

again that Party C receives its seat first, even though it has fewer
residual votes than Party D.

After the allocation of the semiquotient

seats, the distribution appears thus:
Party

Quotient
seats

Semiquotient
seats

Residual
votes

A

3
3

0

4,921
4,636
526
4,923
4,994

B

°11
°
°
°
At this point, there remains one seat and it goes to Party E which now
C
D
E

1

has the largest number of residual votes.

The complete distribution
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of seats based on election results appears thus:
Party

Votes

A

34,921
34,636
5,526
19,923
4,994

3
3

o
o

0

1
1

100,000

7

B
C

D
E

Total

Quotient
seats

Semiquotient
seats

1
0

o
2

Residual
seats
0
0
0
0

Total
seats
3
3
1

% of
votes

% of
seats

1

2
1

34.9
34.6
5.5
19.9
5.0

10

1

10

100.0

100

30
30

10
20

The actual individuals constituting our model city council are
the first three candidates listed on Party A's slate, the first three
candidates on Party B's slated, the first two on Party D's slate and
the single candidates heading the slates of Parties C and E.
Two major political considerations are immediately apparent from
this example:

the importance to the individual candidate of position

on the party's slate, and the advantages to very small minority parties of this electoral system.

APPENDIX D
SAN SALVADOR ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
Actual delivery of services to the citizenry and related fiscal
operations are carried out by 12 line departments:

Current Accounts,

Treasury, Finance, Registration, Urban Development, Community Action,
Special Projects, Engineering, Sanitation, Livestock, Markets and
Cemeteries.
1.

Briefly, the activities of each department are:
Current Accounts acts exactly as the name implies.

It is

concerned with keeping track of addresses, verifying commercial locations, and noticing which firms have gone out of business.

This De-

partment also physically examines sites, checking for vacant lots with
or without squatters.

In short, it keeps the rota of the ratepayers

current.
2.

The Treasury Department is charged with safekeeping mu-

nicipal funds and paying bills.

It is the city's collection agency.

Salvadorean law requires municipal funds collected to be immediately
deposited in the Central Reserve Bank of EI Salvador.
3.
get.

Finance has primary responsibility for developing the bud-

It also determines the ability-to-pay of potential ratepayers.

General bookkeeping and

inven~r~;r

erty are also carried out here.

of municipal real and moveable propFinance is, in addition, required to

make monthly reports to the council on the state of the municipal
fisc.
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4.
to perform.

Registration has one of the most varied sets of activities
It is required to maintain a register, in books of a size

and form and with wording specified in the Municipal Act, of births,
deaths, marriages, divorces and adoptions.

This information must be

supplied to the Director General of Statistics and Census.

The de-

partment also issues certificates of marriage and singleness (never
married) and is in charge of all photocopying for the municipality.
Perhaps the most important function of Registration in the eyes
of the population is the issuing of the cedula, the identity card
without which the individual Salvadorean (and Costa Rican) is very
much a nonperson, unable to vote, enter business, marry or apply for
a passport.

The Department is, in addition, the licensing agency for

a variety of activities and professions, among them being market
stalls, cattle, loudspeakers, man- and animal-powered push carts,
firearms, printers, bootblacks and vendors of lottery tickets.

Fi-

nally, it serves as well as notary public.
5.

Urban Development might be regarded most accurately as a

control agency.

It issues building permits and determines the physi-

cal state of existing structures, ordering repair or demolition where
appropriate.

It reviews building plans both as to siting and to ma-

terials to be used in construction, and registers these plans.

The

Department represents municipal interests at planning hearings and
the like before various central government agencies.

It also pro-

vides some technical assistance to builders and collects statistics
on construction activities.
Two related matters ought be mentioned here.

One, builders
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need permits from the central government as well as the municipality
before beginning any construction.

Two, the Department of Urban De-

velopment does not engage in land use planning.

It may suggest and

advise but planning is a function of the national government.
6.

The Department of Community Action is charged broadly with

the channeling of various municipal and other services to the urban,
suburban and rural communities of San Salvador.
munity organizations.

It is to foster com-

Regulation and improvement of the municipal

dormitories and juvenile home fall in its purview.
It is also the cultural agency, required to coordinate and plan
cultural activities and administer the theater, municipal gallery, and
traveling theater.

Moreover, in its role as patron of the arts it is

"to create in Salvadoreans artistic and cultural capabilities through
the media of theater, dance, painting, chorus, ceramics, music, etc."
A wide variety of extension-type services are also mandated.
For the farmer, the usual sorts of agricultural extension aid and information are to be supplied.

Housewives are to be taught nutrition,

budgeting, child care and the general range of skills usually labeled
home economics.

Finally, the agency is to serve, in U.S. terms, as a

giant municipal 4-H club for the youth of San Salvador.
7.

Special Projects is a very small department, an offshoot

of Engineering.

Because of its nature, no formal description of its

activities is listed.

At the time of the fieldwork in San Salvador

it appeared to exist only on paper.
8.

Engineering carries out a variety of functions, some of

which would most probably be assigned to a Parks agency in most North
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American municipalities.

Among these are tree planting, maintenance

of public parks, lawns and gardens, and removal of fallen trees and
other similar nuisances.
Other activities include topographic surveys, plan approval for
drainage worksmd subsurface construction in general and the usual
maintenance and repair of streets, bridges, sidewalks and culverts.
9.

Sanitation is charged with garbage collection and dis-

posal, construction of public latrines, and cleaning of streets and
sewers.

It also has a number of responsibilities related to vermin

control including fumigation and vector control and the municipality's
role in the national anti-rabies campaign.
10.

Livestock is required to issue permits to those wishing

to deal in animals or carcasses within the city limits and to license
and inspect livestock handlers.

It is responsible for checking

brands, verifying ownership and keeping records of all transactions.
One unit provides both ante- and post-mortem veterinary services.

San

Salvador also operates, under this Department, a municipal slaughterhouse.
11.

Markets is a large Department but one with a relatively

simple and straightforward mandate.

It assigns (but does not issue

licenses for) stalls and floor space, maintains order, discipline and
decorum in the markets, carries out cleaning and physical

maintenanc~~

and most important, collects the fees from the vendors.
12.

Cemeteries is responsible for carrying out all burials

and exhwnations within the municipality, and for the usual graveyard
maintenance.

The Department keeps track of location and occupance of
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plots, crypts, niches and vaults, and collects the appropriate fees.
In a radical departure from usual North American practice, it is this
agency that issues death certificates.
Again, the above description of the administrative structure of
San Salvador is cursory.

But it does provide a general picture of the

organization, and a take-off point for comparison with the structure
and practices in San

Jos~.

APPENDIX E
SAN JOSE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
The remaining mWlicipal activities are classified into seven
fWlctional categories:

General Administration, MWlicipal Health, Edu-

cation and Culture, Economic and Social Services, Maintenance, New
Construction and Urban Development.

Briefly, the components of each

of these categories follow.
1.

General Administration includes most of the support and

financial services.

Among the latter are budget, accounting, treas-

ury, property assessment and rate collection.

Debt management and

handling of subventions from the central government are also included
here.
stores.

Support services include personnel, purchasing, supplies, and
In addition, janitors, watchmen and guards for mWlicipal fa-

cilities are provided in this activity.
2.

Municipal Health provides a wide range of services.

Sweeping of streets and public squares and care of wells and other
water supplies are included.

Collection of residential and commercial

solid waste and its treatment at a site outside the city

op~rated

jointly by San Jose and neighboring municipalities is another function.

Finally, cemetery maintenance, gravedigging, and the like are

the responsibility of this function.
3.

Education and Culture differs somewhat from other activi-

ties in that its main function is the provision of money rather than
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services.

Some of this money goe:: to local school boards, some in the

form of scholarships to needy a},d worthy students.

Funds are also

provided here to ad hoc groups in charge of celebrations for national
and municipal holidays.

Employees from various agencies are pressed

into service temporarily for these festivities.

The only service qua

service provided here is the oP( :: :.:ion of the Municipal Children's
Library.
4.

Economic and Social Services is more economic than social.

Its chief function is operating the city's four markets and the bus
station attached to one of these.

It is the only operation to 'show

a profit' as it includes the parking meters.
cluded here.

Streetlighting is in-

However, since the actual lighting service is provided

by a private enterprise, compania Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, S.A., activities are limited to contract negotiation and ensuring of compliance.
5.

Maintenance performs three main functions.

First is the

repair of streets and roads and the cleaning of storm sewers.

Second

is general maintenance, but not janitorial service, to municipal
buildings.

Third is keeping in good order the various public parks,

playgrounds, forests, gardens and other open spaces of the municipality.
6.

New Construction deals primarily with roads.

While new

buildings and major repairs and additions are handled here, none were
ongoing or planned at the time of the field work in San Jose.

All

phases of new construction are involved--initial planning and engineering, land assembly, allocation of costs (e.g., for heavy
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equipment used on more than one job) to various projects and the actual physical construction.

The operation of the municipal garage is

also included.
7.

Planning and Control of Urban Development is the formal

title of the last function but it is concerned more with control than
with planning.

Two major activities are carried out:

examination

and approval of plans as to both technical specifications and conformity to the municipal general plan, and on-site inspection of new construction.

APPENDIX F
NOTE ON DATA SOURCES
At various places in the body of the paper, as appropriate, comments are made on the sources of numerical data.

In this Appendix a

general description of data sources, data handling and difficulties
with the data is presented.
In Costa Rica five major data sources were used.

These were the

Central Bank, the Comptroller General, the Office of Census and Statistics, the National Planning Office and the Municipality of San
Jose.

References to specific figures used are

indicat~d

in the text.

The Central Bank provided most of the data on the national economy,
while figures on government revenues and expenditures came from the
Comptroller General.

Population measurements and estimates came from

the Office of Census and Statistics.

Planning Office data applied to

specific activities; these data did not fit into any particular classification.

The Municipality supplied much of the data on its own

financial activities.

Some of these data, however, were available

only from the Comptroller General.
In El Salvador, four major data sources were consulted.

These

were CONAP LAN , the Central Reserve Bank, the Office of Census and
Statistics, and the Municipality of San Salvador.

CONAPLAN provided

broad data on the national economy and on government revenues and expenditures.

More specific data, such as the details of a particular
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bond sale, were obtained from the Central Reserve Bank.

Figures on

population and some on housing were supplied by the Office oi Census
and Statistics.

The Municipality made data on its own activities

available to the best of its limited ability.

In both El Salvador and

Costa Rica, of course, most of the housing data came from the involved
agencies, IVU, INVU and

Ful~DASAL.

Comparative data on the two countries were presented by a number
of organizations, among them the Inter-American Development Bank, U.S.
Agency for International Development, Organization of Central American
State, and various divisions of the United Nations.

The single most

valuable source of comparative data was the oft-cited UNICEF publication Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales.
In virtually all cases, financial data as obtained were expressed in the national currencies of the respective countries.

For

purposes of comparison, these were converted by the writer into Central American pesos.

The Central American peso is an artifical cur-

rency, like the Eurodollar, widely used in international bookkeeping
among members of the Central American Common Market.
pegged at par with the U.S. dollar.
the rate of $1.00 C.A.

This peso is

Conversions were calculated at

= ¢6.62 (Costa Rican) = ¢2.50 (Salvadorean).

Use of the Central American peso eliminated a great deal of confusion
due to the designation of the colon as the national currency unit in
both countries.
CONAPLAN provided economic data in both current and fixed (1962)
colones for San Salvador.

The writer calculated the necessary adjust-

ments to Costa Rican current figures to assign them constant (1962)
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equivalents.
Except as otherwise noted in the text, percentages, percentage
changes, per capita amounts, ratios and similar numerical expressions
were calculated by the writer from the raw data.

Parenthetically, it

should be mentioned that all Spanish-to-English translations and interpretations in the paper are the work of the writer alone.
Data gathering for this paper was a far more arduous and timeconsuming task in Costa Rica than in EI Salvador.

In the latter coun-

try CONAPLAN's quarterly Indicadores Economicos y Sociales provides a
wealth of information on EI Salvador's demography, national accounts,
economic activity, public finance, money and banking, and human resources.

Not only is current data supplied but each issue contains

data for at least the five most recent years.
are thus quite straightforward.

Comparisons over time

In addition, the Central Reserve Bank

publishes a monthly review covering all important public and private
sector financial transaction, changes in the money supply and similar
matters.

All this information is readily available.

Securing such data in Costa Rica, however, involves poring over
the Comptroller's massive annual report for each year and extracting
bits and pieces of sought-after data wherever they may be found.
the exception of one study by

the~ntral

Bank, data for more than one

year are not compiled in any single location.
data, moreover, is simply not published.

With

Much of the needed

Obtaining it, therefore,

means days of searching records in the Comptroller's office and hand
copying whatever is needed.
In fairness, though, it should be noted that in two cases data
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were more readily available in Costa Rica than in EI Salvador.

INVU

provided, generally, a more complete set of data than did IVU; San
Jose Municipality was able to present a far more thorough picture of
its financial situation than was its Salvadorean counterpart.
A number of difficulties arose in obtaining and comparing data.
Several of these have been referred to above as they cropped up in the
text.

Nonetheless it is appropriate to assemble them here.

One of

the major problems was that in neither country is the municipality
the unit for which statistics are gathered.

It was necessary, then,

to use proxies, i.e., the urban area of San Jose Province and Metropolitan San Salvador.

Another problem was that the format in which

data were assembled was not necessarily the format most convenient in
the preparation of this paper.

A related difficulty occurred when

formats changed from year to year as, for example, when categories
were expanded or collapsed into one another.
Occasionally, different sources provided different data on the
same phenomenon.

When this occurred it was necessary to seek some

external verification, some reason for choosing one data set over another.

A particular subgroup of this problem was found when inter-

national agencies gave different figures than the national government
1

for phenomena within its boundaries.
Yet another difficulty arose from Costa Rica holding its national census in 1973

an~

EI Salvador in 1971.

In the one case the

figures werenvre recent but still preliminary; in the other, older
but revised.
Finally, there is the possibility of suppression or modification
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of particular data that reflect adversely on government policy.

The

one specific case where this was suspected was identified in the text.
The ultimate questions arising from all these considerations are,
of course:

How much faith can be placed in the data for the two poli-

ties?; and, How comparable are these data?
enough uncertainties about the data to
tical analysis.

We admit that there are

precluc~

sophisticated statis-

But then, we question the appropriateness of such

analysis to this particular paper, holding with Wassily Leontief that
uncritical enthusiasm for mathematical formulation tends
often to concel the ephemeral substantive content of the argument behind the formidable front of algebraic signs. 2
The usual caveats in using our data have been invoked throughout the
paper.

Special care has been taken when comparing changes between

censuses to point out to the reader the different dates involved.
More information is provided in this fashion than is lost or distorted
through lack of perfect coincidence.

In short, while care and cau-

tion, even suspicion, must be used in assembling, analyzing, and comparing the data, we have to do as much with them as we can because,
after all, they are all the data that exist.
APPENDIX F NOTES
1. For a detailed discussion of this point see Thomas I. Dickson, "The
Contribution of the Inter-American Development Bank to the Latin
American Statistics Muddle," Inter-American Economic Affairs 28
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